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# *The QUARTERLY JOURNAL of SPEECH*

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## I. A. RICHARDS AND THE "NEW RHETORIC"

Marie Hochmuth

"No one, I imagine, migrates from Literature to Education for fun," wrote I. A. Richards in 1955, "but through a feeling as to what will happen if we do not develop improved teaching soon enough."<sup>1</sup> To approach Richards merely as a literary man concerned with literary problems is to lose sight of the sense of urgency that runs through all his writings. As a literary man he found himself dealing with a verbal medium, and he became profoundly concerned with the influence of the medium upon thought in all its forms. Conceiving of the language medium as the "instrument of all distinctively human development,"<sup>2</sup> he became persistent in a search for a sounder theoretical approach to language, a method for comprehending it in its various forms and multifarious uses, and the efficiency of language as an instrument. His twin interests have produced a stream of books that begins in 1922 and continues undiminished.

Miss Hochmuth (Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1945), is Associate Professor of Speech at the University of Illinois and Associate Editor of *QJS*. This article is a companionpiece to her "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" which appeared in *QJS* in 1952.

<sup>1</sup> I. A. Richards, *Speculative Instruments* (Chicago, 1955), p. xi.

<sup>2</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York, 1936), p. 131.

Problems once comprehended under the ancient trivium—logic, grammar, and rhetoric—have reappeared under many titles, *The Foundations of Aesthetics* (with C. K. Ogden and James Wood, 1922), *The Meaning of Meaning* (with C. K. Ogden, 1923), *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924), *Science and Poetry* (1926), *Practical Criticism* (1929), *Mencius on the Mind* (1932), *Basic Rules of Reason* (1933), *Coleridge on the Imagination* (1934), *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936), *Interpretation in Teaching* (1938), *How to Read a Page* (1942), *Speculative Instruments* (1955), and other works dealing with Basic English.

In 1936, Richards opened his *Philosophy of Rhetoric* with the remark: "These lectures are an attempt to revive an old subject. I need spend no time, I think, in describing the present state of Rhetoric. . . . So low has Rhetoric sunk that we would do better just to dismiss it to Limbo than to trouble ourselves with it—unless we can find reason for believing that it can become a study that will minister successfully to important needs."<sup>3</sup>

Even if Richards had never written a book under the caption of *The Phi-*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

*losophy of Rhetoric*, his other works would have considerable relevance for the student of rhetoric. His lifelong concern has been with the working of words in their many functions, and none of his works leaves any doubt that he is aware of a rhetorical function.

My purpose is primarily to examine Richards' attempt to revive an old subject. Although a central concern will be with his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, I shall range freely over all his writings in order to determine his guiding principles. I shall be concerned with his conception of language, his theory of communication in general, his attempt to reorient rhetoric, his critical principles. I shall also be concerned with his place in the great tradition of rhetoric.

#### 1.

In 1923, when Richards' first important book, *The Meaning of Meaning*, was published with C. K. Ogden as collaborator, the authors voiced their conviction of an urgency which existed for a stricter examination of language from a point of view then not receiving attention.<sup>4</sup> Their timing was based upon two considerations: (1) the "readiness amongst psychologists to admit the importance of the problem" of language; and (2) the "realization that men of learning and sincerity are lamentably at the mercy of forms of speech."<sup>5</sup> Thus, in the preface, they suggested a psychological approach to the problems of language and trusted that dividends from such an approach might be seen in the lives of men of the work-a-day world.

As the authors turned to the matter of the fundamental nature of language,

<sup>4</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, New impression (New York, 1953), p. x.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. x, xi.

they concluded that "though often spoken of as a medium of communication," it is "best regarded as an instrument; and all instruments are extensions, or refinements, of our sense-organs."<sup>6</sup> Although language is to be considered a "system of signs,"<sup>7</sup> it is "no mere signalling system"<sup>8</sup> or "code";<sup>9</sup> it is an "organ—the supreme organ of the mind's self-ordering growth."<sup>10</sup> It is an "instrument for controlling our becoming."<sup>11</sup>

What, precisely, a sign is, and how language might be thought to be a member of the family of signs have long been problems to psychologists and students of language. In attempting to definitize the concept of sign, the authors concluded that anything which can be experienced or enjoyed and is understood to refer to something else is to be regarded as a sign.<sup>12</sup> Sign experience comes about as the result of the recurrence of experiences in partial uniformity.<sup>13</sup> Signs function by virtue of previous membership in a context or configuration that once affected us as a whole.<sup>14</sup> Even when part of the context reappears, that part affects us as though the whole context were present. Thus, that part of the context may be said to have sign or referential function. For instance, dark skies, thunder, lightning, and rain may once have constituted for us a configuration or context. Thereafter, if thunder or any of the other constituents of the configuration are noted, they affect us as though the rest of the context were

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

<sup>8</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 131.

<sup>9</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, Note, p. 21; see also, p. 50.

<sup>13</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 13th impression (New York, 1952), p. 90.

<sup>14</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 55.

present, and we take them as a sign of rain necessitating appropriate adaptive responses. A sign is "always a stimulus similar to some part of an original stimulus and sufficient to call up" an engram or residual trace left by the preceding experience.<sup>15</sup>

Words in language share the referential nature and work by the same mechanism as do all signs. However, since those signs that are used for purposes of communication and as instruments of thought occupy a peculiar place in the family of signs, and, according to Richards, in human experience generally, they may, for convenience, be referred to as *symbols*. Words, arrangements of words, images, gestures, drawings, and mimetic sounds are all to be considered instruments of thought and communication. These devices are all used to direct and organize, record and communicate; consequently they are to be referred to as symbols.<sup>16</sup>

In stating what symbols direct and organize, or what they record and communicate, Richards distinguishes between Thoughts and Things. It is Thought, or as Richards says, *reference* which is directed and organized; it is also Thought which is recorded and communicated. Language may trick us into believing that things are recorded and communicated; however, it is really thought about things or reference to things which is symbolized. Although we say that "the gardener mows the lawn when we know that it is the lawn-mower which actually does the cutting, so, though we know that the direct relation of symbols is with thought, we also say that symbols record events and communicate facts."<sup>17</sup>

When language is used to make a

statement, three factors are involved: (1) the symbol; (2) thought or reference; and (3) the object of thought, or referent. Between the thought and a symbol, "causal relations hold." When we speak, we employ symbolism caused partly by reference and partly by social and psychological factors, including the purpose for which we make the reference, an intended effect upon other persons, and our attitude. When we listen, the symbols that we hear cause us to perform acts of reference and to assume attitudes which will be more or less similar to the act and attitude of the speaker.<sup>18</sup>

Richards' famous triangle showing the relations among symbols, reference, and referent has become a useful tool among psychologists. In addition to revealing a causal relation between a symbol and reference, it reveals that between thought and referent there is also a relation, "more or less direct," as when we think about or attend to a painting which we see, or "indirect," as when we think of or refer to Hitler. Between the symbol and the referent, there is no really relevant relation other than an indirect one resulting from its being used by someone to stand for some referent.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, one notes that, according to Richards' analysis of language, "thinking or reference is reducible to causal relations." When one speaks of a reference, he is, in fact, speaking of external and psychological contexts by which a sign is linked to its referent. The mental events that take place in an act of reference to produce the symbol, Richards calls "psychological context." "All thinking, all reference," he maintains, "is adaptation due to psychological contexts which link together elements in

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 9.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

external contexts." The contextual theory of reference covers all "beliefs, ideas, conceptions and 'thinkings of'" which relate the symbol to the referent. It asserts the recurrence of mental events in their main features with partial uniformity.<sup>20</sup>

Let us take the following three sets of symbols to illustrate Richards' analysis of language and the classification of its uses:

1. Winston Churchill is eighty-three years old.
2. The grand old man who occupied 10 Downing Street during the Second World War is eighty-three years old.
3. Four-score and three he counts his years, proud England's mighty son.

The first sentence Richards would identify as a purely referential statement, and, therefore, a *scientific* use of language. The context out of which the symbol grew would include recurrent experiences with the process of explicit naming and counting. The referent is the person bearing the name and having those years.

The second sentence represents a change in symbolization. The references, or psychological context, out of which the symbols were composed might include an affectionate attitude on the part of the composer of the symbol, a remembering of the events of the war, a recollection of others who had occupied the house at 10 Downing Street, in addition to a strict reference to the number of years of life. The referent is still to a person. The symbol, however, has not been produced for merely referential uses. Attitudes, reminiscences, and perhaps other factors have exerted strong influence. This use of language Richards, labels "emotive" or "mixed," hence, "rhetorical."<sup>21</sup>

The third set of symbols represents

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 68, 200, 57.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

still further change in symbolization. The purely referential function of language has almost completely vanished. Who is being talked about is no longer definite. The psychological context out of which this symbolization grew might contain feelings about age and England and some queries about relations, sonship, fatherhood. It might even include feelings about Lincoln at Gettysburg. This use of language represents almost completely the "emotive" function of language and would be regarded as poetry, good or bad.

When Richards and his collaborator published *The Meaning of Meaning*, they claimed among their peculiar contributions the following: "An account of interpretation in causal terms by which the treatment of language as a system of signs becomes capable of results," and second, "A division of the functions of language into two groups, the symbolic and the emotive." The symbolic use of words is "*statement*"; the recording, the support, the organization and the communication of references." The emotive use of words is the "use of words to express or excite feelings and attitudes."<sup>22</sup> There are, in other words, "two totally distinct uses of language."<sup>23</sup>

## 2.

Communication, according to Richards, starts from the "natural isolation and severance of minds." The experience of any two people can be but similar.<sup>24</sup> There can be no such thing as transference of experience or participation in identical experience.<sup>25</sup> By the

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. vii, viii, 149.

<sup>23</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 261; see, T. C. Pollock, "A Critique of I. A. Richards' Theory of Language and Literature," in *A Theory of Meaning Analyzed* (Chicago, 1942), pp. 1-25.

<sup>24</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 177.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

use of symbols one may provoke experience in another. A "language transaction or a communication" may be defined as "a use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur in a hearer which are similar in all relevant respects to those which are symbolized by them in the speaker."<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, communication takes place "when one mind so acts upon its environment that another mind is influenced, and in that other mind an experience occurs which is like the experience in the first mind, and is caused in part by that experience." This is a complicated process and capable of degrees in at least two respects. In the first place, two experiences may be more or less similar, and in the second, one experience may be more or less dependent upon the other. All that occurs is that "under certain conditions, separate minds have closely similar experiences."<sup>27</sup>

Richards recognizes certain favorable conditions for communication. Courage or audacity, freedom from pride and conceit, honesty, humaneness, humility, humor, tolerance, good health—the Confucian characteristics of the "superior man"—all these favor communication.<sup>28</sup>

In the absence of special communicative gifts, there is needed a fund of common experience, long and varied acquaintanceship, close familiarity. Even when one possesses special communicative ability, the success of communication in difficult circumstances depends upon the extent to which one may make use of past similarities in experience. Often in difficult circumstances the speaker must supply and control a large part of the causes of the listener's experiences, and correspond-

ingly, the listener must try to block out intrusive, irrelevant elements from his past experiences.<sup>29</sup>

Richards' division of the functions of language yields two types of communication, that which he calls *scientific* and that which he calls *emotive*. Into the first type of communication go those language transactions concerned with strict attention to the symbolization of references. Outside the sciences this form of communication is rare.

In all discussions one finds that what is said is only in part determined by reference, Richards remarks.<sup>30</sup> Preoccupations with things other than referencing often determine the use of words, and unless one is aware of pre-occupations, purposes, and interests of the moment, one will not really know what another may be talking about.<sup>31</sup> "When we speak, the symbolism . . . is caused partly by the reference we are making and partly by social and psychological factors—the purpose for which we are making the reference, the proposed effect of our symbols on other persons, and our own attitude."<sup>32</sup> Presumably to a much greater extent than we realize, we communicate through "offerings of Choices," not through presentation of fact.<sup>33</sup>

Communication may be classified on the basis of the degree to which emotive elements of language usage enters, ranging from strict referential use to poetic use, where the referential purpose is absent altogether or occupies a clearly subordinate position. Poetry, says Richards, affords the clearest examples of the "subordination of reference to attitude. It is the supreme

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>27</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 126.

<sup>28</sup> 176.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11.

<sup>31</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 139.

<sup>26</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, pp. 205, 206.

<sup>27</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 177,

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

form of *emotive* language."<sup>34</sup> The statements used in poetic discourse are "pseudo-statements." These statements are not justified by their truth or falsity as are the scientific statements; they are justified by their "effect in releasing or organizing our impulses and attitudes."<sup>35</sup> The difference between "emotive beliefs and scientific beliefs" is "not one of degree, but of kind." Thus, there is a truth of "reference" and a truth of "acceptability" of attitude.<sup>36</sup>

In considering the arrangements of words in various kinds of discourse Richards points out that in scientific uses of language not only must the references be correct for success, but the relations of references to one another must be logical. In emotive communications, logical arrangements are not necessary and may actually be an obstacle. Attitudes have their own proper organization, their own emotional interconnection which must be respected.<sup>37</sup>

Since, in the main, Richards is not concerned with specific ends and practices in discourse, his theory of communication presents no theoretical basis for the classification and differentiation of "mixed" uses of language in communication, as, for instance, the sermon, the advertisement, the political speech, the poem. One should note, however, that he has no objection to classifications that serve useful purposes. He does not deny that older classifications of expository communication or persuasive communication, the machinery of epideictic, deliberative, or forensic communications, or lyric and epic poetry have their uses.<sup>38</sup> He simply

denies that such classifications are useful where theoretical considerations of language are uppermost. Language has as many jobs as we find "convenient to distinguish for a purpose,"<sup>39</sup> he observes. Linguistic conveniences, so long as they are not taken to be a description of reality or to "apply directly to the make-up of the mind," are "useful, indispensable for their special purposes."<sup>40</sup>

The student of rhetoric may avoid confusion by remembering that according to Richards, communication which is partly emotive and partly referential, that is, communication which is classed as "mixed," is rhetorical communication. Into the class would go historical writing, most philosophical writing, some poetry, speeches, and discourse of any kind.

### 3.

When Richards turns explicitly to the subject of Rhetoric, he does so with considerable complaint and suspicion, finding one of the general themes of the old Rhetoric especially pertinent to his discussion. "The old Rhetoric was an offspring of dispute," he remarks; "it developed as the rationale of pleadings and persuadings; it was the theory of the battle of words and has always been itself dominated by the combative impulse. Perhaps what it has most to teach us is the narrowing and blinding influence of that preoccupation, that debater's interest."<sup>41</sup>

Thus, in effect, does Richards in Olympian fashion seem to dispose of the theory underlying the practice of a Pericles, a St. Augustine, a Fenélon, a Burke, a Churchill, a Roosevelt. Nor does he stop there. Outside of some

<sup>34</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 273.

<sup>35</sup> *Science and Poetry* (New York, 1926), pp.

<sup>70, 71.</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 278,

<sup>268, 269.</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 268.

<sup>38</sup> *How to Read a Page* (New York, 1942), p. 100.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100; see, also, *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 95.

<sup>41</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 24.

reading in educational theory which leans on psychology, he can find no more disheartening reading than "the dreary pages of those masters of Rhetoric who thought themselves perfectly acquainted with the subject when they had learnt only to name some of its tools."<sup>42</sup> Thus, seemingly, is dismissed any theory of rhetoric from Aristotle to Whately which had concern with "observing in any given case the available means of persuasion,"<sup>43</sup> or "influencing the *Will*."<sup>44</sup> What sorts of persuasions are there? and to what ends may we reasonably employ them? he asks in derision. "This is a question we all hope to dodge."<sup>45</sup> "Persuasion is only one among the aims of discourse. It poaches on the others—especially on that of *exposition*, which is concerned to state a view, not to persuade people to agree or to do anything more than examine it."<sup>46</sup>

Richards roundly condemns most of the theory and the practices of the past. From the time of the *Gorgias* onwards the literature of rhetoric has been "sales-talk selling sales-talk"; for good reason, we should today be more interested in defensives against eloquent persuasion, not in aids to it.<sup>47</sup>

Although he finds the art of controlled interrogation man's best hope, it becomes man's worst bane when it turns, as it so often does, into a "technique of purblind disputation."<sup>48</sup> Logic-chopping at Cambridge had not convinced him that discussion was very profitable. Finding the traditional vogue

of the disputation to be immense, he feels impelled to assert his opposition. "No verbal institution," he remarks, "has done more than disputation to frustrate man, to prevent the referential and emotive functions coming to terms, and to warp the conduct of language—in its highest self-administrating activities most of all." He would take a stand against the "puppy war with words" which has been fought ever since Plato's time. Since immediate specific purpose controls the disputant's interpretations, the disputant is usually too busy making his points to see what the points are.<sup>49</sup> A controversy, says Richards, is "normally an exploitation of a systematic set of misunderstandings for war-like purposes."<sup>50</sup>

According to Richards, the old Rhetoric begins with Aristotle and "may perhaps be said to end with Archbishop Whately." Not chiefly Aristotle, but Whately becomes representative of the old mode of dealing with rhetorical matters, and thus becomes Richards' chief target. Whately, who, according to Richards, begins by urging that "Rhetoric must go deep," ends with merely a "collection of prudential Rules about the best sorts of things to say in various argumentative situations, the order in which to bring out your propositions and proofs and examples, at what point it will be most effective to disparage your opponent, how to recommend oneself to the audience, and like matters." As to all of this, Richards concludes, "no one ever learned about them from a treatise who did not know about them already; at the best, the treatise may be an occasion for realizing that there is skill to be developed in discourse, but it does not and cannot teach the skill." So far as Whately

<sup>42</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching* (New York, 1938), p. 11.

<sup>43</sup> *Rhetorica*, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1924), XI, Bk. I, 2, 1355b.

<sup>44</sup> Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*, reprinted from the 7th ed. (London, 1866), p. 113.

<sup>45</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 159.

<sup>46</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 24.

<sup>47</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 166.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>50</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 39.

treats style, Richards complains, it is no better. No philosophic inquiry into how words work in discourse emerges; there is nothing more than the "usual postcard's worth of crude common sense" about being clear, being vivacious, not being dry, using metaphors, avoiding ambiguity, etc. The ancients, Richards remarks, merely "play with generalizations" about the effects of words. Such generalizations he finds unimportant unless one goes more deeply and, more particularly, "by another route."<sup>51</sup>

Thus, Richards dismisses the old theory of rhetoric considered as the rationale of persuasive discourse and suggests an approach by another route. A "macroscopic" approach yields neither theoretical nor practical value unless it is supplemented by "an intimate or microscopic inquiry which endeavours to look into the structure of the meanings with which discourse is composed, not merely into the effects of various large-scale disposals of these meanings." He admits that there may be much in the old Rhetoric that the new Rhetoric will find useful and advantageous, at least "until man changes his nature, debates and disputes, incites, tricks, bullies and cajoles his fellows less."<sup>52</sup>

Richards appears not to have labored long over the old rhetorical doctrines, particularly the *Inventio* and *Dispositio* phases of ancient doctrine. One does not always find his complaints convincing. To equate *invention* with "finding matters for speech or writing," he remarks, oversimplifies and "narrows interpretation unduly."<sup>53</sup> "It is a very frequent meaning, without doubt," he continues, "but neither the only meaning nor the most active meaning

in Tarquin's cry, 'O what excuse can my invention make?'"<sup>54</sup> He finds that the "senses of devising, fabricating, discovering, and originating were all current in Shakespeare's time."<sup>55</sup> He complains of Dryden's equating of imagination with Invention, as one of the "humdrum senses of imagination."<sup>56</sup> He presumably is unaware of the adaptations to poetic theory of the classical conception of Invention in the Renaissance. According to Marvin Herrick, "The sixteenth-century commentators and critics, by combining . . . [the] Aristotelian imitation with theories found in Plato, Cicero, Horace, and Quintilian, arrived at a concept of imitation that closely corresponded to the traditional invention of logic and rhetoric. In fact, by the middle of the century, *imitatio*, *inventio*, *fictio*, and *fabula* were corollary terms, often used as synonyms."<sup>57</sup> Richards' complaint that the standard classical conception of Invention "narrows interpretation unduly" may well be the case; but such a judgment could appropriately be made only after full awareness of the inclusiveness of the meaning of the ancient canon.

Richards' misinterpretation follows naturally from his conception of the classical rhetoric. "Rhetorical theory," he observes, "in its entire scope is after all no more than a somewhat chaotic collection of observations made on the ways of lively, venturesome speech and writing."<sup>58</sup> Sections in the old rhetorics which dealt with audiences or with "Hearers as Men, in General," Richards

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 7, 8, 9.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 24.

<sup>53</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 157.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157; see, Shakespeare, *The Rape of Lucrece*, Line 225.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>56</sup> Coleridge on the Imagination (New York, 1950), p. 27.

<sup>57</sup> Marvin T. Herrick, "The Place of Rhetoric in Poetic Theory," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXXIV (February 1948), 13.

<sup>58</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 158.

remarks facetiously, "should favour mercy."<sup>59</sup> His cavalier handling of ancient doctrines causes R.S. Crane to reprimand him for dismissing "rival" doctrines and substituting others "prior to any inquiry";<sup>60</sup> and H. M. McLuhan ascribes too quickly, no doubt, the label "true nominalist son of . . . Agricola, and Ramus."<sup>61</sup>

In Richards, what was first proposed as a supplement becomes the entire rationale for his philosophy of rhetoric. The new rhetoric which arises is a rhetoric concerned, not with persuasion as a specific end, but with the meanings of statements in any type of discourse. The new rhetoric, Richards urges, "should be a study of misunderstanding and its remedies." It should concern itself with "How much and in how many ways may good communication differ from bad?"<sup>62</sup>

"Rhetoric I take to be 'the art by which discourse is adapted to its end,'" says Richards, echoing the well-known definition of George Campbell's eighteenth-century *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*.<sup>63</sup> What should be among its topics may be seen from the contents of Campbell's book, he says, "a book which deserves more attention than it is likely ever again to receive."<sup>64</sup> He does not believe that Campbell fulfilled his promise, but had he done so, he would have given us "all we need to know."<sup>65</sup>

As Richards turns to the general task

of a new rhetoric, he is concerned both with the task and with the mode of presentation of principles. One should teach rhetoric, "not by dogmatic formula but by *exercises in comparison*." Such exercises should give an understanding of the different modes of speech, their changing forms, and their disguises. The chief divisions of the field for comparison may be "statement, full and explicit, or condensed (by abstraction, ambiguity or implication, the hint, the aposiopesis); statement literal or direct, and indirect (by metaphor, simile, comparison, parallel etc.); suation, open (from appeal to cajolery) or concealed (either as mere statement or as mere ornament) and so on." The more particular problems of rhetoric he believes to be problems concerning the Figures of Speech, about which present practice is deceiving and out of date.<sup>66</sup>

The art of rhetoric, says Richards, should be a "philosophic discipline aiming at a mastery of the fundamental laws of the use of language, not just a set of dodges that will be found to work sometimes."<sup>67</sup> Philosophy he takes to be a critique of assumptions; hence, a philosophy of rhetoric would have as its concern assumptions about the nature of language.

"To account for understanding and misunderstanding, to study the efficiency of language and its conditions," which he believes to be the role of the new rhetoric, is to face squarely the fact that meanings do not reside in words, but in responders to words, that ambiguity, instead of being a fault of language, is its inevitable condition, that metaphor, instead of being a "happy extra trick," is the constitutive nature of language, thought itself being metaphoric. Richards urges that we re-

<sup>59</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 13; see, George Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 7th edn. (London, 1823), Bk. I, Ch. vii, p. 87.

<sup>60</sup> R. S. Crane, "I. A. Richards on the Art of Interpretation," *Critics and Criticism*, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 44.

<sup>61</sup> H. M. McLuhan, "Poetic vs. Rhetorical Exegesis," *Sewanee Review*, 52 (Winter 1944), pp. 266-276.

<sup>62</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 12; Cf. Campbell, Bk. I, Ch. 1, p. 13.

<sup>64</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 12.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>67</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 7.

nounce the view "that words just have their meanings and that what a discourse does is to be explained as a composition of these meanings—as a wall can be represented as a composition of its bricks." The focus of analysis, he argues, should be shifted in order to attempt a more minute grasp of the structures of the smallest discussable units of meaning, and the ways in which these units vary when they are put with other units.<sup>68</sup>

Richards' contextual theory of meaning, thus, paves the way for his conception of the new rhetoric and suggests its role as being that of separating the referential function of language from the other language functions.<sup>69</sup>

After pondering the question, What is the relationship of rhetoric, grammar, and logic? Richards concludes that these three ways to intelligence cannot be separated without frustration. "By Definition things arise," giving us "things-to-be-thought-of." When things are thought of, those things are determined both by references and by other psychological factors. This intermingling of language functions makes for inconstancy. Richards urges a frank recognition of the fact that how any word is used is a matter of choice and consent and not a matter of regimentation or compulsion. Meanings are to be determined by how words are used in a sentence and not by any discrete senses they are imagined to possess.<sup>70</sup> Logic must be the systematizer. Logic, which has been "preoccupied either with judgments which are psychological, or with 'propositions,' which were treated as objects of thought, distinct from symbols and not psychological," should be concerned with "the system-

atization of symbols."<sup>71</sup> "All thought is sorting."<sup>72</sup> Logic is the "Art or discipline of managing our sortings." It is the "ethics of thinking."<sup>73</sup>

The relationship of grammar to rhetoric and logic is that grammar is pervasive. Since words do not have proper meanings, but meanings only in relation to a context, grammar is the "*study of the co-operation of words with one another in their contexts.*"<sup>74</sup>

Richards' conception of the relation of rhetoric to logic and grammar may be revealed by his formulary statement: "The Optative view of Definition (which is the central problem of Logic) makes the creation of the things-to-be-thought-of, that is, the demarcation of Sense from the other language functions (which is the central problem of Rhetoric) a matter of our choice—subject, however, always to the exigencies of communication, that is the provision of sufficiently stable inter-verbal action (which is the central problem of Grammar)."<sup>75</sup>

This, then, is the new Rhetoric. It is concerned with the differentiation of referential and emotive language functions in order to produce understanding or to explain misunderstanding in any type of discourse. It assumes that if one understands the language functions, appropriate uses of language may be chosen for whatever end one may want to advance, be it to state a view clearly, to establish a right relationship with an audience, a right relationship with a subject, win an election, or record one's feelings about things in poetry. It is a study of language behavior and reveals how discourse in being adapted to its end reflects the referential and emotive

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10, 90, 93.

<sup>69</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 395.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 393, 395.

<sup>71</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 87.

<sup>72</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 359.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 395.

language functions, the many manoeuvrings of which language guided by purpose is capable. It is concerned with the smallest structural units of discourse and not with the large-scale ordonnance of arguments.

## 4.

The theoretical position of Richards with reference to rhetoric and communication has been strongly felt in the field of criticism. With care and precision equal to that manifested in his articulation of a theory of communication and meaning, Richards has articulated a critical theory that has given him significance in modern times.

John Crowe Ransom, long-time editor of the *Kenyon Review*, has remarked that "Discussion of the new criticism must start with Mr. Richards. The new criticism very nearly began with him."<sup>76</sup> With this statement few would disagree. Whereas one may find difficulty in defining the precise nature of the New Criticism, he would find the direction of the critical movement clear enough. Criticism simply shifted from a poet-poem or speaker-speech relationship to a poem-audience or speech-audience relationship. Finding metaphysical concern with such questions as What is poetry? or What is a poet? unfruitful, Richards turned to explore what the reader or listener gets from discourse. Poetry became for him an instrument by which experience of some kind is communicated to a reader or listener. To a generation accustomed to contemplating the beauties of poetry as aesthetic object, he asserted in somewhat lowly fashion, "But poetry itself is a mode of communication."<sup>77</sup> "What it communicates and how it does so

and the worth of what is communicated form the subject-matter of criticism. It follows that criticism . . . is very largely, though not wholly, an exercise in navigation."<sup>78</sup> Thus was paved the introduction of a psychological approach to criticism to oppose metaphysical approaches.

We are not concerned with the influence of Richards on the new critical movement, although with Cleanth Brooks we may agree that he may be regarded as the critic "through whose mediation psychology was to make its greatest impact upon literary criticism."<sup>79</sup> We are concerned with the relevance of Richards to the student of rhetoric, for whatever else rhetoric may be, its concern is with communication. Since Richards does not view literature as a private haven for aesthetes, his remarks may be generalized. In truth, he generalizes them himself. "The world of poetry," he remarks, "has in no sense any different reality from the rest of the world and it has no special laws and no other-worldly peculiarities. It is made up of experiences of exactly the same kinds as those that come to us in other ways."<sup>80</sup>

The chief weakness of our best criticism today, Richards remarks, "is the pretense that fundamental matters can be profitably discussed without prolonged and technical thinking." Accordingly, "Most evaluative criticism is not statement or even attempted statement. It is either suasion, which is politics, or it is social communion."<sup>81</sup> Critics and even theorists in criticism currently assume, he remarks, "that their first duty

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>77</sup> William K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Cleanth Brooks, *Literary Criticism* (New York, 1957), p. 613; see also, Stanley Hyman, "I. A. Richards and the Criticism of Interpretation," *The Armed Vision* (New York, 1948), p. 308.

<sup>78</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 78.

<sup>79</sup> *Coleridge on the Imagination*, pp. 5, xiii.

<sup>76</sup> John Crowe Ransom, *The New Criticism* (Norfolk, Connecticut, 1941), p. 3.

<sup>77</sup> *Practical Criticism*, New Impression (New York, 1954), p. 11.

is to be moving, to excite in the mind emotions appropriate to their august subject-matter."<sup>82</sup> Nor will case-history studies of utterances as socio-economic-political products solve current critical problems. Although we should encourage them, since they "feed the scholars who make them," these critical studies, which may tell us "*why something was said*," do not in their present form tell "*what it was*" that was said.<sup>83</sup> Critics, he believes, have hardly begun to ask the question what they are doing and under what conditions they are working.<sup>84</sup>

As Richards understands it, criticism is "the endeavour to discriminate between experiences and to evaluate them." This cannot be done, he believes, without an understanding of the nature of experience, or without theories of value and communication. The principles which apply to criticism must be taken from more fundamental studies. So far as he can see, "critical remarks are merely a branch of psychological remarks."<sup>85</sup>

On the foundation of his theory of language and communication Richards raises his critical structure. Criticism is the "science of . . . meanings and the meanings which larger groups of words may carry." It is not a mere account of what men have written or how they have written, with answers to such questions being determined by borrowed standards, often applied without reference to the nature of the mind or to our growing outlook on the world.<sup>86</sup>

To Richards the critic must have three qualifications. He must be first "an adept at experiencing, without eccentricities, the state of mind rele-

vant to the work of art he is judging. Secondly, he must be able to distinguish experiences from one another as regards their less superficial features. Thirdly, he must be a sound judge of values."<sup>87</sup>

Criticism has only one goal. All critical endeavor, all interpretation, appreciation, exhortation, praise, or abuse has as its goal "improvement in communication." Although he is aware that such a conception may appear to be an exaggeration, nevertheless he asserts that in practice this is true. Critical rules and principles are but means to the end of attaining more precise and more discriminating communication. There is, he admits, "a valuation side of criticism," but he asserts that "When we have solved, completely, the communication problem, when we have got, perfectly, the experience, *the mental condition relevant*," the problem of worth "nearly always settles itself; or rather, our own inmost nature and the nature of the world in which we live decide it for us." Value, he believes, cannot be demonstrated except through the communication of what is valuable.<sup>88</sup>

As Richards begins his critical theory he announces that there are two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest. These are an account of value and an account of communication.<sup>89</sup> The judgment "that a passage is good is an act of living. The examination and description of its merits is an act of theory."<sup>90</sup> A full critical statement, accordingly, consists of two parts. The part which describes the value of the experience Richards refers to as the *critical* part. The part dealing with a description of the object arousing the

<sup>82</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 3.

<sup>83</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 82.

<sup>84</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 227.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 23.

<sup>86</sup> *Coleridge on the Imagination*, pp. 231, 232.

<sup>87</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 114.

<sup>88</sup> *Practical Criticism*, pp. 11, 12.

<sup>89</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 25.

<sup>90</sup> *Coleridge on the Imagination*, p. 140.

experience he refers to as the *technical* part.<sup>91</sup>

His critical system presents the theory underlying the judgment of both sides of the coin. His first concern is with the question, What kind of experiences are good? "What is good or valuable," he remarks, "is the exercise of impulses and the satisfaction of their appetencies." An impulse, he defines as the "process in the course of which a mental event may occur, a process . . . beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act." An appetency is a "seeking after." He admits that the word *desire* might serve as well as appetency, were it not for the fact that one cannot easily avoid the implication of accompanying conscious beliefs with reference to what is sought and a further restriction to felt and recognized longings. For him, the term *want* has similar disadvantages. "Appetencies may be, and for the most part are, unconscious, and to leave out those which we cannot discover by introspection would involve extensive errors." For the same reason it is wiser not to start from *feeling*. He extends his conception of what is good or valuable by concluding, "Anything is valuable which will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or *more important* appetency; in other words, the only reason which can be given for not satisfying a desire is that more important desires will thereby be thwarted." The most valuable states of mind are those "which involve the widest and most comprehensive co-ordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation, and restriction." The most valuable effects of communicative activity are those to be described in terms of *attitudes*, "the resolution, inter-inanimation, and balancing of im-

pulses." In a well-developed person imaginal action and incipient action, that is, action which does not go so far as actual movement, is more important than overt action.<sup>92</sup>

As Richards turns to the matter of communication, he remarks that the important fact for the study of literature or any mode of communication is that several kinds of meaning are to be differentiated. Either in speaking and writing or in reading and listening, the "Total Meaning we are engaged with is, almost always, a blend, a combination of several contributory meanings of different types." A critic, therefore, concerned with the matter of discrimination, must first discern what meanings are being communicated, and thereafter, how successfully these are being communicated.<sup>93</sup>

Most human utterance and nearly all articulate speech, he believes, can be profitably regarded from four points of view. The four aspects which are distinguishable he calls *Sense*, *Feeling*, *Tone*, and *Intention*. "We speak to say something," he remarks, "and when we listen we expect something to be said. We use words to direct our hearers' attention upon some state of affairs, to present to them some items for consideration and to excite in them some thoughts about these items." This is what Richards means by *Sense*, and, as may be readily recognized, it pertains to the matter of making references. Secondly, we have some "feelings about these items." We have attitudes, biases, and interests with respect to these items, and we use language to reflect these attitudes, interests, and feelings. Thus, *Feeling*, or attitude towards referents, becomes another dimension of meaning. Thirdly, the speaker ordinarily has

<sup>91</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 86, 47, 48, 59, 113, 111.  
<sup>93</sup> *Practical Criticism*, p. 180.

*"an attitude to his listener."* His word choice and arrangement is largely governed by audience variation in automatic or deliberate "recognition of his relation to them." This is the *Tone* dimension of meaning, in terms of which Richards believes many of the secrets of style could be shown to reside. Finally, speakers have intentions or aims, conscious or unconscious; they desire to secure effects. Purpose modifies one's speech. An understanding of this dimension of meaning, purpose or intention, is "part of the whole business of apprehending . . . meaning." According to Richards, unless we know what a speaker is trying to do, we are unable to estimate the measure of success. Sometimes, Richards notes, a speaker will "purpose no more than to state his thoughts (1), or to express his feelings about what he is thinking of, e. g. Hurrah! Damn! (2), or to express his attitude to his listener (3)." "Frequently his intention operates through and satisfies itself in a combination of the other functions. Yet it has effects not reducible to their effects. It may govern the stress laid upon points in an argument for example, shape the arrangement, and even call attention to itself in such phrases as 'for contrast's sake' or 'lest it be supposed.'" Nevertheless, it "controls the 'plot' in the largest sense of the word, and is at work whenever the author [or speaker] is 'hiding his hand.'"<sup>94</sup>

The difference between better or worse utterances, says Richards, is in "design." Poor speech and poor writing is poor "either because it is not attempting anything worth trying or because it is inefficient."<sup>95</sup> Critics often demonstrate unmistakable confusion between

value and communicative efficacy.<sup>96</sup> A complete critical statement would be a statement about the value of experience and also a statement about communicative efficacy through which the experience is revealed. Thus, Richards' critical theory and practice represent an attempt to be microscopic in approach, just as does his rhetorical theory and practice.

#### CONCLUSION

"We struggle all our days with misunderstandings," remarks Richards as he contemplates the process of reviving an old subject, and "no apology is required for any study which can prevent or remove them."<sup>97</sup> That rhetoric as a term has been equivocal throughout its lifetime can scarcely be gainsaid. It has been a term of abuse as well as a virtue word, a term referring to the whole rationale of persuasive discourse, and a term referring to means. Has Richards clarified or confused the concept?

When *The Meaning of Meaning* emerged from the press in 1923, Richards and his collaborator announced a new "science of symbolism." By making the "beginning of a division between what cannot be intelligibly talked of and what can" the authors believed the new science to be in a position to "provide a new basis for Physics,"<sup>98</sup> to solve the most important problems of the theory of knowledge, to dispose of the problem of Truth, and to provide a definitive basis for scientific aesthetics.<sup>99</sup> These were considerably pretentious claims which, of course, have not completely yielded the harvest expected.

<sup>94</sup> *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 255.

<sup>95</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 3.

<sup>96</sup> *The Meaning of Meaning*, pp. vii, 85.

<sup>97</sup> See Max Black, "Some Objections to Ogden and Richards' Theory of Interpretation," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXXIX (May 21, 1942), 281.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 181, 182, 207, 182, 183.

<sup>95</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 122.

That the few topics discussed in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* are to be regarded as solving the problem of understanding and misunderstanding is doubtful. One feels considerable sympathy with the remark of F. R. Leavis, "had the ambition been less the profit might very well have been greater." The "largeness of promise and an impressiveness of operation [are] quite disproportionate to anything that emerges."<sup>100</sup>

As has sometimes been remarked, the importance of Richards' work on communication has been obscured for many people by their annoyance at a too frequent outcropping of the "amateur spirit." A romantic inflation about the significance of the topic, dark hints about the extent of our ignorance, the cataclysm that awaits us unless we accept his new theories, the ready dismissal of all who have gone before him—all these intrude upon the reader to make him suspicious of the performance. "No matter what a man's standing, and no matter how impressive the substance of his views, you can still regard him from an unassailable vantage-ground if only you happen to observe that he isn't capable of understanding what is said to him."<sup>101</sup>

Nevertheless, that Richards is a thoughtful man no one can doubt. Nor can one doubt that he has been a profound student of communication and rhetoric. R. S. Crane has posed a problem which may be seriously regarded by all students of rhetoric: "For what is the force of an appeal to the nature of things against rival doctrines of language or discourse when that nature itself has been determined by a decision,

prior to any inquiry, to identify reality only with what can be signified in a particular fixed relationship among three equivocal words. And what is there to compel an abandonment of the distinctions of traditional grammar or logic in an argument which derives all its negative cogency from a metaphor so admirably adapted to the end of destroying such distinctions as that upon which Richards' system is based?"<sup>102</sup>

It would be easy to answer Crane's question with a resounding protest to the effect that there is nothing to compel an abandonment of traditional distinctions. The answer, I think, would not really be a response to Richards' theory. B. F. Skinner has reminded us that classical rhetoric might have been the forerunner of a science of verbal behavior. It began as an objective discipline, closer, perhaps, to a science than either the logic or grammar of the same period. Hundreds of technical terms were developed to describe linguistic features. As rhetoric came to be used for purposes of ornamentation and persuasion, it died as a pure science. "What is wanted is *an account of the events which occur when a man speaks or responds to speech.*"<sup>103</sup>

No one doubts that there is a rhetoric of practice and persuasion. Richards does not doubt this either. Indeed, without much casuistry, one could argue that Richards does not believe language communications are anything other than instances of persuasion, for he remarks that he "regards all discourse—outside the technicalities of science—as over-determined," that is, as having "multiplicity of meaning" due to the co-presence of referential and

<sup>100</sup> F. R. Leavis (Review of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*), *Scrutiny*, VI (September 1937), 212.

<sup>101</sup> D. W. Harding, "I. A. Richards," *Scrutiny*, I (March 1933), 336.

<sup>102</sup> R. S. Crane, p. 44.

<sup>103</sup> B. F. Skinner, *Verbal Behavior* (William James Lectures) (Harvard University, 1948), pp. 4, 5.

other functions of language.<sup>104</sup> Contemporary literary men have found Richards' theory distasteful on this point, that is, that he is willing to place his emphasis in poetry on external relations with an audience rather than on integrated structure to be contemplated for pleasure.<sup>105</sup>

Richards leans heavily upon George Campbell's conception of rhetoric, as the "adaptation of discourse to its ends," and Campbell has long been considered an eighteenth-century interpreter of the classical tradition in rhetoric. Furthermore, Richards has noted the disregard by contemporary scholars of their classical forbears. When, says he, "not long ago some of the very same concerns revived which had originally prompted the *Topica* and the *Rhetoric*, not many of those who set out, behind 'anti-metaphysical' or 'non-Aristotelian' banners, to teach us all how we should talk, evinced much curiosity about the ancient highways leading into their well-advertised new territory."<sup>106</sup>

One cannot easily make an anti-classicist out of Richards. One can far more easily make his work a vast subdivision of the classical tradition. When he opens his *Interpretation in Teaching*, he remarks: "Rhetoric, Grammar, and Logic—the first three liberal Arts,

the three ways to intelligence and a command of the mind that met in the Trivium, meet here again." Neither "the general problem nor the plan of attack can be new."<sup>107</sup> "How to make minds clear as well as keep them clear," he says, "is . . . for us, as it was for Socrates, the key question."<sup>108</sup>

Allying the wisdom of the past with insights from all times, Richards has presented a "microscopic" supplement to ancient patterns, a gigantic supplement. His desire was to make language theory yield to experimental procedure, to refine and make precise that which has sometimes been cloudy or mystical. Significant scientists of language, including Charles Morris, have paid tribute to his "pioneer" work in the field of semeiotic, and a large segment of rhetorical scientists at work today testify to the helpfulness of the pioneering.<sup>109</sup>

Rhetoric and poetic severely separated in the nineteenth century meet again in the twentieth century through Richards in the ancient trivium, Rhetoric, Grammar, and Logic. This writer suspects that the future is in the direction of Richards. As understanding increases, a mere falling back upon tradition will not work. Sheer ecstasy and cults of the obscure will give way to ordered procedures and uses of the best tools for analysis that are available, whatever the field from which they come.

<sup>104</sup> *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 39.

<sup>105</sup> See, H. M. McLuhan, "Poetic vs. Rhetorical Exegesis," *op. cit.*, pp. 266-276; also, Charles I. Glicksberg, "I. A. Richards and the Science of Criticism," *Sewanee Review*, XLVI (Oct.-Dec. 1938), 520-533; also, John Crowe Ransom, "A Psychologist Looks at Poetry," in *The World's Body* (New York, 1938), pp. 143-165; also, Christopher Isherwood, *Lions and Shadows* (London, 1933), pp. 121, 122.

<sup>106</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, pp. 164, 165.

<sup>107</sup> *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 3.

<sup>108</sup> *Speculative Instruments*, p. 71.

<sup>109</sup> Charles Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (New York, 1946), pp. vii, 265.

# LORD THOMAS ERSKINE: MODERN ADVOCATE

Carroll C. Arnold

ON January 10, 1750,<sup>1</sup> Thomas Erskine was born in Edinburgh, the youngest son of Henry David, tenth Earl of Buchan. He was fortunate in family, health, and natural intelligence, but unfortunate in being the third son of a "good family" whose patrimony had been wasted by previous generations. His parents had only meager funds for the education of their eldest and second sons and little but affection and guidance for the youngest.<sup>2</sup> Still, the accepted chronicle of Erskine's first fifty-six years is remarkably filled with fortunate coincidences and examples of determination and talent demanding and earning their proper rewards.

Erskine displayed apt scholarship and high spirits as a grammar school student, first in Edinburgh and then in St. Andrews. At the age of thirteen, he briefly attended lectures on science and mathematics at the University of St. Andrews, but could not afford to matriculate. For the same too-familiar reason he was unable to purchase the army commission he coveted; and so, assisted or perhaps pressed by friends and

family, he enlisted as a sailor on the man-of-war, the *Tartar*, in the spring of 1764.

Thus entered upon service in His Majesty's forces, Erskine was probably expected to move through the ranks, carving for himself the standard naval career of an impecunious scion of good family. But fortune had better things in store. At eighteen, with a small inheritance from his father, he managed to purchase an ensign's commission in the First Royal Regiment of Foot. At twenty, and still without clear prospects, he foreclosed a common path to personal advancement by marrying for love a girl as poor as he. When his regiment was moved to Minorca for a period of two years, Erskine used his leisure to develop an extensive knowledge of English literary classics. Back in England, at twenty-three and with the rank of lieutenant, he is said to have visited, almost casually, a courtroom presided over by Lord Mansfield. On this day, so the story goes, he was invited to sit beside the distinguished jurist on the bench and later to dine with him, in consequence of which Erskine fixed his hopes upon a career at the bar. Whatever the genesis of Erskine's interest in the law, Lord Mansfield does appear to have encouraged it, and, receiving approval but virtually no aid from his family, Erskine enrolled as a student at Lincoln's Inn in April 1775. His chief source of support for himself, his wife, and his children was money realized from the sale of his lieutenancy.

Mr. Arnold (Ph.D., Iowa, 1942) is Chairman of the Department of Speech and Drama at Cornell University and is an associate editor of *QJS*. Readers will recall his distinguished essay on George William Curtis in Volume III of *The History and Criticism of American Public Address* (1955).

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Lovat-Fraser in his *Erskine* (Cambridge, 1932) gives the date as January 10, 1749, Old Style, citing the Erskine family Bible as his source (p. 1). Almost all other sources give the birth year as 1750, though a few change the day to January 21 to accommodate it to the calendar change of 1752.

<sup>2</sup> The very brief biographical sketch here follows Lord James Campbell, *Lives of the Lord Chancellors* (New York, 1874-1881), VIII; Lloyd Paul Stryker, *For the Defense* (New York, 1947); and Lovat-Fraser, *Erskine*.

A university degree reduced from five to three years the required period of

enrollment at an Inn of Court; therefore, since university and law terms could be kept concurrently and since Erskine was entitled by rank to a degree without examination, he also matriculated at Trinity College, Cambridge. During the same period he regularly attended and engaged in debates and harangues at Coachmakers' Hall<sup>3</sup> and elsewhere in London. By thus telescoping his formal education, by living in what was at best embarrassing poverty, and by studying law, literature, and public life assiduously, Thomas Erskine secured an honorary A.M. from Cambridge in June 1778 and was called to the bar the following July. He was twenty-eight. He had been midshipman, army officer, university student, law student, and now he was a barrister without a brief.

Good fortune and evident intelligence brought Erskine from his ordinary station to the prospect of a great career in a single, giant stride. An invitation to dinner gave him the occasion to defend in conversation one Captain Baillie, formerly Lieutenant Governor of Greenwich Hospital but now under suit for libel against those responsible for the institution's support and administration. Captain Baillie, or it may have been the Captain's brother, was also at the dinner, heard Erskine's talk, and next day the young lawyer received his first fee and an invitation to serve as a junior counsellor in Baillie's trial. Erskine did

<sup>3</sup> This hall, on Noble Street, was evidently used as a meeting place by a variety of groups. Just when Erskine participated in debates and harangues here, and on what subjects, I have not discovered. The Protestant Association, formed in 1779, met here and in this hall resolved on May 29, 1780 to accompany its President, Lord George Gordon, to the House of Commons to present the "Protestant Petition." The riots leading to Lord George's indictment for treason and Erskine's defense of him followed. See Walter Thornbury, *Old and New London: A Narrative of Its History, Its People, and Its Places* (London, 1873), I, 363.

the unexpected. He exercised his counsellor's privilege during the trial, despite his junior status, and delivered to Lord Mansfield and the other judges what Lord Campbell called, "all the circumstances considered, . . . the most wonderful forensic effort of which we have any account in our annals."<sup>4</sup> Baillie was acquitted, and Erskine's argument was credited with contributing greatly to the outcome. Thus the course of his career was settled; he would rise from success to success in pleading until, having once served as Lord Chancellor, he could no longer practice in the courts. Only then would his star slowly begin to set.

It is with the quality of Erskine's forensic pleas that this essay has to do. His courtroom arguments have been universally praised; but in this century, at least, we are in some danger of submerging his claim to greatness as a forensic *artist* beneath our enthusiasm for the political ideals into which his art breathed new life and vigor in an important but limited series of trials.

There is unquestionable nobility and significance in Erskine's iterated propositions that subversive *intent* must be shown before convictions for treason or libel can be just, and that *juries* must be allowed to judge *both* fact and intent where libel is charged. But others, before and after, spoke on these and equally noble themes without comparably influencing the course of law and without adding to our permanent literature. We shall err, therefore, if we suppose that Erskine's claim to continued attention springs primarily from the political position he took in a few momentous state trials. He was not, after all, a one-man Civil Liberties Union; neither was he a Clarence Darrow irrevocably committed to the cause

<sup>4</sup> *Lives of the Lord Chancellors*, VIII, 29.

of the underdog, though Stryker's biography and the foci of other recent studies might seem to imply that he was.<sup>5</sup>

Whether Erskine defended John Stockdale's publication of a pamphlet critical of the Government or prosecuted Thomas Williams for publishing Paine's *Age of Reason*, whether he prosecuted Benjamin Boddington for eloping with his cousin's wife or defended Richard Bingham who had eloped with the wife of Bernard Howard, Erskine's rhetorical artistry gave to each client his fullest, rightful claim to judicial attention and sympathy. It was by art more than by choice of briefs that he served the cause of justice, for in a wide variety of causes he gave full effect to the honorable tradition that if liberty and justice are to be wedded in the courts, each litigant must have the most persuasive representation the limits of fact and law allow. There is, I think, no other English-speaking pleader who, in the service of this tradition, achieved more completely the degree of creative excellence to which Cicero has Crassus allude in his question: "What is so admirable as, that, out of an infinite multitude of men, there should arise a single individual,

who can alone, or with only a few others, exert effectually that power that nature has granted to all?"<sup>6</sup>

If we take Erskine's published forensic addresses as a whole, the leading and distinctive quality of his discourse is the congruity of the rhetorical forces he loosed in each persuasive effort. The most striking elements in this consonance of matter and manner seem to me to be three: his ability, within a single speech, to direct effective persuasion toward the predispositions of judges and jurors even when these two classes of auditors were differently inclined; the entire harmony of language, thought, and purpose which marks all his pleas; and, above all else, his ability to discover and make inescapable the *public* significance of each case for which he accepted a brief. These, I believe, are the features of pleading which set Erskine apart from the advocates who were his contemporaries and raise his addresses above those of the advocates who have followed. They are features the more striking because they appear in the speeches of one who spoke at a time when much English oratory was cluttered with vestiges of a rhetoric shorn of *inventio* and *dispositio* and burdened on the one hand by digression and ornament and on the other by dull detail.

Henry Roscoe asserted that the care and nicety with which Erskine joined fact, reason, and feeling to central principles of justice was "the most remarkable" of all the qualities that contributed to the success of his addresses. Roscoe continued:

In every case he proposed a great leading principle to which all his efforts were referable and subsidiary, which ran through the whole of his address, arranging, governing, and elucidating every portion. As the principle thus pro-

<sup>5</sup> Lovat-Fraser's view is expressed thus: "If he had been a great advocate only, he would soon have been forgotten. He is remembered because he was also a resolute champion of liberty, a valiant defender of freedom, and a noble and far-seeing patriot" (p. xi). Most academic investigations have also focused on the treason and libel pleas. See William E. Young, "The Rhetorical Methods of Thomas Erskine," unpublished M.A. thesis (State University of Iowa, 1928); Lloyd Watkins, "Argumentation of Thomas Erskine in the Trial of Thomas Hardy," unpublished M.A. thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1951); and Merrill T. Baker, "Rhetorical Analysis of Thomas Erskine's Courtroom Defenses in Cases Involving Seditious Libel," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (State University of Iowa, 1952). Lawrence R. Rumley's "The Pleas of Thomas Erskine in Selected Trials for Criminal Conversation, 1789-1805," unpublished M.A. thesis (Cornell University, 1951), is the only exploration of Erskine's nonpolitical pleading I know of.

<sup>6</sup> *De Oratore*, trans. J. S. Watson (London, 1881), I. viii.

posed was founded in truth and justice, whatever might be its application to the particular case, it necessarily gave the whole of his speech an air of honesty and sincerity which a jury could with difficulty resist.<sup>7</sup>

Such centricity in composition has merit in almost any oral discourse but it contributes special force and effect to forensic argument, where facts of human actions and their relations to accepted systems of rules and policies are the bases of judgment. Harry Caplan has used the phrase, "the complete economy of the entire speech," to suggest this degree of centricity required in effective pleading.<sup>8</sup> This is precisely the degree of unity and systematic emphasis Erskine achieved. He created in each address a "complete economy" of thought and feeling in which a principle of truth or of justice became the additive force and the decision called for became a necessary intermediate step in accepting the still more attractive central proposition.

The broad principles to which the rhetorical resources of Erskine's pleas had unbroken relationship were not usually rules of law. They were propositions about justice or the way to justice, about truth or the way to truth. They focused attention on the ends and methods of social organization. If they were also administrative rules or guides to legal interpretation, this was incidental. Characteristically, they suggested strongly but indirectly that judge and juror ought to *make* law, ought to refashion social patterns by *creating* precedents.

There were at least two strong reasons for the favor with which these subtly developed invitations to form or con-

<sup>7</sup> *Lives of Eminent British Lawyers* (London, 1830), p. 381.

<sup>8</sup> *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, trans. Harry Caplan (London, 1954), lxi.26. Caplan translates his author thus: "Once the Point to Adjudicate is found, the complete economy of the entire speech ought to be directed to it."

serve social practices were received: 1) the "Point to Adjudicate," being relatively non-technical and therefore readily comprehensible, was inescapable, for it was central to everything in the entire plea; 2) jurors almost always, and judges very often, actively desire to influence the future, even though they know, intellectually, that they are expected to render decisions according to law and precedent alone. To put the matter another way, Erskine tempted his courtroom "deciders" to become policy makers too, a temptation few men even desire to resist.

Almost all of Erskine's defenses and prosecutions exemplify what has been said of the nature and function of pivotal propositions in his forensic addresses, but the defenses of Bingham<sup>9</sup> and Hadfield<sup>10</sup> furnish convenient il-

<sup>9</sup> *Howard v Bingham*, Court of King's Bench, February 24, 1794; Lord Kenyon presiding. I have not seen the transcript of this famous trial, if one exists. Reports from *The Times*, February 25, 1794, and other sources such as C. A. Goodrich, *Select British Eloquence* (New York, 1880), pp. 708-713, are the bases for the following summary of facts.

Bernard Howard sought damages against Richard Bingham, charging criminal conversation with his wife, Elizabeth Howard. After four years of marriage to Howard and one child by him, Mrs. Howard eloped with Bingham. At the time of the trial Mrs. Howard was living with Bingham and was pregnant, admittedly by Bingham. The significant complication in the affair was that Mrs. Howard had been engaged to marry Bingham until her parents broke the engagement, determining she must make a better connection by marrying Howard, heir to the Duke of Norfolk. Under the law, Howard was clearly entitled to damages if Bingham had deprived him of "the society and comfort" of his wife. Erskine accepted Bingham's brief as an act of personal friendship.

Though Roscoe (p. 386) says there are "three or four instances" of Erskine's appearing for the defense in such cases, this is the only such plea appearing in any of the standard collections of his speeches or referred to by name in any of the standard biographical sources.

<sup>10</sup> *Rex v Hadfield*, Court of King's Bench, June 26, 1800; Lord Kenyon presiding. The record of the trial appears in *State Trials*, comp. T. B. and Thomas J. Howell (38-40 Geo. III) (London, 1820), XXVII, 1281-1356.

As to the facts, the case was simple, but

lustrations unencumbered by the themes with which Erskine's name has been so exclusively associated in twentieth-century studies.

First to be noticed are the gradual, cautious, but always directly relevant stages by which Erskine advanced toward the principle of justice on which he would rest his plea. In Bingham's behalf the principle to be established was that forced, loveless marriage is prostitution. Through the first two thirds of the speech the coldness and degradation of the Howards' marriage are hinted at, asserted, vivified, and finally traced to their source: "the legal prostitution of parental choice in the teeth of affection." There follows the familiar social application of the principle: the jury's decision must resoundingly condemn marriages of arrangement and must teach the aristocracy to abandon practices so morally reprehensible and so dangerous to established order. The jury was only too willing to teach the lesson, and *The Times* did Erskine the honor of copying out his homily.<sup>11</sup>

Erskine's defense made the nature of insanity and the legal responsibilities of the insane the deciding issues. James Hadfield, a wounded veteran of the war with France, discharged a pistol loaded with two slugs at George III, as the king stepped forward in his box to receive the ovation of the audience at a command performance of Colley Cibber's *She Would and She Would Not*, in Drury Lane Theatre. The king was not harmed. Hadfield was dragged from his place in the pit to a room beneath the stage, where he was interrogated before being imprisoned. Trial evidence showed he had methodically procured the pistol, made the slugs, placed himself in a strategic spot in the theatre. Evidence also showed he was subject to fits of insanity.

As traditionally interpreted and as applied by the Crown, the law stipulated that to be unaccountable for crime one must be unable "to form a judgment of that which he proposed to do, of that which he did, and of that which he had designed."

<sup>11</sup> Lord Campbell, Goodrich, James Ridgway, Lovat-Fraser, and others report that the jury tried to bring in a verdict of damages against Howard but, being reminded by Lord Kenyon

Erskine's plea for Hadfield was built around a basic principle of justice too. He stated it in rather negative fashion at the close of the first third of his address:

He alone can be emancipated . . . [from criminal responsibility] whose reasoning and corresponding conduct, though governed by the ordinary dictates of reason, proceed upon something which has no foundation or existence.

Lord Kenyon endorsed this proposition and made it a principle of law by interrupting the presentation of defense evidence to suggest a directed verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity.<sup>12</sup> But Erskine had not taken the jurist's mind by storm. His principle was a proposition of law as well as justice, and he had woven the web of his discourse cautiously. By rhetorical necessity he had to instruct the judges without seeming to invade the realm of their privileged judgment, for he was not, as in

that the adultery was admitted and Howard stood blameless before the law, granted Howard a trifling £500 where £10,000 would ordinarily be thought low. On the other hand, *The Times*, on the day after the trial, reported that the plaintiff was awarded £1,000. In either case the award was extraordinarily small.

On February 26, 1794, *The Times* editorialized: "This trial ought to serve as a very serious warning to parents, how they enforce matrimonial engagements on their children, without the parties having a mutual inclination for each other."

<sup>12</sup> William C. J. Meredith says in his *Insanity as a Criminal Defense* (Montreal, 1931) that Erskine "upset the doctrines which until then had generally been recognized as law" by removing from Lord Kenyon's mind "the hitherto accepted doctrine of Coke and Hale" (pp. 118, 124). Twelve years after, Lord Mansfield discarded Erskine's and Kenyon's "delusion theory" in favor of the thesis that ability to distinguish right from wrong was a more precise test of sanity. Nonetheless, Erskine's argument for his principle is generally credited with having opened the way for more realistic and more merciful views of criminal insanity. See E. C. Mann, "Mental Responsibility and Diagnosis of Insanity in Criminal Cases," in *Papers Read Before the Medico-Legal Society of New York*, 3rd Ser. (New York, 1886), p. 480; John C. Bucknill, *Unsoundness of Mind in Relation to Criminal Acts* (Philadelphia, 1856), pp. 21-23.

the Bingham case, addressing chiefly the less self-conscious jurors.<sup>13</sup>

The argument for Hadfield began conventionally enough. The advocate praised the caution and generosity of English justice; he protested that the case was not entirely as the prosecutor, Sir John Mitford, had represented it. But even here he inserted the first hints of the psychological problem the court must resolve: the prisoner's obligation to British institutions, "if he had the consciousness and reason to reflect upon [them]," was deftly mentioned before the pleader passed on to explore the special difficulties of interpreting the legal responsibilities of the insane under British law. Having thus laid open the inadequacies of existing law, Erskine hastened to reassure his listeners that he had no revolutionary judicial interpretation in view; he would never, he insisted, apply in a criminal case such liberal definitions of insanity as Coke and Hale had applied in civil cases. Who could refuse fair and favorable attention to the case analysis that would follow from such conservative doctrine?<sup>14</sup>

Only after such cautious preparation did Erskine dare to assault directly Mitford's legal orthodoxy:

If a total deprivation of memory was intended by these great lawyers to be taken in the literal sense of the words . . . [Mitford had so taken it] then no such madness ever existed in the world. It is idiocy alone which places a man in this helpless condition; where from an original mal-organization there is the human frame alone without the human capacity.

<sup>13</sup> Erskine's defense of Lord George Gordon offers a close parallel to the plea for Hadfield, both in the rhetorical problem to be met and in the method of meeting it.

<sup>14</sup> The indirect suggestion that existing law was inadequate to render justice in this case may have had added force with the judges because the idea was familiar. Newspaper and magazine accounts of Hadfield's act and apprehension had represented Hadfield as a victim of mental disease.

By now his argument clearly showed that Hadfield's ability to reason and plan could not be taken as proof of his *general* sanity, but Erskine did not rest content with this factual and theoretical invalidation of traditional views. He set about to justify his own theory of mental disease by illustrating from familiar cases at law the restricted character of insanity in some of its forms. It was thus that he cleared the way for his summary observations that "insane persons frequently appear in the utmost state of ability and composure" and that Hadfield's act was the "immediate, unqualified offspring of the disease." With the minds of the judges prepared by this chain of suggestion, direct refutation, and affirmative reasoning and evidence, Erskine felt secure enough to assert, in the most reserved language, the pivotal judicial principle I have already quoted. He did not neglect to add that the monarch's safety would be better served by justice to Hadfield than by an effort "to stretch the laws" to convict him.

When Erskine at last revealed the principle of justice for which he was arguing, one may suppose judges and jurors found it plausible and sanctified by reason and authority (though no authority had been adduced to support it directly). They received the new doctrine without shock, for the speaker had done nothing abruptly; from first to last his proofs were rendered acceptable by the method of *insinuatio* before being directly argued. Even Sir John Mitford appears to have been convinced by Erskine's argument, once evidence had established that Hadfield actually suffered from special and recurring delusions.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> When Lord Kenyon stopped the case to suggest acquittal and confinement of Hadfield as an insane person, Mitford observed: "With respect to his sanity immediately preceding and subsequent to the act, I have offered the

Though one of the pleas just reviewed recommends a revolutionary interpretation of the marriage contract and the other extends the principles of civil law to a limited class of criminal cases, their general rhetorical design is the same. The arcs of discourse, as it were, rise gently and suggestively toward the proposition that sustains the plea, then inflect through an application of the principle, finally coming to rest on an aspect of Erskine's favorite topic of persuasion—the decision to be rendered must be that which best promotes the public good.<sup>16</sup>

When one remembers that judges in the late eighteenth century claimed authority to sit in judgment on fact as well as law and that juries were often restless under such judge-imposed restrictions on their powers, Erskine's subtle urgings that *both* classes of auditors assume deliberative authority seem especially well adapted to the sometimes conflicting inclinations of his two audiences. By so carefully clearing the way for his central propositions, he made it easy for even conservative judges to assume lawmaking functions,

evidence I had; unquestionably, the circumstances which have now been stated, were perfectly unknown to me." (*State Trials*, XXVII, 1354.) It was Garrow, assistant counsel for the Crown, who suggested that the jury be directed to "state in their verdict the grounds upon which they give it," and thus embodied Erskine's general principle in the verdict formally rendered (*ibid.*, 1356).

<sup>16</sup> Two of Erskine's published forensic addresses are exceptions: his plea for a new trial in the case of William Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph, and his defense of Stockdale. In both, the principle of judgment is asserted very early in the address. The former is an appellate plea and this may account for the difference in method, but why the proposition that the *whole intent* of a work must be the measure of its libelous character should have been announced at the outset of the plea for Stockdale eludes me. Erskine's method here may have allowed doubts to build up in the jurors' minds, for Lord Campbell observes that "it is a curious fact . . . that the jury deliberated two hours before they found a verdict of NOT GUILTY" (*Lives of the Lord Chancellors*, VIII, 80).

almost without realizing it. And since he asked that decisions be rendered on principles having considerable public significance, it became easier and seemingly justifiable for jurors to act upon the bases of their common sense and their impressions of society's needs.<sup>17</sup>

In selecting and structuring persuasive materials Erskine exhibited a fuller apprehension of the scope of forensic discourse and of the psychological process we call suggestion than did the rhetorical theorists of his own or earlier times.<sup>18</sup> By unifying direct and indirect persuasion in the service of central purposes that reached beyond the confines of existing law and isolated cases, he almost imperceptibly raised his courtroom arguments to that level of thought which Aristotle considered "nobler and more statesmanlike than the branch that is concerned with the everyday relations

<sup>17</sup> Kenyon's almost casual promulgation of a new doctrine on criminal insanity, the jury's burst of sympathy for Elizabeth Howard and Richard Bingham, and Kenyon's frequently moralistic charges to juries in criminal conversation cases are all instances in point. Some writers imply that in the Hadfield case Kenyon was so far carried away by Erskine's supralegal persuasions that he did not even realize he was radically changing the law by his disposition of the case. His colloquy with Mitford, the prosecutor, at the end of the trial, suggests this. Henry Weihofen, in *Insanity as a Defense of Criminal Law* (New York, 1933), says "the speech of the Counsel which practically put an end to the trial" led Kenyon to render a decision which could not stand for long because it failed to define the test it endorsed (pp. 21-23). Yet Kenyon, formerly a specialist in the law of conveyancing, was not given to looseness in definition and detail.

<sup>18</sup> Hugh Blair's Lecture XXVII sets out the general rule that English lawyers ought not follow too closely Ciceronian and Demosthenian arguments from topics of expediency and public welfare because at the English bar "the field of speaking is limited to precise law and statute" (*Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*). Only in discussing introductions and statements of facts does Blair touch on the value of preparing the minds of listeners by indirect means, and in this he follows the pattern of most classical treatments of "the subtle approach." George Campbell considered neither the uses of indirect argument nor the values of alternative methods of speech organization in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*.

between man and man."<sup>19</sup> His forensic addresses are, thus, subtle blends of forensic and deliberative elements in which, contrary to the advice of most rhetorical theorists, he extended to all parts of the discourse the method of *insinuatio*. These qualities were rare in eighteenth-century pleading and, I suggest, their presence in Erskine's pleas contributed greatly to the high proportion of unexpectedly favorable verdicts he obtained from juries and judges alike.

Not only did Erskine select and develop subtle arguments clustered closely but unobtrusively about principles of policy and justice, he exercised equal care and purposefulness in selecting the language that was to bear his thought. So far as I have been able to discover, only Sergeant William Draper Best and Sir Robert Dallas, among his contemporaries at law, even resembled him in these respects; and they resembled him but weakly. Certainly among his colleagues there was no other who succeeded in making history, law, and literature while pleading.<sup>20</sup> Best was thought "one of the principal ornaments" of the common law courts, but it was also said of him that, being superficial in both legal and general knowledge, he needed an able "junior" to

<sup>19</sup> *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, trans. Lane Cooper (New York, 1932), I. I. 1354b.

<sup>20</sup> Among those with whom and against whom Erskine served as counsel were: *Lloyd Kenyon*, later Lord Chief Justice of King's Bench; *John Scott*, later 1st Earl of Eldon, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, Lord High Chancellor, and dominant member of the Cabinet for most of the period, 1801-1827; *Edward Law*, later 1st Baron Ellenborough, Chief Counsel for Warren Hastings, Chief Justice of King's Bench, member of the All-the-Talents Administration; *Sir John Mitford*, afterwards Speaker of the House of Commons, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, writer on legal subjects; *Spencer Perceval*, Attorney General, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Prime Minister, 1809-1812. Others, who did not assume high public office, included *William Garrow*, *Edward Bearcroft*, *John Dunning*, *Sir Robert Dallas*, and *William Draper Best*, all greatly sought after as pleaders.

handle the more formal aspects of difficult cases.<sup>21</sup> In his defense of E. M. Despard against charges of treason, Best had a splendid opportunity to emulate Erskine in thought development and style but fell far short of Erskine's artistry in both respects.<sup>22</sup> Sir Robert Dallas, who, like Erskine, had practiced debate at Coachmakers' Hall, could isolate pivotal principles on which to rest a case and could bring circumstances within the vicarious experience of jurors; but beside Erskine's, his style is flat and wanting in vitality.<sup>23</sup> There is certainly little similarity between the bright efficiency of Erskine and Sir John Scott's "detail of facts, mixed up with protestations of his own honesty and good intentions," or Scott's carelessness "as to the structure of his sentences, or the order of his discourse."<sup>24</sup> Bearcroft's verbose circumlocutions clearly mark him as Erskine's inferior. It was with Edward Law that Erskine divided most of the business of the common law courts so long as Law remained in active practice, but Law's dry recitals of facts, his abruptness in argument, and his overly "cautious and calculating spirit"<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> "Amicus Curiae" [John Payne Collier], *Criticism on the Bar* (London, 1819), pp. 53, 59.

<sup>22</sup> See "Proceedings in the Trial of Edward Marcus Despard, Esq., for High Treason," in *State Trials*, XXVIII, 345-528. Best was chief counsel for Despard and, in the manner of Erskine, showed that treason should not be adjudged where *overt* acts of treason could not be proved. Having done this, he showed why some considered him a rather unsafe "leader" for he gave equal emphasis to the argument that Despard's intelligence and character were such as to make it impossible to believe he would choose to act as charged. The impossibility of demonstrating the second contention badly weakened the force of the first.

<sup>23</sup> His plea in the trial of James O'Coigly and others for high treason, in 1798, is an excellent argument; but the style, though clear, seldom reinforces thought with feeling. See *State Trials*, XXVII, 53-90.

<sup>24</sup> Lord Campbell, *Lives of the Lord Chancellors*, "Lord Eldon," VIII, 434.

<sup>25</sup> Archer Polson, *Law and Lawyers* (Philadelphia, 1841), I, 188-192; "Amicus Curiae," p. 10.

deny him favorable comparison with Erskine.

The fact seems to be that in Erskine's day courtroom pleading was more often than not acute but dull; yet even those pleaders who were not dull usually exhibited a rhetoric less functional and hence less persuasive than Erskine's. James Macintosh's great address in the trial of Jean Peltier is justly famous; but in it Macintosh adopted a grand, discursive manner such as Erskine never used in court. In striking but diffuse fashion the plea for Peltier magnifies the domestic and European need for a free English press, it turns aside for extended condemnation of Bonaparte and the Jacobin spirit, it is threaded with literary allusion, analogy, and quotation, often more impressive than persuasive. The judges and jurors must be excused for finding much of the discourse irrelevant to the actions of Macintosh's client and the specific libel charged against him, so evocative and so generalized are the leading arguments for freedom of political expression.<sup>26</sup>

The Irish advocate John Philpot Curran was seldom if ever dull in pleading, yet Erskine's superiority in invention and style is at once apparent on comparison. Happily, very close comparison is possible, since Curran, with one Bartholomew Hoar, prosecuted a criminal conversation case almost exactly like the famous *Markham v Fawcett* cause in which Erskine appeared. In each instance a clergyman's wife had been se-

duced by one to whom her husband had extended his personal friendship. In 1802, Erskine sought damages for the Reverend George Markham, against John Fawcett, on such charges; and in 1804, Curran and Hoar represented the Reverend Charles Massy in a similar action against the Marquis of Headfort. Both cases were tried in county courts, the former in Middlesex and the other in County Clare, Ireland. In each case it was imperative that the prosecutors magnify the offensiveness of the undeniable adultery by impressing upon their hearers that the wrong was the greater for being also a violation of friendship.

Hoar's treatment of this forensic commonplace is fairly represented by the following passage from his opening for Massy:

The Cornish plunderer, intent on the spoil, callous to every touch of humanity, shrouded in darkness, holds out false lights to the tempest-tost vessel, and lures her and her pilot to that shore upon which she must be lost forever—the rock unseen, the ruffian invisible, and nothing apparent but the treacherous signal of security and repose. So, this prop of the throne, this pillar of the State, this stay of religion, the ornament of the Peerage, this common protector of the people's privileges and of the crown's prerogatives, descends from these high grounds of character to muffle himself in the gloom of his own base and dark designs; to play before the eyes of the deluded wife and the deceived husband the falsest lights of love to the one, and of friendly and hospitable regards to the other, until she is at length dashed upon that hard bosom where her honor and happiness are wrecked and lost forever. The agonized husband beholds the ruin with those sensations of horror which you can better feel than I can describe. Her upon whom he had embarked all his hopes and all his happiness in this life, . . . sunk before his eyes into an abyss of infamy, or if any fragment escape, escaping to solace, to gratify, and to enrich her vile destroyer.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Attorney General Spencer Perceval neatly destroyed much of Macintosh's effect by his reply: "We are both agreed as to the illegality of printing and the illegality of publishing libels against those with whom we are at peace: the only question then for you to decide is this, whether or not these publications . . . were or were not published with the intention of vilifying the French Consul?" Lord Ellenborough [Edward Law] paraphrased Perceval in his charge, and the jury "immediately returned a verdict of—GUILTY." *State Trials*, XXVIII, 563-608, 615, 618-619.

<sup>27</sup> From the text as published by William L. Snyder, *Great Speeches by Great Lawyers* (New York, 1882), pp. 667-676. Bartholomew Hoar (or Hoare, or Hore) was born in the County of Cork, son of Benjamin Hoar, in 1754. He re-

As Snyder says, "the striking parallel . . . with the treachery of the Cornish pirates . . . presents a graphic picture,"<sup>28</sup> but one must also add that the compensable anguish of the husband twice betrayed is enshrouded in words better calculated to sustain the orator's rhythmic flight than to mirror the poignancy of his client's suffering.

Curran's closing plea for the same plaintiff illustrates a similar sacrifice of sharp persuasiveness in favor of embellishment:

There is another consideration, gentlemen, which, I think, most imperiously demands even a vindictive award of exemplary damages, and that is the breach of hospitality. To us peculiarly does it belong to avenge the violation of its altar. The hospitality of other countries is a matter of necessity or convention; . . . but the hospitality of an *Irishman* is not the running account of posted and legered [*sic*] courtesies, as in other countries; it springs, like all his qualities, his faults, his virtues, directly from his heart. The heart of an Irishman is by nature bold, and he confides; it is tender, and he loves; it is generous, and he gives; it is social, and he is hospitable. This sacrilegious intruder has profaned the religion of that sacred altar so elevated in our worship, so precious to our devotion; and it is our privilege to avenge the crime. You must either pull down the altar and abolish the worship, or you must preserve its sanctity undebased. There is no alternative between the universal exclusion of all mankind from your threshold, and the most rigorous punishment of him who

ceived the B. A. from the University of Dublin (Trinity College) in 1775, was called to the Irish Bar in 1778, and subsequently became a King's Counsel. For at least part of his active career he resided in Dublin. (I am indebted to Professor Lewis W. Morse, Librarian, Cornell Law School, and to Mr. Arthur Cox of Dublin for this information.) Exhaustive search of records might produce additional data on Hoar, but had he been a pleader of more than ordinary powers references to him would surely be more frequent in standard sources. Had he been an inferior pleader, he would hardly have opened in a case where Curran led the plaintiff's counsel and George Ponsonby led the defense. His address, neither better nor worse than many others of the period, doubtless entered the literature of forensic oratory because Curran and Ponsonby also spoke.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 668.

is admitted and betrays. The defendant has been so trusted, has so betrayed, and you ought to make him a most signal example.<sup>29</sup>

The profusion of religious symbols and the appeal to national pride make it easy for the listener to lose sight of the immediate issue before the court; the Reverend Mr. Massy ceases to be a husband-friend betrayed and becomes an abstraction, an artifact of Irish character and custom. The invocation of deliberative ends is so complete that "the everyday relations between man and man" are almost lost from view.

Erskine had the same argument to make in the Reverend Mr. Markham's behalf, but the manner of its making was profoundly different:

Invited into the house of a friend—received with the open arms of affection, as if the same parents had given them birth and bred them—in this situation this most monstrous and wicked defendant deliberately perpetrated his crime, and, shocking to relate, not only continued the appearances of friendship, after he had violated its most sacred obligations, but continued them as a cloak to the barbarous repetitions of his offence; writing letters of regard, whilst, perhaps, he was the father of the last child, whom his injured friend and companion was embracing and cherishing as his own. What protection can such conduct possibly receive. . . ? A passion for a woman is progressive; it does not, like anger, gain an uncontrolled ascendancy in a moment, nor is a modest matron to be seduced in a day. Such a crime, can not, therefore, be committed under the resistless dominion of sudden infirmity; it must be wilfully, and wickedly committed. The defendant could not possibly have incurred the guilt of this adultery without often passing through his mind (for he had the education and principles of a gentleman) the very topics I have been insisting upon before you for his condemnation. . . . He was a year engaged in the pursuit; he resorted repeatedly to his shameful purpose, and advanced to it at such intervals of time and distance, as entitle me to say that he determined in cold blood to enjoy a future and momentary gratification, at the expense of every principle of honor which is held sacred amongst gentle-

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 691-707.

men, even where no laws interpose their obligations or restraints.<sup>30</sup>

Curran and Hoar could not have claimed that their client must doubt the parentage of a child he had thought his own, and it is true that Headfort devoted but four months to his nefarious business. But Massy's advocates might, like Erskine, have focused attention more clearly upon the deliberateness of the deceit, the trust of the husband for his friend, and the impossibility of excusing the Marquis on grounds of sudden weakness.<sup>31</sup> Erskine's development of these standard topics of degree in wrongdoing is stronger than the developments furnished by either of his Irish contemporaries because, proceeding with economy and rigid relevancy, he vividly "furthered the magnification of the crime against his client by creating a hierarchy of loss: one item after another . . . added to the structure of the argument until the crime became the worst of its kind and the loss suffered by Erskine's client, the deepest."<sup>32</sup>

Other ways in which Erskine's art excelled that of his contemporaries are also illustrated by the passages just quoted. In contrast to the practice of Curran, Hoar, or Macintosh, Erskine admits to his discourse no allusion that might draw the mind of a hearer from the quality of the human action he examines. His language contains scarcely a hint of copy-book polish; yet he is at great pains that the amplification of his topics shall recreate in the vicarious experience of each auditor the most

<sup>30</sup> From the text as published in J. L. High, *Speeches of Lord Erskine* (Chicago, 1870), 4 vols., IV, 214-238.

<sup>31</sup> George Ponsonby did, in fact, use this topic in behalf of the Marquis, insisting that Mrs. Massy could not have fallen so swiftly out of love with her husband unless he had, himself, been at fault (Snyder, p. 690). Curran did not reply directly.

<sup>32</sup> Lawrence R. Rumley, p. 214. This characterization Rumley applies to "every trial which would support such treatment."

acute sensations of his client. Figures of speech and thought, allusions, quotations—all the beautifying and evocative resources of language—are cleanly functional; the presence of each symbol is justified by its contribution to the sum of the advocate's *proof*.

But when Erskine stepped from the bar to the floor of the House of Commons or, later, delivered his opinions in the House of Lords, it was as if his wonted unity of thought, harmony of methods, and functionalism in style had been left among his briefs and law books. In Parliament he cluttered his speeches with *ad hominem* arguments, sprinkled them with lumbering quotations from Dr. Johnson, with commentary to match, and only now and then revealed his real powers in a telling proof of expediency or inexpediency. He who, as Goodrich observed, never digressed in the courtroom without bringing back from his excursion something important to his central theme,<sup>33</sup> treated parliamentarians to so many autobiographical semi-relevancies that he fairly justified the taunt in the suggestion that he be raised to the title "Baron Ego, of Eye, in the county of Suffolk."<sup>34</sup> The texts of his legislative addresses are at some points studded with parentheses, those printers' accommodations to involved constructions and unmanaged qualifications of thought.

Clearly Erskine was not a brilliant pleader because he possessed some divine general gift of persuasive speech; had it been so, his deliberative speaking must surely have been quickened. Though from the beginning he was able to solve the rhetorical problems of courtroom discourse, he seems never to have understood fully the ultimate ends

<sup>33</sup> *Select British Eloquence*, p. 635.

<sup>34</sup> *Lives of the Lord Chancellors*, VIII, 307.

and methods of advisory or occasional speaking. Had he, then, only a special, limited knack? Or had he studied and learned the art on which his profession depended? One may speculate, but no clear answer is to be found.

Quite possibly poverty and ambition drove the highly intelligent Erskine to induce the elements of the pleader's art from independent observation and study.<sup>35</sup> Since he was already successful in his profession when he entered Parliament, he was probably not similarly motivated to analyze the new rhetorical problems that confronted him there, after 1783. Almost certainly, too, legislation interested him less than advocacy.

If we were to judge from his deliberative oratory alone, we might suppose him a child of the tradition that saw rhetoric as style or as delivery, but his forensic principles could never have been derived from such sources. The rhetorical works published in England during the period of his formal and self-education offered little advice that would make for the qualities of oratory he displayed in the courtroom.<sup>36</sup> It would be far easier to believe that his achievements at the bar drew some

<sup>35</sup> One cannot assume that his legal study provided much experience in argumentation, for disputations and moots were no longer generally practiced at the Inns of Court. See W. Herbert, *Antiquities of the Inns of Court and Chancery* (London, 1804), pp. 180-181; and R. M. Jackson, *The Machinery of Justice in England*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 209-210. His participation in debates at Coachmakers' Hall and elsewhere may, of course, have supplied enlightening experience.

<sup>36</sup> The list of leading English works on rhetoric published between his eleventh and twenty-fifth years includes: Burgh's *Art of Speaking* (1761), Sheridan's *Lectures on Elocution* (1762), Leland's *Dissertation on the Principles of Human Eloquence* (1764), Rice's *Introduction to the Art of Reading with Energy and Propriety* (1765), Gibbons' *Rhetoric, or a View of its Principal Tropes and Figures* (1767), Enfield's *The Speaker* (1774), Steele's *Prosodia Rationalis* (1775), Cockin's *The Art of Delivering Written Language* (1775).

guidance from that branch of rhetorical theory which, during his earlier years, was beginning to move "out of the intellectual vacuum in which Ward [and others] had kept it, and . . . into line with contemporary developments in psychology, epistemology, and literary criticism."<sup>37</sup>

Erskine's forensic practice might have derived from thoughtful application of the theoretical doctrines published by George Campbell in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, particularly those found in Book I, Chapters VII through IX.<sup>38</sup> There is no evidence that Erskine read this book by a fellow Scotsman, but Campbell stated the psychological premise that underlay all of Erskine's distinctive methods when he wrote, "It must be allowed there are certain principles in our nature, which, when properly addressed and managed, give no inconsiderable aid to reason in prompting belief."<sup>39</sup> Again, Campbell's concern with rhetorical adaptation to listeners, collectively and particularly, is an emphasis remarkably consistent with Erskine's principles of practice.

But to try to erect an hypothesis connecting Erskine's art with Campbell's body of theory would certainly strain the scattered bits of circumstantial evidence. Campbell's *Philosophy* was, after all, only one of a number of signs of rising interest in psychological principles, including those of communication. An alert and ambitious barrister-in-training, with even a general impression of the scientific and critical speculations emanating from his native Edinburgh, might well see for himself how completely the principles of persuasion

<sup>37</sup> Douglas Ehninger, "John Ward and His Rhetoric," *Speech Monographs*, XVIII (March 1951), 16.

<sup>38</sup> The work was published in 1776, while Erskine was studying law.

<sup>39</sup> *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York, 1841), p. 77.

derive from the natures of men in general and men in particular. The supposition that Erskine formulated his principles of pleading independently of contemporary theory and practice is strengthened by the fact that he extended the range of forensic thought and feeling considerably beyond the bounds Blair or Campbell prescribed.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, he was more rigid than they or his more systematically educated fellow barristers in measuring both substance and language by the test of *immediate* relevance.

Thus, the sources of Erskine's principles of advocacy remain obscure and uncertain; but whatever their derivation, his practice was distinctive. I have suggested as the essence of his forensic art the convergence of all the forces of discourse—as though this were their nature and not the orator's design—toward a clear and expedient rule for decision in a given case. In his forensic addresses there are no digressions inspired by models of another age or by a rhetoric confused with poetic. There are no vagrant thoughts; even vagrant words are few, considering the habits of the age. There is much that is striking and beautiful but it is as *proof*, not as formula, that style arrests or excites: consider the idyl on conjugal love in the plea for Bingham or the description of Hadfield's battle wounds.<sup>41</sup> Even when he rose to deliver his first plea,

for Captain Baillie, on November 24, 1778, Erskine gave notice that his was a fresh, broad-gauged theory of argument in which the structuring of listeners' predispositions, perceptions, and emotional energies was the end of all persuasive effort. His artistic command over the complex ideational and motivational resources of advocacy came to its full development in the last decade of the eighteenth century and reached its zenith, I believe, in the later treason and libel trials, in his defense of Bingham, and in his defense of Hadfield.

Almost without exception, Thomas Erskine's speeches at the bar illustrate that the best persuasion is unitary, that forensic rhetoric is neither reason on a work detail nor parade-ground polish on review. His rhetoric was an artistic integration of reason, suggestion, and functional symbols, organized to form a complete and dynamic economy. In this he was, and remains, a thoroughly modern practitioner of the art of rhetoric—though in one of its branches only. In the manner of the classical forensic orator, he perceived that, "There is indeed no cause in which the point that falls under dispute is considered with reference to the parties to the suit and not from arguments relating to questions in general."<sup>42</sup> In the modern manner he applied the method of *insinuatio*, "the subtle approach," in all the parts of his discourses. Again, exhibiting his modernity, he found the topics of forensic discourse not only in places having reference to particular and general questions of fact and justice, but in those reaches of popular thought where questions of expedient public policy are found and resolved. Finally, more than the ancients or his contemporaries, he devoted his rhetorical efforts to the end of evoking and controlling strongly mo-

<sup>40</sup> Blair's conception of the range of forensic speaking has been cited. Campbell devotes so little attention to this form of persuasion that it seems fair to assume he had no quarrel with restrictive definitions that confined the pleader to questions of fact and legal interpretation.

<sup>41</sup> It is worth noting that anthologists have singled out few passages from Erskine's forensic addresses as beautiful when considered apart from their context. The "Indian Chief" segment of his defense of Stockdale is such a passage, but it is the only one Goodrich was moved to call "beautiful in itself," though he published and annotated nine of Erskine's courtroom speeches.

<sup>42</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, II.xxi.

tivated reason through rigorously organized and sharply relevant substance and symbols.

Immediate influence, not beauty or profundity, was Lord Erskine's goal in the courtroom; in consequence, he achieved all three. In the process he left his mark on Anglo-American law, advanced the general cause of political liberty, and, at so unlikely a place as the counsel's bench, he enlarged the store of imaginative literature in the English language. His life of influence through consummate art closed on Feb-

ruary 7, 1806, when he accepted the seals of the Lord Chancellor's office and thereby closed his career as an advocate. He died on November 17, 1823. The intervening years were years of slow but steady decline, for the artist was denied the practice of his special, single art. His culture was denied the further contributions to law, politics, and literature that the challenge of courtroom advocacy might have inspired in Lord Thomas Erskine, Baron of Restormel Castle, whose motto was, "Trial by Jury."

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# ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S INFLUENCE ON JOHN MARSHALL'S JUDICIARY SPEECH IN THE 1788 VIRGINIA FEDERAL RATIFYING CONVENTION

Gale L. Richards

## 1.

THIS paper will assess the influence of Alexander Hamilton upon the rhetorical treatment in the Virginia Federal Ratifying Convention of 1788 of the debate on Article III in the proposed Federal Constitution, the clause establishing a national judiciary. It will focus attention primarily upon the effect of Hamilton's writings in the *Federalist* essays upon John Marshall's speech on the Federal Judiciary, the major argument on this portion of the constitution in the Virginia convention.<sup>1</sup>

Hardly had the Federal convention at Philadelphia adjourned before Hamilton had turned his enormous energy to the task of converting issues into votes in the New York ratifying convention set for Poughkeepsie, where it convened on June 17, 1788, fifteen days after the opening of the Virginia convention in Richmond. On October 27, 1787, with the ink yet hardly dry on the Constitution, Hamilton and Madison, with some help from John Jay, had begun a series

of essays printed in New York newspapers over the signature "Publius," which ran until the following spring and then were collected and published in two volumes in March and May 1788.<sup>2</sup> These essays, hastily written in the heat of a political controversy with the avowed purpose of persuading voters, presented, nevertheless, such a thoroughly detailed development of the arguments which could at that point in time be brought to bear in favor of the Federal Constitution, that they rapidly assumed the place of state papers, classic descriptions of one of the most dramatic turns in the history of western civilization. They probed with eloquence and profundity the basic tenets of democratic government in order to demonstrate the essential feasibility of the governmental plan laid down in the Federal Constitution.

It is clear that these papers were available to the Federalist leaders in the Virginia convention, both through Madison and more directly, since Hamilton saw to it that others received

Mr. Richards (Ph.D., Iowa, 1950) is Assistant Professor of Speech and Director of Forensics at the University of Washington. This paper was presented as part of the program commemorating Hamilton at the Convention of the SAA in Boston in August 1957.

<sup>1</sup> Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist, or the New Constitution*, ed. Carl VanDoren (New York, 1945), pp. 519-571.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii. The authorship of these essays was a tightly-held secret until, in 1804, in setting his affairs in order before the fateful duel with Aaron Burr, Hamilton noted in a memorandum the appropriate authors of each essay. Even at that he was apparently careless or faulty of memory, since the accuracy of his notation has been directly challenged.

copies of the bound volumes.<sup>3</sup> Thus we know that arguments in the Virginia convention, particularly those advanced by the Federalist side, might readily have been shaped by the arguments in *The Federalist*.

Bower Aly has attributed much of Hamilton's success in the debates of the New York ratifying convention to his writing of the *Federalist* papers and to the preparatory background for argument it gave him.<sup>4</sup> In light of this effect on Hamilton himself, it would not seem rash to conjecture that the carefully ordered arguments made material contribution to the indisputably effective Federalist advocacy in the Virginia convention, and in particular made a marked impression upon John Marshall's arguments in favor of the Federal system of justice proposed in the Constitution.

2.

Shortly after the delegates convened in Richmond, James Madison, the floor leader for the pro-ratification forces in the Virginia convention, informed a Massachusetts colleague, Rufus King, of the issues which appeared to be critical to Virginia's ratification:

The ostensible points of opposition are direct taxation, the imperfect representation in the H. of Reps., the equality in the Senate, regulation of Trade by majority and the Judiciary Department. The first and last are dwelt on most. Besides these the Mississippi, the Indiana claim with some other local matters are made a great handle of.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "I executed your commands respecting the first volume of the *Federalist*. I sent forty of the common copies and twelve of the finer ones, addressed to the care of Governor Randolph. The printer announces the second volume in a day or two, when an equal number of the two kinds shall also be forwarded. . ." Hamilton to Madison, May 19, 1788; in *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1904), IX, 431.

<sup>4</sup> Bower Aly, *The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton* (New York, 1941), p. 184.

<sup>5</sup> Madison to King, June 13, 1788; in *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, ed. Charles R. King (New York, 1896), I, 332.

As the discussions in the convention developed, the issues emerged more clearly and assumed a somewhat different complexion. Because Patrick Henry, the leader of the group opposing ratification, dwelt upon it so eloquently, and because it was important in the election of delegates from doubtful western Virginia and Kentucky counties, the navigation of the Mississippi assumed central importance.<sup>6</sup>

Direct taxation, regulation of trade, and the legal structure deriving from the establishment of a Federal judiciary, approximately in that order, became the other important issues as the debates progressed. The method of representation in Congress became linked with the argument on direct taxation, and Marshall, for example, combined the two issues in his argument in favor of direct taxation.<sup>7</sup> The Indiana claim did not emerge as the major issue which Madison had predicted, and was dropped from the discussions after the first few sessions.

Did space permit, a closer scrutiny of the convention audience and the circumstances under which it met would certainly be in order. Louis Mallory's study of Patrick Henry's oratory, however, provides a brief description—clear though somewhat cryptic—of the audience and occasion of these debates.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Madison admitted the significance of the western vote, somewhat ruefully, in the same letter to King: "the vote of Kentucky will turn the scale and there is perhaps more to fear than to hope from that quarter." *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Jonathan Elliot, *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, together with the Journal of the Federal Convention* (Philadelphia, 1896), III, 222-236.

<sup>8</sup> Louis A. Mallory, "Patrick Henry," in *A History and Criticism of American Public Address*, ed. W. N. Brigance (New York, 1943), II, 580-602. This study contains a comprehensive appraisal of Henry's oratory in this convention.

The writer has described this social setting elsewhere in much fuller detail.<sup>9</sup>

## 3.

At thirty-two, John Marshall already stood in the front rank of the legal profession in Virginia. He had been an active member in the Virginia House of Delegates and in the Governor's Council of State since 1782, and so had behind him some six years of experience as a parliamentarian.<sup>10</sup> Madison had earmarked him as one of the important Federalist delegates to the ratifying convention.<sup>11</sup> Hence there was good reason for the Federalists to appoint young Marshall the prime disputant in this portion of the debates. Marshall had been active in the formation of the legal system of which Virginia was proud. In the House of Delegates, he had been a vital force in committee sessions on the judicial system in Virginia.<sup>12</sup> The law was Marshall's prime interest, and remained so until his death. Nothing could be more attuned to his natural desires than the assignment to present the main argument for the Federalists in the Judiciary debate. David Loth, in his recent study of Marshall's role in the growth of our nation, insists that there was a simple tactical reason for Madison and his lieutenants to choose Marshall for this role, despite the availability of two learned jurists, Pendleton and Wythe:

<sup>9</sup> Gale L. Richards, "The Public Speaking of John Marshall prior to 1801," unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1950.

<sup>10</sup> Albert J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall* (Cambridge, Mass., 1916), I, Ch. 6.

<sup>11</sup> In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison lists Marshall fifth in a group of "The characters of most note which occur to me. . ." Madison to Jefferson, April 22, 1788, in *The Writings of James Madison*, ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York, 1906), V, 120.

<sup>12</sup> Marshall was appointed to the committee on Courts of Justice for each session he attended. *Journal, Virginia House of Delegates, 1782-1787*, *passim*.

They put Marshall up because they wanted a plain man to utter some plain truths. They wanted a man whose learning would not be discounted, whose position as a judge would not lead to any suspicion of special pleading. They wanted to appeal to a jury, not a court. Finally, they wanted a popular, easy speaker to discuss an unpopular, traditionally dry subject.<sup>13</sup>

## 4.

Six essays in the *Federalist* bear directly on the Judiciary, numbers seventy-eight through eighty-three inclusive.<sup>14</sup> In addition—and also from Hamilton's pen—there are some remarks on the necessity of having a Federal court system in those essays devoted to "The Defects of the Confederation," in number twenty-two. In this early essay Hamilton pointed out, quite reasonably, that if a supreme authority is set in a limited area of government, then there must be a court in which to enforce it.<sup>15</sup> He added quickly that this adjudication must occur at the seat of central authority or different state courts would interpret the Constitution differently, and the Union would be at the mercy of "the bias of local fears and prejudices," and "local regulations."<sup>16</sup> This distrust of the differential effect of local feeling on the administration of justice is of course the direct reciprocal to the distrust of the solicitude of a central authority for individual rights or for local concerns, expressed so eloquently by George Mason and Patrick Henry at Richmond. It reveals an irreconcilable attitudinal bias, which in Hamilton was so fixed as to lead eventually, in 1798, to such questionable measures as the Alien and Sedition acts and the Disputed Elections bill.

<sup>13</sup> David Loth, *Chief Justice John Marshall and the Growth of the Republic* (New York, 1949), p. 100.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra*, n. 1.

<sup>15</sup> VanDoren, p. 142.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

The six essays on the Judiciary in the *Federalist* were concerned respectively with the appointment and salaries of judges (numbers seventy-eight and seventy-nine), the powers of the Judiciary (number eighty), the distribution of judicial authority to inferior courts (number eighty-one), concurrent jurisdiction of Federal and state courts (number eighty-two), and the lack of a guarantee of trial by jury in the Constitution (number eighty-three). It is surely no matter of mere coincidence that we observe Hamilton devoting so much space to a tightly-woven argument for the concurrent jurisdiction of Federal and state courts, and an entire essay to reassurance that trial by jury could not be set aside under the Constitution, for these were two major points in dispute in the Virginia convention. To reassure the reader, he dwelt heavily on the lack of force in the Federal courts. According to Hamilton, they constituted the weakest of the three departments of government, and should be protected from the influence of both executive and legislature.<sup>17</sup> The threat of impeachment by the Senate, he argued, would hold the judges in check. Then he brought his logic full circle with the assertion that the courts were direct agencies of the people through the Constitution:

It is more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, there was the bland assumption on the part of Federalists that judicial review of legislation was a natural part of the Constitution. As we

know, it was not until some sixteen years later, in the celebrated *Marbury v. Madison* case, that the court in a decision written by Marshall first applied this principle directly to Federal legislation. But Hamilton left no doubt, nor did Marshall at Richmond, that the power was clearly implied in Article III. Said Hamilton:

Limitations of this kind [on legislative authority] can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.<sup>19</sup>

In equally blunt terms, using his favorite, the rhetorical question, Marshall inquired:

To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the Judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such a protection.<sup>20</sup>

This was a far more vital point of issue than any other in Article III; but the opponents of the Constitution in Virginia and elsewhere were more concerned with those guarantees of trial by Jury finally incorporated in the "Bill of Rights" immediately following ratification, with the proliferation of Federal inferior courts, and with the awkwardness of determining which court should have jurisdiction over what case.

The structure of the Federal courts was of course quickly determined by Congress, as provided for in the Constitution, and no difficulty developed in jurisdiction during the early years of our government, probably because the killing practice of having Supreme Court justices travel to preside over district sessions did not encourage heavy Federal litigation. As Marshall insisted at Richmond:

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 521.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 522.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 521.

<sup>20</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 554.

Does not every gentleman here know that the causes in our courts are more numerous than they can decide, according to their present construction? . . . If some of these suits be carried to other courts . . . they will still have business enough.<sup>21</sup>

Yet it cannot be said that Hamilton had failed to foresee that this matter of judicial review was important as a possible point of controversy, for he gave it considerable space in number seventy-eight of the *Federalist*, making it perfectly clear that he presumed it to be a rightful prerogative of the court. He spelled out the function of the court as a directive force, resistant to rapid change, conservative in character. This point he punctuated emphatically by remarking that no "momentary inclination," even of a majority of the citizenry, should be allowed to change the Constitution through legislative action.<sup>22</sup>

5.

Marshall's speech on the Judiciary was intended primarily to answer George Mason, who had spoken at length the day before on the first two sections of the third article of the Constitution, and Patrick Henry, who had delivered one of his most emotional appeals just prior to Marshall's recognition by the chair.<sup>23</sup> We find Marshall in his favorite argumentative posture,

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 553.

<sup>22</sup> VanDoren, pp. 524-525.

<sup>23</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 521-530 and 539-546. This third volume of Elliot is based on the report of the Virginia debates published by David Robertson, a stenographic reporter who personally recorded the debates while the convention was in progress. To determine if Robertson's account was Elliot's source, the writer compared samples of Elliot with Robertson's published account. See David Robertson, *Debates and other proceedings of the Convention of Virginia, convened at Richmond, on Monday, the second day of June, 1788, for the purpose of deliberating on the Constitution recommended by the Grand Federal Convention* 2nd ed. (Richmond, 1805).

carefully sifting lines of argument pursued by his opponents, and weaving the fabric of his own refutation on the base of this analysis. The overnight delay in replying would suggest careful and relatively detailed preparation of the speech.<sup>24</sup> Actually, several speeches of shorter duration intervened, so that Marshall spoke late in the day on Friday, June 20, just four days before the final vote on ratification.<sup>25</sup>

The arguments introduced in this segment of the debates show the Federalist delegates making an effort to meet only those objections which were raised and to treat them in a placating manner. The Federalists were quite obviously counting votes and moving with judicious care toward the impending vote on ratification, attending anxiously to the reactions of members who might be driven to shift sides because of undue emphasis on some point unwise dwelt upon too long. A vital point, it should be remembered, is that the Federalists were endeavoring to secure ratification without prior amendments, allowing for amendments to be added as necessary later.<sup>26</sup> In view of the fact that the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments in the Bill of Rights are concerned with the administration of justice and that they were promptly added to the Constitution, the fear of generating strong negative feeling through inadvertent or unwise opposition to reasonable demands for further guarantees was not a phantom caution.

Since he had been preceded by a

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Hugh Blair Grigsby, *The History of the Virginia Federal Convention of 1788*, vols. 9-10, Collections of the Virginia Historical Society, New Series (Richmond, 1891), IX, 297.

<sup>25</sup> Madison to King, June 22, 1788; in King, I, 336.

<sup>26</sup> The Federalists of course were convinced that a pivotal part of Antifederalist strategy was to call for certain "essential" amendments prior to ratification.

rather ponderous effort of Judge Pendleton to put Mason and Henry right on certain points of law and to stand off their objections to the implied power in the Federal courts, it must have been with some relief that the Federalists then saw young John Marshall rise to his feet to complete the debate with his speech refuting Mason and Henry. Marshall's arguments on the Federal court system were premised on the assumptions (1) that the creation of a new government would bring legal problems the consideration of which was outside the purview of present courts, and so demanded a new set of courts,<sup>27</sup> and (2) that the Constitution, when ratified, would be a law and so demand a Supreme Court to interpret it.<sup>28</sup> The two major objections Marshall attempted to refute were (1) that a fair trial would not be possible in such courts,<sup>29</sup> and (2) that there would be interference between their jurisdiction and that of the state courts.<sup>30</sup> He did not consider these assertions in separate lines of argument, but combined them in considering various objections to the judiciary set forth by Mason.

His efforts to establish that a fair trial could be had in the Federal courts centered upon "independence in office, and manner of appointment," clearly echoing Hamilton's argument in number seventy-eight of the *Federalist*.<sup>31</sup> Characteristically, Marshall did not employ factual support or even hypothetical examples to demonstrate his point; instead he applied broad principle in an enthymematic form. Beginning with the assumption that independence in office and wisdom in appointment make

us trust our judges, he compared the proposed system of selection with that used by the State of Virginia, thus appealing to his auditors' pride in their state government. This pointed to the conclusion, now clearly implied, that there was little possibility of an unfair trial because the judges were wisely appointed and independent in office, and therefore would not permit it. This clearly harks back to the opinion expressed in the *Federalist* papers that the Constitution was a law and so demanded competent legal interpretation.<sup>32</sup>

A curious circularity appears in Marshall's response to Mason's suggestion that since "the laws of the Federal government being paramount" to those of the states, there is "no case but what this will extend to."<sup>33</sup> Marshall's argument depended on the concept that the Federal government, in handing down decisions from the bench, rightfully could exercise only those powers enumerated for it. This premise was utilized by the Federalists generally in these debates. Marshall of course dealt with this idea in quite another way in his decisions from the bench. In 1788, however, he insisted that,

If they [the Congress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard.<sup>34</sup>

This argument has much the same ring as the arguments used by Hamilton in leading up to his statement of the concurrent jurisdiction of state and Federal courts in numbers eighty-one and eighty-two of the *Federalist*. Indeed, Marshall moved immediately into this

<sup>27</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 554.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 552.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 553.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 552.

<sup>32</sup> VanDoren, p. 522.

<sup>33</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 553.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

line of argument as a defense against Mason's accusation, an obvious attempt to assuage the feelings of the not inconsiderable number of the audience favoring limited Federal powers.<sup>35</sup>

Marshall threaded his way carefully through the complex of objections raised by Mason and Henry to jurisdictional power. These objections concerned, essentially, conflicts of three types: (1) disputes between one state and the citizens of another state, (2) disputes between the citizens of one state and the citizens of another, and (3) controversies between a state and a foreign nation. Marshall seemed willing to permit a state to act as a plaintiff in a case, at the same time that he was reluctant to admit that a state might be made a defendant in a federal court. Here again is a direct reflection of Hamilton, who in delineating the powers of the courts in number eighty-one of the *Federalist* digressed for a considerable space to deny vehemently that a state could be brought to the bar by an individual without its consent.<sup>36</sup> In light of later actions by the Supreme Court under Marshall, this course of reasoning would appear to be defensible only as one adopted directly from Hamilton or whatever common source influenced both Hamilton and Marshall, with questionable expediency, to meet an immediate argumentative need.

Further, Marshall reasoned that if an individual applied to a legislature he would secure redress, but if a state had a claim against an individual, it must have recourse to the courts to obtain it. Hence there was a need for a court superior to the state court to adjudicate

the claim.<sup>37</sup> This picture of simple, direct redress to an individual, while a state wallowed in the legal entanglement of a court claim was a fairly obvious, and perhaps a trifle shabby, attempt to appeal to the strongly democratic element in his audience. That the crucial votes on ratification lay with the democratic forces in the convention might indicate the purpose underlying Marshall's eagerness to weave an appeal to their motives into his reasoning on this point.

On the second point, disputes between the citizens of one state and the citizens of another state, Marshall temporized, insisting that, although he could not in honesty argue that it was essential that all such cases be brought into Federal courts, there would be no real harm in this. Again he referred to the independence of the Federal judges as insuring justice through Federal courts, and, he inquired,

Shall we object to this, because the citizen of another state can obtain justice without applying to our state courts?<sup>38</sup>

The objection to Federal adjudication of controversies between states and foreign nations struck squarely at one of the annoying minor issues of the Virginia convention, that of British debt claims.<sup>39</sup> A segment of the audience, primarily smaller planters of the lower Piedmont area, was opposed to the Constitution for fear that a strong Federal government might enforce pay-

<sup>35</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 556.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Debts of Virginia planters to British merchants, uncollected because of the Revolution, were estimated by Thomas Jefferson at about two million pounds sterling at the end of the war. Jefferson to M. Meusnier, January 24, 1786; in *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York, 1896), V, 28. Jefferson indicated that this was a conservative estimate.

<sup>38</sup> See Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1937), p. 28.

<sup>39</sup> VanDoren, p. 547.

ment of these claims.<sup>40</sup> In 1795 the Supreme Court did, in fact, rule in favor of British claimants. Ironically, Marshall, in his only appearance at the bar of the Supreme Court before mounting the bench, argued for the defense of the debtors. The final vote on ratification indicates that he did not allay the suspicions aroused on this point in his audience, since the delegates from the lower Piedmont registered disapproval of ratification.<sup>41</sup>

Marshall gave considerable space, as did Hamilton, to those matters which were being argued as proper substance for a "bill of rights" to be appended to the Constitution prior to ratification. It has been mentioned earlier, and bears repeating here, that Marshall's purpose, and that of Hamilton and the other Federalists, was to secure ratification *prior* to such amendments, and not necessarily *without* them, although this purpose made it incumbent upon them to express the conviction that the Constitution was defensible exactly as it stood. Antifederalist strategy, in the Federalists' view, was to recommit the Constitution to a second Federal convention for revision, then to employ the time thus gained to stir up popular sentiment against it. Specifically, Marshall treated only three of the amendments which had been argued as essential to a proper Constitution: (1) security against entry and seizure, covered later

<sup>40</sup> Exemplifying this attitude is this excerpt from a letter of St. George Tucker to his stepsons, one of whom was the later famous John Randolph of Roanoke: ". . . the Constitution has been adopted in this state. That event, my dear children, affects your interest more dearly than that of many others. The recovery of British debts can no longer be postponed, and there seems to be a moral certainty that your patrimony will all go to satisfy the unjust debt from your papa to the Hanburys." Quoted in Moncure Daniel Conway, *Omitted Chapters of History, disclosed in the Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph* (New York, 1888), p. 106.

<sup>41</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 654-655.

in the fourth amendment; (2) the right to trial by jury, given in the sixth amendment; and (3) denial of the right of a Federal court to change a fact determined by a jury, given in the seventh amendment. Again he referred to the favorite Hamiltonian argument on the "independence of the judges," offering numerous analogies from state court practices to minimize the necessity for prior assurance against these invasions of personal liberty under the new Constitution.<sup>42</sup>

Finally, of course, the principle of judicial review was endorsed by Marshall as it had been by Hamilton.<sup>43</sup> It is fitting indeed that Marshall should have been unequivocal on this point since his fame as a jurist rests, in the final analysis, upon his enunciation and repeated application of this principle during his many years on the bench. There is little doubt that in 1788 Hamilton and Marshall were prepared to argue that the court should function in the way which made it possible for Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, on a much later occasion, to say, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."<sup>44</sup>

Certain of the Antifederalists, notably William Grayson, would have preferred that Congress be granted more power over the Judiciary. In his reply to Marshall, which was presented the following morning, Grayson contended that the legislature should be a "superintending central power to help prevent interferences in jurisdiction of the courts."<sup>45</sup> This argument provoked a brief response from Governor Randolph, who

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 555, 560.

<sup>43</sup> *Supra*, n. 19, 20.

<sup>44</sup> Edwin S. Corwin, *The Twilight of the Supreme Court* (New Haven, Conn., 1934), p. xxvii.

<sup>45</sup> Elliot, *Debates*, III, 563.

apparently ended the day's speechmaking.

Marshall's speech on the Judiciary was the final definitive argument on that subject. Some other brief comments were made, of which Grayson's was one of the most extended. But the bulk of the argument had been presented on either side when Marshall had replied to Mason and Henry.

#### 6.

The effect of Marshall's speech on the convention audience is difficult to assess, in part because of the close teamwork of the Federalists during the debates and the interconnection in their argument and use of evidence. We can be certain, however, that opposing speakers listened to his arguments and attempted to answer them, and that his own colleagues responded to his words.

In retrospect, it would seem fair to

assume that Hamilton's influence on this debate, although indirect, was considerable. The availability of the *Federalist* and Madison's familiarity with it could only mean that Federalist speakers were prepared to follow the lines of reasoning developed in the essays. There is an apparent similarity both in content and in method between Marshall's arguments on the Federal Judiciary and those developed by Hamilton in the *Federalist* essays. In the absence of unequivocal evidence to validate it, I still suggest that the unifying effect which Aly believes Hamilton's arguments gave to the Federalists at Poughkeepsie extended, through the agencies of the *Federalist* papers, the person of James Madison, and the address by John Marshall, to the debate on the Federal Judiciary at Richmond in the Virginia Federal Ratifying Convention of 1788.

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# THE EARLY MORMON THEATRE

Roderick Robertson

## 1.

WHEN Joseph Smith founded the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormon) in 1830, the general attitude of the Christian church in America toward the idea of adult recreation and the theatre in particular was one of hostility. The New England Puritan spirit flourished in organized religion, even if the believers could not always be dissuaded from amusing themselves in any number of sinful ways. How odd, then, that the Mormon Church should look favorably upon amusements and that it should provide "the earliest instance of an American theatre being founded by a religious organization."<sup>1</sup>

While Joseph Smith had many of the traits of those mystics, so often fanatic, who converse with angels, see visions, speak in strange tongues, and write the holy books of our civilization, he also had a down-to-earth side to his personality and displayed much interest in healthful, innocent recreation. While he lived in the Mormon city of Nauvoo, he could often be found playing ball with the brethren, wrestling and defeating the champion wrestler of a nearby town, and engaging in a friendly sharp-shooting match with pistols. He liked to attend parties and picnics. He was in favor of the theatre, and made sure that the city council of Nauvoo was given the power, in 1840, to "license and regulate theatrical and other exhibi-

tions, shows and amusements."<sup>2</sup> And when theatrical performances were given in Nauvoo, Smith was often in the audience.

Yet the personal tastes of Joseph Smith are not enough to explain the attitude of the Mormons in general. Rex A. Skidmore lists four reasons why they broke away from the accepted religious position of the time (and took a new stand) in smiling on and actually stimulating theatrical and other similar activities for recreation and amusement.<sup>3</sup> (1) The leaders of Mormonism introduced a new set of ideas which stressed the point that temporal and physical welfare were essential to spiritual welfare. Naturally, relaxation and diversion were important features of such a philosophy. (2) The Mormons found themselves socially isolated from the American community of the time and could develop their own thought and pattern of living fairly free from the dominant influences of the time. (3) The Mormons were persecuted and suffered considerable hardship in establishing their religion and their society; therefore, they found relief from the hard facts of their often rigorous life. (4) And finally, the Mormon community came to be made up of a number of racial and cultural strains, so that new patterns of activity could grow out of the mixture without conflicting with any hard core of commonly accepted beliefs.

*Mr. Robertson is a member of the faculty of Skidmore College.*

<sup>1</sup> Glenn Hughes, *A History of The American Theatre 1700-1950* (New York, 1951), p. 215.

<sup>2</sup> Rex A. Skidmore, "Mormon Recreation in Theory and Practice: A Study of Social Change," *Pennsylvania Dissertations*, CXCII (Philadelphia, 1951), 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Driven from Ohio and Missouri, the followers of Joseph Smith founded, in 1839, a new city on the banks of the Mississippi in Illinois and called it Nauvoo, "the beautiful." Here, they built homes, workshops, a temple, and a communal hall used for theatricals and concerts. It happened about that time that in Philadelphia Thomas A. Lyne was converted to Mormonism by George J. Adams. Both of these men were professional actors, and Lyne had played principal parts with Charlotte Cushman, Junius Brutus Booth, and Ellen Tree. After his conversion, he traveled to Nauvoo, and it was probably owing to his influence that Joseph Smith organized an amateur dramatic company and encouraged the production of plays. Lyne directed this company and often appeared on the boards himself in such plays as *Virginius*, *The Iron Chest*, *Damon and Pythias*, *William Tell*, and *Pizarro*. On at least one occasion, the part of the High Priest in this last play was taken by none other than Brigham Young himself. Lyne's company played not only in Nauvoo but occasionally in other towns on the river. These early theatrical activities evidently ceased when Lyne became disaffected, left the Church, and dropped out of sight.

In 1844, Joseph Smith and his brother were murdered by a mob in nearby Carthage, Illinois, during the outbreak of long smoldering hostility toward the Mormons among the citizens of the area. It soon became clear that the Mormons could no longer stay in Illinois, and they prepared to move west toward some unknown "promised land." The leadership of the group was assumed by Brigham Young, a man of personal power, religious fervor, and shrewd sense who dominated the economic, social, political, and religious

life of the Mormons for years to come. Young had performed in Nauvoo and believed strongly that innocent amusement was a necessary feature of a sane and virtuous life. He promoted many recreational activities of the Mormons and took a vigorous part in them himself. Years later, he spoke of his own rigorous and constricted childhood:

I shall not subject my little children to such a course of unnatural training, but they shall go to the dance, study music, read novels and do anything else that will tend to expand their frames, add fire to their spirits, improve their minds, and make them feel free and untrammeled in body and mind. Let everything come in its season, place everything in the place designed for it, and do everything in its right time.<sup>4</sup>

In 1847, he claimed to have received a revelation from God which dealt with many matters but included this significant verse: "If thou art merry, praise the Lord with singing and with music, with dancing and with a prayer of praise and thanksgiving."<sup>5</sup> One writer has suggested: "Brigham Young guessed publicly that there was a lot more singing and dancing in Heaven than in Hell, and he saw no reason why the Saints should try to imitate the hot place."<sup>6</sup>

The Mormons began their exodus from Nauvoo in February 1846, when the snow was thick on the ground and the temperature twenty degrees below zero. The first vanguard camped near Sugar Creek, Iowa, for about a month while most of the rest of the population of Nauvoo crossed the frozen Mississippi and caught up. At this camp, one of the first activities was to clear away the snow from a piece of frozen ground, build large fires, have supper, and, after worship and a prayer, hold a

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Wallace Stegner, *Mormon Country* (New York, 1942), p. 18.

dance. Brigham Young told them: "I want you to sing and dance and forget your troubles. We must think of the future that lies ahead and the work which is ours. We are to build the Kingdom of God in a new Zion. Let's have some music and all of you dance."<sup>7</sup> And dance they did to the rousing music of Captain William Pitt's Nauvoo Brass Band, which continued to be an indispensable part of the pioneer caravan. Wherever the Mormons went, the fiddlers and cornet players went along.

## 2.

The Mormons began entering the Salt Lake Valley in July 1847, and for the first year or two they were fully occupied with the labor of building a city, tending the new crops, and staying alive. But it was not long before the dramatic impulse began to make itself felt:

Out of this Nauvoo Brass Band indirectly grew our first theatrical company. An amalgamation was effected between the members of the band and certain gentlemen and ladies possessing dramatic instincts and predilection, several of whom had also been connected with theatricals before they came into the isolation of these mountains.

The project of organizing a theatrical company, with a combination of musical and dramatic elements, received the hearty sanction of Brigham Young, and he at once became the patron of the Salt Lake stage.<sup>8</sup>

Years later, Young remarked: "If I were placed on a cannibal island and given a task of civilizing its people, I should straightway build a theatre for the purpose."<sup>9</sup>

The new company was called the Musical and Dramatic Company and immediately went about preparing to perform in public. Though there is

some disagreement about the location of the initial performance, it was evidently held in a crude building known as the Old Bowery, probably named after the well-known New York theatre. There had been an actual bowery of boughs and limbs erected in Temple Square in July 1847, but it is unlikely that plays were ever presented there. The Old Bowery, constructed soon after the earlier recreation hall, was a structure of more durability, and was used for regular church services on Sunday as well as for recreation.

The first play in Salt Lake City was performed in the winter of 1850-51 in the Old Bowery and was entitled *The Triumph of Innocence*. In the spring of 1851, the Dramatic Company presented the second act of the two-act drama, *Robert Macaire*. Shortly afterward, under the leadership of a Bishop Raleigh, the company was reorganized as the Deseret Dramatic Association, a name it bore for many years. In the season of 1851-52, more than a thousand people saw performances of dramas, which included Kotzebue's ever popular *The Stranger* and the farce *Hector Timid*.

There was certainly a ready market in Salt Lake at that time for theatrical presentations, for the new colony was in its own words "a thousand miles from everywhere" and quite outside the limits of the regular touring companies. Yet many in those early audiences were fairly sophisticated theatregoers who had been converted to Mormonism in England and then migrated to Utah. Some had seen Macready, the Kembles, Sarah Siddons, and Edmund Kean in their native land, and many had been accustomed "to go to the theatre and to the philharmonic concerts, to see the best of acting and hear the divinest singing."<sup>10</sup> Writing on the same sub-

<sup>7</sup> Milton R. Hunter, *Utah—The Story of Her People* (Salt Lake City, 1946), p. 154.

<sup>8</sup> Edward W. Tullidge, *History of Salt Lake City* (Salt Lake City, 1886), p. 736.

<sup>9</sup> Skidmore, p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> Tullidge, p. 737.

ject, Phil Margetts, one of the early leaders of the Deseret Dramatic Association, commented:

Many [of the settlers] came from large cities, both on the other side of the water and from the Eastern cities of America, so that we had in our midst some of the best mechanics, best artist-musicians, and a great many possessing a wonderful amount of dramatic talent; consequently we were prepared to commence right in our efforts to form a stock company that in after years was considered second to none west of New York. The beginning was, all things considered, truly worthy the sequel, and I would not have my friends suppose for a moment that everything connected with our first presentation of the drama in Utah was crude, imperfect and without its redeeming features. It is true we were beset by annoyances of various kinds for want of materials, etc., but what we lacked in that respect we made up in the general consideration of the beholders in large and heavy drafts on their imagination.<sup>11</sup>

To meet the growing social needs of the people, a social hall was erected and formally dedicated on January 1, 1853. It had an auditorium sixty by forty feet with a capacity of three hundred people, although it was often crowded to hold four hundred. The stage was three or four feet above the level of the auditorium and measured forty by twenty feet. In the basement were two dressing rooms, a kitchen, and a banquet hall seating five hundred people. This building, of adobe brick, was in continuous use for amateur theatricals and other purposes until it was torn down in 1921.

According to George D. Pyper,<sup>12</sup> the first play performed in Social Hall was *Don Caesar de Bazan* on January 17, 1853, along with the farce, *The Irish Lion*. However, he admits that some authorities report *The Lady of Lyons* as the first play.<sup>13</sup> In this respect, the

testimony of Mrs. B. G. Ferris proves helpful. She had accompanied her husband on a trip to Utah and spent the winter of 1852-53 in Salt Lake where she attended theatrical performances in Social Hall. She reported:

17th [of January] Last evening we went to the theatre at Social Hall, a building erected for purposes of amusement. The acting was on a dais or platform, raised some three or four feet above the room occupied by the spectators. The play was the *Lady of Lyons*, and the performance so much better than we anticipated, that I should have enjoyed it well enough had it not been for some side acting in the crowd, which must preclude us from going again to the same place.<sup>14</sup>

Mrs. Ferris goes on to state that only some of the actors had had professional experience on the stage, though one was evidently well-experienced in other matters and was obviously in full pursuit of a fellow player, Mrs. Wheelock, whose husband was conveniently out of town on a religious mission. "She was so much an attraction among the actors in this play, as to occasionally interfere with the performance intended for the amusement of the public."<sup>15</sup> She continues by mentioning the number of free tickets given to Brigham Young and his family as well as to other leaders of the Church: "Of course, where dead-heads, like autumn leaves, literally cover the floor, the sum to be divided, after deducting expenses, is exceedingly small."<sup>16</sup>

Mrs. Ferris' husband, Benjamin G. Ferris, who was Secretary of the Territory of Utah at that time, published his own observations of the theatrical activities among the Mormons:

During the winter, they keep up theatrical exhibitions at Social Hall, and generally the performances are better sustained in all their parts than in theatres in the Atlantic cities, though

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by George D. Pyper, *The Romance of An Old Playhouse* (Salt Lake City, 1928), p. 42.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Mrs. B. G. Ferris, *The Mormons at Home* (New York, 1856), pp. 149-150.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

the principal part would not so well bear comparison. They lack in costume, but their music is good, and they have a scene-painter who would embellish theatres of much greater pretensions.

But the misery of all their social and theatrical entertainments is that they are too often made the places of assignation. At the theatre, the audience combines the peculiar characteristics of the pit and third tier of eastern cities; and as the room is imperfectly lighted, there are things said and done which would not bear a stronger light or a more definite description.<sup>17</sup>

The actors of the Deseret Dramatic Association received no salaries for their work. They attended rehearsals every night of the week except Wednesdays and Saturdays, when performances were given. The rehearsals often lasted until midnight or later, even though the players all held regular jobs during the day. Occasionally, benefits were given for the members of the group, the proceeds being divided equally among them. One of the actresses of the company, Mrs. Sarah Cooke, related that in twelve years she received the total sum of \$150.<sup>18</sup> None of these early players ever became known outside Utah, but on their own grounds they became well-loved and achieved no mean skill in their art. One of them, Bernard Snow, came to be styled "The Roscius of the Rocky Mountains."<sup>19</sup>

All the actors were naturally members of the Deseret Dramatic Association, which met regularly to carry on the business necessary to produce plays. Pyper records the minutes of a regular meeting of the Association in October 1855.<sup>20</sup> After the meeting opened with prayer, the group elected a new secretary, voted that the next play performed would be *Leap Year*, and that it would

be given on November 6th. New members were admitted to the group, and the part of Miss Flowerdew in *Leap Year* was cast to Miss Tuckett (by majority vote?). Two members performed musical solos, and the meeting adjourned with a benediction.

During the season of 1855-56, the repertoire included *She Stoops to Conquer*, *Othello*, *New Way to Pay Old Debts*, *Richard III*, and a number of contemporary melodramas and farces. By this time, performances were given three times a week and were composed of the principal attraction, an after-piece, and an olio in between, usually a musical solo. Performances began at 6:30 in the evening, and tickets cost fifty cents, though produce was acceptable to the company. A performance of *Othello* in 1855 has been described by an English visitor to Salt Lake City:

'The performances will commence with—who could have thought it?—'Othello: Act 3.' Shakspere in Utah! And what a moral for such a people! the murder of a fond and falsely-suspected wife; and the act chosen that in which the husband's suspicion is first aroused. Mormonism might take lessons from a worse teacher than Shakspere, and read them out of a better edition than the representation I saw; fortunately, it was but one act. The parts of Othello and Iago were, for the place, not badly filled; but Desdemona—the gentle womanly Desdemona, child-like even in her dignity, and hurt not angered at the refusal of her boon—she was a tall masculine *female*, but with cheeks painted beyond the possibility of a blush. But for the play-bill—for there were play-bills—one might have supposed that, as on the ancient Greek stage, the part of the heroine was acted by a man; the acting and tone was up to the appearance; quite ungracious, not to say that of a virago. Even worse was Emilia; an old dowdy she looked, who might have been a chambermaid at a third-rate hotel for a quarter of a century, and then attended for five or ten years more on a deaf elderly lady. I fear I shall ever associate the lost handkerchief with their acting. The afterpiece, one of the two-act Lyceum dramas, was, on the contrary, very well performed; though any one must seem lame in

<sup>17</sup> Benjamin G. Ferris, *Utah and The Mormons* (New York, 1854), p. 306.

<sup>18</sup> Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Utah* (San Francisco, 1890), p. 585.

<sup>19</sup> Tullidge, p. 738.

<sup>20</sup> Pyper, p. 47.

Charles Matthews' part: the country girl was better played than at the Lyceum, for there was an absence of the traditional tone of a rustic, and she was pretty and unpainted. The audience, which had listened attentively, but with as little enjoyment as myself to *Othello*, entered thoroughly into this piece, and laughed and applauded from end to end, despite a few unknown phrases and allusions. . . .<sup>21</sup>

## 3.

Dramatic presentations in Salt Lake City were broken up in 1857 by the "Utah War." A series of charges, countercharges, and misunderstandings led President Buchanan to believe the Mormons were planning an insurrection against the United States Government, and in 1857, he dispatched an army of 2500 men under General Albert S. Johnston to march on Salt Lake City. The Mormons prepared to resist this move, and fighting seemed imminent. However, in April 1858, a peace commission managed to get an agreement from the Mormons to allow the army to pass peacefully through Salt Lake City and establish a camp outside it. This was accomplished, and the army stationed itself at Camp Floyd, thirty miles south of the city on the shores of Utah Lake. During this winter of fearful anticipation, the Deseret Dramatic Association evidently did not produce any plays, and though attempts were made to revive the previous successes in 1858, 1859, and 1860, they were unsuccessful. The Association lived on in name only until the building of the Salt Lake Theatre.

During the fall of 1858, the troops at Camp Floyd built a crude playhouse under the direction of Sgt. R. C. White. They organized the Military Dramatic Association and on November 12, 1858, presented a bill consisting of a pro-

logue, a two-act farce, *Used Up*, and an afterpiece, *The Dead Shot*. An orchestra of ten players from the Seventh Infantry Band supplied the music for the evening. Some actors and actresses in this venture came from Salt Lake City and lived at nearby Spanish Fork, but many of the players were soldiers. An anti-Mormon newspaper, *Valley Tan*, printed in Salt Lake, reported the initial performance:

The theatre at Camp Floyd opened on Tuesday night, and the performances we understand were highly creditable. . . . Some idea may be formed of the difficulties labored under when we state that in the absence of yellow ochre or chrome a portion of the scenery was actually painted from a solution of mustard and does not present a very jaundiced aspect at that. We made a hasty visit to Camp Floyd a few days since, and while there took a daylight peep into the theatre. Although not yet completed and the workmen still busily engaged, yet we could not but admire the taste displayed in the whole arrangement, especially when we took into consideration the difficulties they have had to encounter. . . . We saw with our own eyes . . . scenery and fresco work painted from the most ordinary materials. Mustard, common chalk, and blacking used for boots, were the elements from which palaces, cottages, gardens, and landscapes generally were brought out upon the canvass, while Shakespeare, himself, the patron saint of the Dramatic Temple the world over, loomed out above the curtain drop done up in common chalk. The scenic effect is certainly creditable and exhibits a degree of artistic skill which is most praiseworthy; and the Bard of Avon, could he see his face sketched between the proscenium, even though in chalk, would not redden or blush at his likeness.<sup>22</sup>

The Military Association was soon playing such dramas as *Luke the Laborer*, *The Rough Diamond*, *The Lady of Lyons*, *The Stranger*, *All That Glitters is Not Gold*, *The Rivals*, and *Othello*. The *Valley Tan* reporter was on hand for a production of the last play and sent the following dispatch to his editor:

Saturday, September 24, 1859: It is usual, we

<sup>21</sup> William Chandless, *A Visit to Salt Lake* (London, 1857), pp. 223-224.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted by Pyper, pp. 61-62.

believe, in large theatres to rehearse the pieces intended to be performed—particularly five-act ones. But it seems from the manner in which 'Othello' was put upon the stage that the Military Dramatic Association dispenses with this formula.<sup>23</sup>

Performances continued until the impending Civil War made it necessary for the army to leave Utah and return east.

In the fall of 1859, a group of Salt Lake thespians organized the Mechanics' Dramatic Association as an amateur company independent of the official sanction of the Mormon Church. The group did not at first have any place in which to perform, but one of the members, Harry Bowring, was then building a house for himself and turned over the entire ground floor to the Association for a hall which was appropriately named Bowring's Theatre, the first building in Utah to bear the name "theatre." "It was a theatre now, no longer a bowery; no longer a Social Hall; secular not sacred; Grecian (from whence its parentage), not Hebraic. It was the beginning of our proper dramatic era."<sup>24</sup> The building had a small stage, some well-painted scenery, and a curtain; the auditorium was furnished with rising tiers of wooden seats and had a capacity of around seventy-five persons. Plays presented here included *The Gamester*, *The Mock Duke*, *Othello*, *Betsey Baker*, *Farmer Wakefield*, and *Luke the Laborer*.

Although the Church had not opposed the operation of Bowring's Theatre, the proprietors were anxious to obtain its blessing, and Brigham Young and his Counselor, Heber C. Kimball, were invited to attend a performance. They came and saw *Luke the Laborer*

and liked it so well they returned the following night with their families—ninety people in all—to see *The Mock Duke*. The little theatre could hardly hold the crowd, but a good time was evidently had by all, since at the end of the evening Young made a speech in which he declared that Salt Lake City ought to have a regular theatre because "the people must have amusement as well as religion."<sup>25</sup> Immediately after, the Mechanics' Dramatic Association merged with the old Deseret Dramatic Association, taking the name of the older company, and plans were begun for the construction of the Salt Lake Theatre.

#### 4.

Brigham Young believed that the people of Utah needed a theatre before they needed a temple, and when he built a theatre he spared no pains to make it the best one possible. Social Hall had become inadequate to meet the demands of a growing community, and the small Bowring's Theatre could hardly fill the gap. Besides, the activities at Camp Floyd had attracted many of the best actors and actresses away from Salt Lake City. Ironically, though, it was this same Camp Floyd which was to provide indirectly the basis for the new theatre. When the Army left Utah, many supplies were left behind and sold to the highest bidder. Young purchased \$4000 worth of building materials, glass, nails, canvas, groceries, and other items. He sold some of these, thereby realizing \$40,000, and the rest was used in the actual construction. The money served as capital for the venture.

Work was begun on July 1, 1861, under the designing hand of William H. Folsom. Before completion, however, an English architect, E. L. T.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

Harrison, arrived in Utah and did most of the interior decoration. It was said that he was an admirer of the Drury Lane Theatre in London, and the elaborate ceiling, filigree work in the boxes, and the proscenium suggested the influence of that house. The Salt Lake Theatre cost over \$100,000, and when it was completed, Folsom presented Brigham Young with the following description of it, signed by himself:

It was commenced July 1, 1861, and completed for temporary use March 5, 1862. The building is situated on the corner of the State Road and First South Street. The size of the building on the ground floor is 80 by 144 feet, 40 feet high from water-table to the square of the building. The roof is self-supporting and hipped all around, with a promenade on top 40 by 90 feet. The south main entrance has an opening of 32 by 20 feet supported by two Grecian Doric columns. The exterior of the building is Grecian Doric. The auditorium has a parquette and four circles, 60 feet on the outer circle, 37 feet on the inner, and covered with a circular dome in ogee or bell form. In the interior, the stage has an opening at the drop curtain of 31 feet front by 28 feet high, shows 27 feet in flats and 62 feet deep from the footlights, 10 feet proscenium and 40 feet high from stage floor to ceiling. The building is still in progress and will probably be completed the present season.<sup>26</sup>

The Theatre was built and in use a full eight years before the Union Pacific Railroad reached Salt Lake City. The only power used in the construction, apart from human and animal, came from a water wheel in a nearby creek. It stood as a remarkable achievement in the history of theatre. The interior dome was later removed for acoustical purposes, and the house was often praised for its perfection on this score. Artemus Ward wrote that it was "quite as brilliant as that of any theatre in London."<sup>27</sup> And a critic of the Mormons, Samuel Bowles, wrote in 1869: The theatre is one of the finest and largest

buildings in the city; it compares well with the best opera-houses of the East in size and appointments; and the performances in it are always respectable and sometimes very superior. There is generally a star actor or two from the East or from California; but the principal portion of the performers are amateurs,—merchants and mechanics, clerks and laborers, wives and daughters of citizens of Salt Lake City. The scenery and dresses are all first-class, and there is evidently a stage manager who understands his business. We had a drama and a spectacular farce for one evening's entertainment; and I have rarely seen a theatrical performance more pleasing and satisfactory in all its details and appointments.<sup>28</sup>

Some of the scenery mentioned by Bowles had been purchased from the Army and had been in use years before at Camp Floyd.

The Salt Lake Theatre was formally dedicated on March 6, 1862. Brigham Young and several church dignitaries sat on the stage in front of the curtain, and Young called the gathering to order with the practical remark that though the building was not yet complete, it was perfectly safe. A hymn was sung, and Daniel H. Wells delivered a long prayer of dedication in which he dedicated to God the building, the ground, the adobes, the stage, the galleries, the orchestra, the actors, the green room, the dressing rooms, and a long list of details. He prayed that the Theatre:

may be pure and holy unto the Lord our God, for a safe and righteous habitation for the assemblages of Thy people, for pastime, amusement and recreation; for plays, theatrical performances, for lectures, conventions, or celebrations, or for whatever purpose it may be used for the benefit of Thy Saints. . . . And, O Lord, preserve forever this house pure and holy for the habitation of thy people. Suffer no evil or wicked influences to predominate or prevail within these walls, neither disorder, drunkenness, debauchery or licentiousness of any sort or kind; but rather than this, sooner than it should pass into the hands or control of the wicked or ungodly, let it utterly perish

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>27</sup> Quoted by M. R. Werner, *Brigham Young* (New York, 1925), p. 444.

<sup>28</sup> Quoted by Skidmore, p. 50.

and crumble to atoms; let it be as though it had not been, an utter waste, each and every part returning to its natural elements; but may order, virtue, cleanliness, sobriety and excellence obtain and hold fast possession herein, the righteousness possess it, and 'Holiness to the Lord' be forever inscribed therein.<sup>29</sup>

Perhaps never before in modern times has a theatre commenced operations with such solemn ceremony or been dedicated to such a high purpose. There were two musical numbers after the prayer, and Brigham Young spoke on "The Capacity of the Human Body and Mind for Improvement and Development." He recalled his own strict upbringing and affirmed that the people would be benefited and refreshed by watching theatrical entertainments. There were other speeches, another musical number, and then the curtain rose on *The Pride of The Market*, after which there was dancing on the stage.

Regular performances of *The Pride of The Market* began two days later, along with a comic song as olio and an afterpiece, *State Secrets or The Tailor of Tamworth*. Prices were seventy-five cents for the parquet and first and second circle and fifty cents for the third circle, though produce was also accepted at the box office for tickets. Though the play did not begin until seven o'clock, every seat in the house was filled by 5:30. At the end of this performance, which included more speeches, musical numbers, and a dramatic recitation, the scene was suddenly shifted in full view of the audience, the orchestra struck up "Sir Roger de Coverly," and Brigham Young led a group in that dance onstage.

The policy of the house was to play a standard play, an olio, and an afterpiece, and performances were given every other night during the season.

The curtain went up promptly at 8 p.m., the show was over by 10:30. A temporary floor could be laid over the seats on the lower floor, level with the stage, and thus the Theatre could be and often was used as a ballroom. It became traditional for the Mormons to occupy the lower floor and parquet while "gentiles" and visitors took over the dress circle. The two other circles were filled by the less respectable members of the community, not to mention boys and Indians. These early audiences were a little unconventional:

Sociability reigned supreme. Everyone felt at home in the theatre. Gossiping was not unheard of, lunches were eaten, and on unusually cold nights pails of soup were occasionally brought in and sampled between the acts. Also it has been related to me, by one who was there and knows that on a certain night a prominent lady, whom I will not name and who had received the first set of artificial teeth ever worn in Salt Lake, attended the theatre and passed the plate around for the inspection of the amazed and privileged first nighters.<sup>30</sup>

During the first season, the Deseret Dramatic Association, which became a true stock company, presented such plays as *The Serious Family*, *Used Up*, *Love's Sacrifice*, and *Lavater the Physiognomist*, as well as the usual afterpieces. The following season, 1862-63, in addition to the plays already mentioned, the company added to its repertoire such dramas as *Virginius*, *Secret Agent*, *Ingomar*, and *Damon and Pythias*.

To reinforce community feeling about the new playhouse, Brigham Young encouraged his own children to act on its stage, and his ten oldest daughters once formed a dance team in the play, *The Mountain Sylph*. They were only the first and largest of Young's many daughters and were therefore known as the "Big Ten." They achieved a great

<sup>29</sup> Quoted by Tullidge, pp. 743-744.

<sup>30</sup> Pyper, p. 124.

popular success on the stage "with their shapely ankles exposed while their blue tarlatan skirts fell midway between knee and ankle."<sup>31</sup>

In the spring of 1863, the house closed for a short time, and when it reopened, acting on its boards was none other than Thomas A. Lyne, who had played twenty years before in Nauvoo. Lyne had been brought from Denver by Brigham Young and placed in charge of the Salt Lake Theatre. He finished off that season by producing *Pizarro*, *William Tell*, *The Stranger*, and *The Merchant of Venice*. He proved to be both a popular and energetic actor-director. The following season, he was joined by Mr. and Mrs. Selden Irwin as stock stars, who opened their engagement on November 4, 1863, with *The Lady of Lyons*.

From this moment on, the company became more and more professional in spirit, and the early, struggling days

were over. Yet, for some years, the actors carried on at regular jobs during the day. Many of them were community leaders, and the Mormon influence in the operation of the Theatre continued for some time. When salaries were eventually given to the actors, the Church contributed directly in their support when necessary. Rehearsals opened with prayer, and smoking and drinking were forbidden. The temple of drama long remained a well-defined community project and asset rather than a private, commercial venture, and the quality of its productions was vouched for on all sides. The coming of the "combination companies" killed off the stock company, the Deseret Dramatic Association, in 1879, and the Church later withdrew from direct interest in the theatre. But the Salt Lake Theatre continued to serve by presenting all the popular players of the time, operating successfully until it was torn down in 1929.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

## PRESSURES TOWARD CONFORMITY IN GROUP DISCUSSION

Stanley F. Paulson

PRESSURES toward conformity are strong in our society. Observer after observer, both foreign and domestic, has testified that this is so. Any teacher might well wonder how much and how inevitably these pressures come to bear in his classroom. In an era of group discussion teachers of speech may need to be particularly concerned about conformist pressures, for there is ready evidence that in pursuit of group harmony these pressures become intensified. Teachers themselves may intensify them. If individual dissent as well as agreement is to be valued, we must understand the danger that lurks in these subtle influences and seek ways to minimize it.

To see these pressures in context, we might recall that over a century ago astute observers such as De Tocqueville felt that a society based on free discussion and decision was vulnerable to a "tyranny of the majority." He argued that where it is believed that a greater number of men will necessarily have more wisdom than an individual and that the rights of the many are to be preferred to the rights of the few, the majority will acquire a prodigious power. This, he held, was dangerous. "If it be admitted that a man, possessing absolute power, may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should a majority not be liable of the same reproach? Men are not apt to change their characters by agglomera-

tion; nor does their patience in the presence of obstacles increase with the consciousness of their strength."<sup>1</sup> As a result of his observation of the functioning of democracy in this country, he reached the conclusion, "In America the majority raises very formidable barriers to the liberty of opinion."<sup>2</sup>

More recently, critical observers of our culture have seen a shift toward greater advocacy of group values as opposed to the values of individualism. William H. Whyte, Jr., for example, avers, "First, that the belief is growing that the health of our society depends upon increasing adjustment by the individual to the consensus of the group. Second, that this is not simply an unwitting yen for conformity but a philosophy—a philosophy actively advocated by a sizeable proportion of leadership in society."<sup>3</sup>

David Riesman believes this has led to a characterological change in the members of our society. The "inner-directed" person whose guidance came from internal goals implanted early in life by his elders and toward which he was inescapably directed, is giving way to an "other-directed" person. "What is common to all the other-directed people is that their contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual. . . . The goals to

<sup>1</sup> Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* [1835], trans. Henry Reeve (New York, 1945), I, 259.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>3</sup> William H. Whyte, Jr., "The New Illiteracy," *Saturday Review*, XXXVI (Nov. 21, 1953), 34.

ward which the other-directed person strives shift with that guidance; it is only the process of striving itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life."<sup>4</sup>

This change, according to Riesman, partially results from a modification of the influence of the parent, the teacher, and the peer group. Parents, increasingly troubled as to the proper way to rear their children, turn to experts, to other parents, even to the children themselves for approval of their actions, and the children cannot fail to be impressed how dependent their parents are on others for criteria of acceptable behavior. The teacher, more than ever sensitive to the adjustment of the child to the group, frequently more pleased by his "attitude of cooperation" than by the content he has learned, communicates to the child the significance of group acceptance. It is not surprising then, that "The peer group becomes the measure of all things; the individual has few defenses the group cannot batter down. In this situation the competitive drives for achievement sponsored in children by the remnants of inner-direction in their parents come into conflict with the co-operative demands sponsored by the peer group. The child, therefore, is forced to re-channel the competitive drive for achievement, as demanded by the parents, into his drive for approval from his peers. Neither parent, child, nor the peer group itself is particularly conscious of this process."<sup>5</sup>

Riesman's analysis is particularly pertinent to our attempt to see the pressures toward conformity in group discussion, for discussion is basically a

peer-group activity. The earlier it is used in the classroom, the earlier the individual discovers the comfort of being on the side of the majority. And he is predisposed to seek it if it is highly valued in his environment.

Not only from our cultural milieu, however, do we feel such pressures. They come in part from the nature of the group situation. S. E. Asch, in an ingenious experiment, studied individuals each of whom was put in a group where every one of the others held a (secretly agreed upon) opposing viewpoint. In a series of trials the group was in each case to choose one of three lines which would match a given line in length. By previous arrangement seven of the members had been instructed to agree on an erroneous judgment at specified times in the series to see if the pressure of the majority would induce the critical eighth member to bow to their judgment rather than follow the evidence of his own eyes. After putting fifty subjects into this experimental situation, Asch concluded, "There was a marked movement toward the majority. One third of all the estimates in the critical group were errors identical with or in the direction of the distorted estimates of the majority."<sup>6</sup> The stimulus materials had previously been tested to insure that individuals under these conditions could ordinarily perceive the differences. His results seem to suggest that the force of the majority is a powerful one, powerful enough to coerce agreement in one out of three cases in spite of the evidence of one's own eyes. If the tendency toward conformity is of this order in a visual judgment, one wonders whether it would not be increased on a social is-

<sup>4</sup> David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd*, Doubleday Anchor Series (New York, 1956), p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 104.

<sup>6</sup> S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," *Group Dynamics*, ed. A. Cartwright and D. Zander (Evanston, Ill., 1953), p. 153.

sue such as we consider in our discussion classes, where ambiguity is greater and dependence on others for corroboration is more likely to be needed.

Further light on the influence of the majority is given by R. L. Gorden, who interviewed 24 members of a co-operative living project, first privately and later in a group, on their attitudes toward Russia. He found that 49% of the responses members gave in the group were changed from the original attitudes they had revealed to him in private, and they were changed in the direction of the individual's estimate (previously recorded) of the majority viewpoint. The rest of the responses either were the same as they had been in private or in a few cases were changed to greater deviation from the majority. He concludes, "For the group as a whole, conformity was the predominant mode of adjustment to the discrepancy between the person's private opinion and his estimate of the group opinion."<sup>7</sup>

If there is a "natural" tendency within many persons to conform to a group's opinion, there is also, it appears, a pronounced likelihood that the dynamics of group discussion will work to overpower the individual whose opinion differs from the others. Festinger points out that two studies have substantiated the hypothesis that "the force to communicate about 'item X' to a particular member of a group will increase as the discrepancy in opinion between that member and the communicator increases."<sup>8</sup> In the Schachter study, about five times as many communications were addressed to the hold-

er of the divergent point of view as were addressed to the others.<sup>9</sup> One possible instance of this that many of us have observed is that in which a subject is being discussed in a routine and pedestrian manner, when one person suggests an idea radically different from what has preceded. As the great guns of a battleship swing round to bear on an enemy, the group members may shift to attack the alien idea.<sup>10</sup> If the innovator has the means to defend himself, the exchange may prove profitable. If not, he will think twice before he again so exposes himself to assault, especially if he realizes that the more his ideas differ from those of the group, the stronger will be the tendency to reject him, a fact which is also supported by research on small groups.<sup>11</sup>

In a speech classroom, of course, there is more than a group discussing something. There is a teacher guiding the class in discussion technique—presenting discussion theory, commenting on procedures, supervising criticism of performances. His conduct plainly has much to do with the conditions of conformity and dissent in his classroom. One way in which a teacher might unwittingly bolster conformist pressures

<sup>7</sup> Raymond L. Gorden, "Interaction Between Attitude and the Definition of the Situation in the Expression of Opinion," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (1952), 55.

<sup>8</sup> Leon Festinger, "Informal Social Communication," *Psychological Review*, LVII (1950), 275.

<sup>9</sup> S. Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection and Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVI (1951), 190-207.

<sup>10</sup> "One of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea. It is, as common people say, so 'upsetting'; it makes you think that, after all, your favourite notions may be wrong, your firmest beliefs ill-founded; it is certain that till now there was no place allotted in your mind to the new and startling inhabitant, and now that it has conquered an entrance, you do not at once see which of your old ideas it will or will not turn out, with which of them it can be reconciled, and with which it is at essential enmity. Naturally, therefore, common men hate a new idea, and are disposed more or less to ill-treat the original man who brings it." Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* [1869] (New York, 1948), p. 169.

<sup>11</sup> Festinger, p. 278.

is by overstressing certain aspects of discussion theory. How important, for example, is agreement? It is sometimes suggested that a discussion seeks more than majority approval; it seeks, if possible, agreement of all: consensus. A leader is said to be ill advised to have a vote on an issue. A vote separates people, and the hope is that the group may be unified in their final decision. When we draw from this the implication that unanimity is the goal that is reached in successful discussion, the non-conforming individual who stays with his convictions cannot but feel that he is interfering with the group's progress. In this respect an analogy has sometimes been drawn between members of a group and the parts of the body. Each has its own function, yet they work in continual harmony for the good of the whole organism. If one is out of harmony with the others, it is said, the condition is pathological. This ought to let the non-conformist know exactly where he stands.

Occasionally undue pressures toward agreement rise out of the procedures of the discussion class. The class may be divided into groups which will take up different topics. Let us say one group takes the problem of the Supreme Court decision ordering that FBI files be opened to defendants who have been accused on the basis of that evidence. Time for them to read and prepare is necessarily limited. The rest of the class is working on other subjects and the teacher is not specially trained in the subject this group is discussing. The climate of criticism is more severe with respect to discussion technique than with respect to the issue itself. With the previously mentioned pressures toward unanimity and these immediate classroom conditions, the group is far more likely to pass

lightly over subtle disagreements and differences than they would if more time, study, and incisive criticism were available. The same students discussing this subject in a course in constitutional law would probably discover far greater divergencies of viewpoint among themselves after intensive study than are likely to emerge in one class discussion on the subject. The number of topics considered in a discussion class restricts the opportunity to explore minority views on any given topic.

Furthermore, as teachers, we influence the character of discussion by the criteria we use to evaluate it. How high a value have we placed on the individual viewpoint? How important do our students consider it to be to get the unique opinion heard, examined, and respected if its holder cannot relinquish it after hearing the facts and opinions of the majority? An inspection of seven lists of criteria of evaluation in three standard textbooks used in our colleges shows fourteen items which stress the importance of the individual agreeing with the group (e.g. "Evidence that members feel a responsibility to the group before they feel a responsibility to themselves," "Ability to compromise and adjust to differences of opinion and majority feeling"). Only three items stress the importance of individual dissent (e.g. "Was minority opinion protected?"). These writers and teachers of discussion are not indifferent to the views of the minority. On the contrary, the discussants are urged to listen to the dissenter and consider his point of view. This is rather a question of balance. A disproportionate weight seems at present to be on the side of seeking consensus, adjusting to the group, willingness to change opinion, avoiding conflict, subordinating individual inter-

ests, following the majority—group centeredness rather than independent judgment.

Group values are far more important for the behavior of the discussants than for their thinking. The person who is antagonistic to the others in his manner of speaking, who refuses to accept the procedure others desire, who treats majority opinion and its holders with sarcasm or contempt, who pursues his solitary way precisely because the others have chosen a different path, will injure any discussion. The person, however, who sees the issue differently, who introduces a view held by no one else in the group, who can support it with data when it has been challenged, who examines the hasty generalization made and accepted by the majority, who raises the overlooked question to impede the rush toward specious agreement, will generally contribute most to the quality of thinking of the group. Co-operation, harmony, and group centeredness are necessary for the procedure of discussion, but independent thought and judgment are essential to the handling of its ideas. The former values are prominently represented in our criteria of evaluation; the latter hardly make their appearance.

Perhaps, too, we ought to look again at the role of conflict in discussion. Some seem to consider conflict the arch enemy of good discussion. The participant is urged to avoid it. The leader is told how to dispose of it by reinterpreting the language of the opponents, by shifting attention from it to points on which there is agreement, by switching participation from the persons opposed to others not involved, by taking up another question, or, if desperate, by a recess. Conflict, it is said, is characteristic of debate but alien to discussion. Of course it is

not that simple. Haiman helpfully distinguishes between extrinsic conflict arising out of emotional barriers to agreement and intrinsic conflict arising out of differences in reasoning, evidence, meaning or values.<sup>12</sup> Emotional barriers to agreement interfere with the orderly process of deliberation. Intrinsic conflict, however, is the heart of good discussion. Groups deliberate on questions precisely because there are alternative answers—because there are differences of interpretation as to the facts, and because different sets of values imply different answers. The more these sorts of conflict come out in the discussion, the greater the opportunity for productive decision-making. Avoidance or superficial resolution of such differences inhibits individuality and destroys the creative capacity of the group.

An interesting experiment in using discussion, not for the purpose of group consensus but to develop individual viewpoints, is now being carried out by the American Foundation for Political Education, a non-profit organization operating with the assistance of the Ford Fund for Adult Education. More than 50,000 persons across the country have already participated in this program. In the basic series, members are given a set of readings from authorities on such subjects as war, democracy, Communism, world government, etc., which provide material for weekly discussions. "The aim of the program," members learn, "is to develop individual independence of thought. The important thing is what the individual thinks, not what the group thinks. If the participants were driven to accept some group conclusion,

<sup>12</sup> Franklyn S. Haiman, *Group Leadership and Democratic Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 182, 189.

it would make a neater ending for the meeting, but only at the expense of diluting the unique quality of each individual's thoughts about the problems discussed."<sup>13</sup> For this reason the leaders are not to summarize the agreements of the group. As their leader's manual puts it, "The *group* is not being developed; in ten weeks the group will pass entirely out of existence. We use the group only as a means of developing individual capacities and skills. What is important for each member is whether he recognizes fundamental problems and whether he develops sound independent judgements about them."<sup>14</sup>

Their view of conflict is noteworthy. The leader is told, "When the discussion is going well, the participants are engaging in a meaningful controversy concerning important political issues. Your job is to maintain this controversy

on a high level. You do so by probing first on this side, then on that. But you do not support either side. Rather you support the controversy itself."<sup>15</sup>

Whether such an approach actually does encourage independent judgment and reduce the pressure toward conformity is not yet established on the basis of objective evidence. The leaders of the organization, however, are firmly convinced of its effectiveness. At least it is an attempt to introduce into the methodology of group deliberation greater protection of individuality. Teachers of discussion can probably provide better methods of achieving the same ends if they are convinced there is a real need for them. If the quality of thinking in a democracy is dependent on the opportunities it affords to minority opinions to be heard, methods of encouraging their expression will always be needed. And the limited knowledge we have of group discussion at present suggests that they are needed now in our classrooms.

<sup>13</sup> R. Goldman, R. Lerner, and G. Stourzh, *Readings in World Politics* (Chicago, 1957), p. 117.

<sup>14</sup> Staff, American Foundation for Political Education, *Discussion Leader's Manual* (Chicago, 1955), p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

# THE MAN WITH THE GREY FLANNEL MOUTH

Hugo E. Hellman

CURRENTLY, the curricula of American universities are being aptly described as tailored to produce the man in the grey flannel suit. We in speech seem bent on completing his ensemble by tailoring the speech curriculum to produce the man with the grey flannel mouth. In so doing, we render a disservice to our profession, our students, and our society.

That a leading trend in speech curricula is growth in the number of courses in group discussion and increase in group discussion in related courses at the expense of debate, persuasion, and rhetoric is adequately substantiated by John Keltner and Carroll Arnold's recent study, "Discussion in American Colleges and Universities," published in this journal.<sup>1</sup> Keltner and Arnold furnish ample evidence of a shift from the debate-persuasion-rhetoric-centered curriculum to the discussion-centered one.

That the product of group discussion training as presently advocated and practiced is the man with the grey flannel mouth would seem to follow from the speech objectives set up in the textbooks. In *Discussion and Human Affairs* James McBurney and Kenneth Hance describe the speaking appropriate to discussion as that which expresses "thought in process of arising out of states of perplexity, hesitation, or doubt."<sup>2</sup> In the *Art of Good Speech* (which is currently the most widely

adopted of all college textbooks for the basic course) James McBurney and Ernest Wrage tell us that discussion speaking "at its best" is "thought in process without fixed commitments." It is "thinking out loud in which the thinker is not completely clear where his premises will lead him"<sup>3</sup>—which, I presume, means a speaker who does not know where he is going.

William E. Utterback in *Group Thinking* would have us train to the same objective when he emphasizes his view that in group discussion "all members participate freely and on a basis of equality, no one expecting to be told what to think or to tell others what to think,"<sup>4</sup> adding that "those who are certain they already know the answers, can contribute little."<sup>5</sup>

John Keltner in *Group Discussion Processes* furnishes "an instrument developed by the author for use in high school and college discussion contests" in which one of the criteria for judging speakers is the "ability to avoid argumentative and oratorical display."<sup>6</sup> Assuming that a discussion theorist would not be guilty of the semantic device of using "display" as a loaded word and that we can therefore take it in its simple denotation of "a show of something," we have here set up, as a criterion for judging excellence in discussion speaking, the ability to avoid showing argumentative and oratorical skill. Also included in this list of cri-

Mr. Hellman (Ph.D., Marquette, 1940) is Director of the School of Speech of Marquette University.

<sup>1</sup> *QJS*, XLII (1956), 250-256.

<sup>2</sup> (New York, 1950), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> (New York, 1953), p. 256.

<sup>4</sup> (New York, 1953), p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> (New York, 1957), p. 356.

teria is "the ability to keep everyone happy."<sup>7</sup>

From the standpoint of speech training, then, the end product of group discussion training is the speaker uttering thought in the process of arising from states of hesitation, perplexity, and doubt, and the speaker thinking out loud who does not know where he is going. And the ultimate test of his effectiveness will be his ability to avoid any show of argumentative or oratorical effectiveness. For this sort of speaking it would seem that "the grey flannel mouth" is accurately descriptive.

At issue then is the question of whether or not this is the sort of speech training we should be emphasizing best to serve our profession, our students, and our society. My view, already stated, is that our present preoccupation with it, to the neglect of debate and other persuasive and argumentative forms, is a disservice to all three.

Let us look first at the implications of this sort of speech training for our society. This is first a problem in the area of political and educational philosophy, which raises "first questions."

Is this man with the grey flannel mouth the ideal and proper citizen of our democratic society? There can be no doubt that he is if democracy is what current group discussion theory defines (or re-defines) it to be. Frank Haiman, in *Group Leadership and Democratic Action*, says, for example: Democracy is understood to be a social process in which the group as a whole is self-governing (not subject to any outside authority), in which all members of the group are equally represented in the making of collaborative decisions.<sup>8</sup>

William Utterback in *Group Thinking* defines democracy as government by talk in which "action is based on col-

lective decision reached through cooperative thinking."<sup>9</sup>

These are the basic premises in political and social philosophy on which discussion theory is built and they arise from what is obviously a misconception of what our democracy is, or ought to be, or was intended to be by our founding fathers. Jefferson is extensively quoted in discussion literature and at first sight the discussionists might appear to be properly aligned with Jefferson and at odds with Hamilton. On more careful examination, however, one is forced to the conclusion that they have aligned themselves, not a little to the left with Jefferson, but way out in left center field with no one of any consequence who can be quoted. Jefferson said plainly that it is not in governing themselves that people exercise the democratic process, but rather in giving the consent of the governed. He said pointedly enough that the people are "not qualified themselves to exercise the executive department; but they are qualified to name the person who shall exercise it. They are not qualified to legislate; with us, therefore, they only choose the legislatures."<sup>10</sup>

Democracy, at least in the time and the concept of those who created its American form, was essentially a matter of the consent of the governed to governors of their choosing. This is quite different from saying that "the essence of democracy" is "the group as a whole self-governing with all equally represented in collaborative decisions."

Throughout our history, both before and after Jefferson, the mass of Americans have expected and have generally been happy to be told what to think, by men they judged qualified to tell

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 357.

<sup>8</sup> (Boston, 1951), p. 33.

<sup>9</sup> Utterback, p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Jefferson, *Works*, Ford Edition (Boston, 1898), pp. 103-104.

them, and they judged qualified such men as Henry, Washington, Adams, Webster, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and a score of others whom we still honor today for their contribution to our democratic way of life. And yet, in the concepts of current discussion theory, such men are "authoritarian," and "autocratic," and dangerous to a democratic society.

It would seem, then, that the political philosophy underlying group discussion is not that of the founders of this republic, nor is it consistent with the 150 years of rather successful practice of American democracy.

But how about democracy today? Or in the future? Is the political society which the discussion theorist describes the sort of society for which we ought to be training our present generation of citizens? Even here there is a preponderance of evidence that current group theory is off in a direction diametrically opposite to the road that most students of the lessons of our time are insisting we should be taking. David Reisman's *The Lonely Crowd*, a penetrating sociological study of the changing American character, argues that the greatness of America is being lost in the change of our character from "inner directed" to "outer directed"—to a generation of men moved and motivated not from the inside as the rational and thinking man is motivated, but from the outside from mass social and group pressures. "Politics is to be appraised in terms of [mass] consumption premises,"<sup>11</sup> and we become a race of conformists conditioned to accept with grace the "consensus" of the groups in which we "co-act" and "co-think."

William Whyte's *The Organization Man* is a similar appraisal in the area

of business and trade.<sup>12</sup> It is a ringing indictment of the notions fundamental to group discussion theory (stemming in large part from William James and John Dewey) that through science and the scientific method we can not only understand but regulate all human activity at the expense of the individual. We have replaced, Whyte believes, the business ethic of individual thrift and competition with the social ethic of security and the collective spirit. We have abandoned the idea of the good fight and the healthy conflict for the ideal of compromise and helpful social adjustment. We have developed the myth that strong leadership is somehow undemocratic, and as we create organizations run increasingly by "multiple management" with increased reliance on the creativity of the group as against the creativity of the lone individual, we have come to think of the ideal leader not as the wisest man making clear his wisdom but as the smoothest compromiser best able to effect a collaborative mediocrity.

The most incisive appraisal of the nature of the democratic society for which we as speech teachers ought to be training solid citizens is to be found in Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*.<sup>13</sup> Lippmann begins by marshalling the facts of our recent sad history to validate the premise that "there has developed in this country a functional derangement of the relationship between the mass of people and the government," because, he says, "the people have acquired power which they are incapable of exercising and the governments they elect have lost powers which they must recover if they are to govern." The inevitable result is that:

<sup>11</sup> David Reisman, Nathan Glazer, Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (New York, 1953), p. 218.

<sup>12</sup> (New York, 1956.)

<sup>13</sup> (New York, 1956.)

Where mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the true functions of power. . . . This breakdown in the constitutional order is the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of Western society. It may, if it cannot be reversed, bring about the fall of the West.<sup>14</sup>

In apparent contradiction to the basic notions underlying group discussion theory, Lippmann, who is an eminent authority on public opinion, says categorically:

The public opinion of masses cannot be counted upon to apprehend regularly and promptly the reality of things because theirs is an inherent tendency to feed upon rumors incited by their own wishes and fears, even where there is no deliberate distortion by censorship and propaganda which is unlikely in these times.<sup>15</sup>

And almost in direct answer to the discussion theorists' notion that in our time there is no place for the man who would tell us what to think and no place for him who would listen, Lippmann, speaking of the tragedy of national and international errors following hard upon one another since 1913, says:

At the critical moments in this history, there have been men worth listening to who warned the people against their mistakes. There have been men . . . who judged correctly . . . but the climate of modern democracy does not usually inspire them to speak out.<sup>16</sup>

And what sort of climate would the discussionist supply for inspiring those who judge correctly to speak out? Since these who had judged correctly would "know the answers" they would "have nothing to contribute" and really to speak out would be out of bounds. Group discussion assembles opinions (preferably tentative ones of the "thinking out loud" sort) and makes the statistical sum of these the final verdict on an issue. And when the opinions do not

add up (integrate), a vote is taken to decide what is right. Concerning this, Lippmann observes:

They [the people] are betrayed by the servile hypocrisy which tells them that what is true and what is false, what is right and what is wrong, can be determined by their vote.<sup>17</sup>

And the result, Lippmann insists, is that Mass opinion "has acquired mounting power in this century." . . . It has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. . . . It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when the stakes are life and death.<sup>18</sup>

Other students of our developing American democracy have made similar observations. Almost thirty years ago, James Truslow Adams pointed out that the early leaders of this republic to whom we owe its greatness were men who "insisted on being themselves" unswayed by group opinion. But, he observed, "with each succeeding generation the growing demand of the people that its elected officials shall not lead but merely register the popular will has steadily undermined the independence of those who derive their power from popular election."<sup>19</sup>

It is not only for our own time and for our own particular sort of democratic society that the discussionist's notions of the science of politics are at variance with the facts of life. Two thousand years ago that rather competent observer of human experience, Plutarch, summed up the contribution of Cicero to the greatness that was Rome:

For Cicero, it may be said, was the one man above all others who made the Romans feel how great a charm eloquence lends to what is good, and how invincible justice, if it be well spoken.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> James Truslow Adams, *The Adams Family* (New York, 1930), p. 95.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*, trans. John Dryden (New York, 1932), p. 1048.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

This, I believe, brings us to the crux of the matter. Two proper ends of government anywhere are truth and justice. These, if they are to prevail, need eloquent champions, "aggressive fighters for the right." To set up as "the essence of democracy" this discussion process in which such speaking is taboo, or by rules and dicta to silence those who would so speak, is then a denial of the processes of truth and justice as real as any invented by recent history's most autocratic dictators.

From all of this it should be clear enough that the attitudes that are the educational objective of discussion teaching are not those best suited to the citizen of our democratic society, and it follows also that in such teaching we render a disservice to our students and our profession. Furthermore, this profession of ours, in the expectations of our students and the public, is centered in "speech"—speaking and public speaking. To the extent that we exhaust our efforts on distant tangents or in the periphery our central task is neglected. How far into the fringes group

discussion has gone was suddenly brought home to me in the most recently published textbook in the area, John Keltner's *Group Discussion Processes*. It is a substantial "speech" textbook of 373 pages, in which "speaking" comes in for the following treatment, and I quote in full:

You must make yourself understood when you speak. Your speaking should maintain a pleasant conversational tone, be clear and direct and demonstrate sincerity and poise. All these are necessary if you get your idea across to others.<sup>21</sup>

A physical education course in football science and tactics with a unit on signal calling would be more extensively concerned with "speech" than a "speech course" based on this text.

And so as we proliferate these courses, there is less and less training in "speech," and what remains has for its end product only the Man With the Grey Flannel Mouth—a citizen ill prepared for our society, his career, or anything else, except perhaps post-graduate work in discussion.

<sup>21</sup> Keltner, p. 10.

# AN ORAL INTERPRETER'S INDEX TO QUINTILIAN

Martin T. Cobin

THE following *Index* is a guide to the material within the twelve books of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* of particular interest to the student or teacher of oral interpretation. The significance of this material is four-fold. First, as an orator dealing with many matters of concern to the interpreter, Quintilian establishes a close relationship between rhetoric and interpretation. Second, the *Institutio Oratoria* is of value for its theories of pedagogy. Third, the work presents many techniques of interpretation. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the work is a valuable source book for the student of the history of interpretation. Within these major areas of significance, it is possible to isolate discussions of a variety of subjects. These subjects are used as headings in the *Index*. The listings under these subject headings do not attempt to record every statement pertinent to interpretation. The items listed do reflect a conscientious effort to represent every pertinent concept. Some matters are represented by a number of citations in order to indicate various sections of the work in which discussions of a particular concept are located, or because the student of interpretation may find the additional documentation of particular value or interest. Further use of cross-references is avoided in order to prevent the *Index* from becoming unwieldy.

Item designations list book number, paragraph number (*Pr.* standing for

"Preface"), line number, and page number. Page numbers are given for the edition in the *Loeb Classical Library*. The *Index* can be used with other editions designating book, paragraph, and line numbers, in which case the page numbers of the *Index* are to be ignored. The *Loeb* edition is in four volumes, each volume containing three books of the *Institutio Oratoria* with text and translation by H. E. Butler on the facing pages (*Index* page references are to the translation) and with page numbers starting over again with each volume. In the interest of simplicity, no volume designation is made in the *Index*.

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Mr. Cobin (Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1953) is Assistant Professor of Speech at the University of Illinois.

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- (see also *Ornament*)
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# THE FORUM

## WORLD VIEW IN RHETORIC

*To the Editor:*

In recent months I have had occasion to read extensively in many of the classical journals from this country and England. I am struck with the apparent fact—and it may be real—that some of the finest rhetorical criticism is written not by scholars in speech but by men steeped in the study of classical languages. This is the more disconcerting because many of them have had little or no speech training as we think of it. And it is a patent fact that in classical scholarship the most thorough work done with the ancients is by Europeans.

Lack of thoroughness of American speech scholars in classical research is due to several factors, primarily the fact that our departments do not push the study of the classical languages as they should. True, they are pleased when the occasional student happens along who is acquainted with Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Chinese, or Sanskrit, but these languages are not encouraged as French, German, and Spanish are. Thus, we are almost invariably dependent on translations for nearly every non-English work. This limitation restricts us in the study of style and invention and eliminates the possibility of textual criticism.

Our departments and graduate schools too often reject Chinese, Arabic, Russian, Japanese, or Koine Greek, to name only five, as satisfying the language requirement, despite an appalling lack of adequate rhetorical information in any of these fields.

Modern Eastern languages are especially important because we are losing forever the speeches and their effects on the changing climate of Asia. Where are the rhetorical studies of Mossadegh's fiery speech on British-Arabian oil in 1948? on Nasser's proclamation of the nationalization of the Suez Canal? on Communism's triumph in certain parts of India, or on its complete victory in China? (I know of only one study on the public speaking of China.) Who has read—much less studied—the sword-rattling speeches of Khrushchev? In fact, who knows *anything* of the rhetorical theory and practice of most of the national leaders and orators of non-English-speaking countries? I confess that an embarrassing and frustrating gap exists in current speech research and is widening with the passage of time. We seem content in our historical studies to plow again the familiar ground of FDR, TR, Bryan, Moody, and (I suspect) Billy Graham in years to come.

As rhetoricians we cannot look indifferently at classical languages, nor indeed, at any foreign languages. Some of our institutions today offer Ph.D. degrees with no language requirement whatsoever. (Of course, this has been true of the Ed.D. degree for sometime.) If the Ph.D.'s don't do the pioneer work in other languages, who will? And if such research isn't done, when will "speech" cease to be a peculiarly American discipline? Surely our apathy toward foreign languages and to speech in foreign countries largely accounts for the almost total lack of foreign students in our classes. It is doubtful if more

than one or two departments rank as low or lower in their appeal to non-Americans.

The blame, therefore, lies with ourselves.

Some of us have tried far and wide for foreign appointments to teach speech. Invariably, the answer (or its euphemistic paraphrase) is: we can use teachers of English grammar, or literature, but speech . . . what is that? Foreign administrators (or even American administrators of Christian mission boards) have little conception of what speech is doing in their country, because we have never shown them in our publications. Why should they waste money and positions on professors of a discipline they either question or believe to be merely common sense?

A change in this attitude will never come about until we encourage and foster a more complete mastery of foreign languages by our young scholars.

ROBERT W. SMITH  
Ann Arbor, Michigan

#### "THERE WAS THIS MAN. . . ."

*To the Editor:*

Changes in language are in continual evidence all around us, many of which begin with people who have no idea that they are initiating change: the ordinary person, for example, who uses language as simply and as directly as he can, or some specialized group (such as the military) who will initiate the use of some word or phrase which in time catches the ear of the general public and is absorbed into the language. Of course, not all changes initiated this way will go on to gain permanent status. For example, the word *flapper*, known as early as 1570, meant (as in *Gulliver's Travels*) one who strikes another, but by 1903 and through the

"twenties," in popular slang it referred to a young girl of emancipated beliefs (implying even flightiness or lack of decorum). Finally it faded into the oblivion of the dictionaries of slang. How then judge the permanence of any popular change in the language? One of the best ways is to mark those which people given to educated usage gradually begin to appropriate for their own; *their* acceptance of any change or of a new word is almost sure to confirm its complete acceptance eventually by all.

Such a change, it seems to me, is appearing at present in the use of the word *this* (or *these*) in place of the indefinite article *a* or *an* (or *some*) or the definite article *the*. "I saw *a* man coming towards me," for example, is heard as "I saw *this* man coming towards me." Conventionally we would suppose that here we have an attempt to distinguish between two persons—that is, *this* man and not *that* man—both of whom are immediately present before the speaker. In other words, the word *this* is being used as a particularizing adjective. The usage is perfectly conventional if such meaning is intended. But it is not. Actually the meaning intended is the one normally gained by the article *a*, *an*, or *the*.

It may be easy to explain the whole thing as merely a common example of substandard usage, since the usage is especially prevalent in the speech of individuals who clearly show a lack of educated usage otherwise. But further observation suggests that while the frequency of the usage in question is lower in people with well-educated backgrounds, it is by no means entirely absent. It can be found in the speech of many people whose reputations rest on their speaking ability and whose grasp of the language otherwise seems

to leave little to be desired. Philologists might agree that here we have misusage being adopted by speakers of better than average quality and that, therefore, we may well have a permanent change in the language manifesting itself. But exactly what change is occurring here, and why?

There always has been a natural desire in people to make the main subject of their conversation as *specific* as possible, because then the conversation picks up in vitality and enthusiasm and the main subject tends to become particularized in an interesting way. Now, the definite article *the* is weak in the particularizing function. True, "*a man*" is supposed to become distinctly more definite when changed to "*the man*"—but it does not really work out satisfactorily because the word *the* is just too weak to furnish the full particularizing flavor desired. Thus, the enthusiastic speaker, in his desire to communicate with greater vitality, has found that when he substitutes the word *this* (or *these*) for the word *the*, the full particularizing effect being sought is quite satisfactorily achieved. The change is so satisfactory, in fact, that it becomes for some people (more hardened users especially) a substitute for all the articles, definite and indefinite.

There is left but a final point to explain—the peculiar side dish of enthusiasm and vital good humor gained in the narrative atmosphere when the conversion is used. The conversion seems to give the speaker a convivial, intimate, interesting, heart-of-gold flavor or touch, as if somehow the whole practice calls up a popular type who tells a story with just this conversion as his trade mark. Is there such a character? I think there is, created by none other than Damon Runyon, the man whose fictional characters, patterned after sev-

eral New York types, represent for many the true folk type, a type specifically and peculiarly American.

RAUL REYES  
Ohio University

#### REPLY TO WILSON ON WILSON

*To the Editor:*

In his paper on Woodrow Wilson (*QJS*, October 1957) John F. Wilson asserts that of the three charges commonly made against President Wilson accounting for his failure, the charge especially significant for those interested in him as a speechmaker is "that in his speeches he explained the league instead of advocating it." An examination of this assertion is in order.

(1) The writer seems to offer three alternative reasons. He does not seem to be aware that the three may not be mutually exclusive. He reasons that the cause, to interpret him in Kenneth Burke's terms, must lie in the scene, or in the agent of the act (the physically broken Wilson), or in the act itself (the reliance on exposition against advocacy). When taken in terms of scene, agent, and act, it becomes obvious that no one factor is operative in itself. The act requires an agent, and the agent must perform the act in the context of a scene.

(2) Once it is realized that all factors must be taken into account, it becomes easier to analyze the motive underlying the Wilson act. We are made immediately aware that a man of Wilson's intellectual capacities and habits is incapable of acting without taking into account the scene about him. His scene, as I understand it, was largely one of doubt and disbelief. The voting public of his day, as in all, was a slowly moving, often stumbling, opinion block.

The acceptance of new ideas is hard. Democracy is suspicious of innovations. This is the scene in which Wilson had to perform his act.

(3) Every speaker should analyze his audience (scene). Is it not an axiom of rhetorical art that the disbelieving audience is to be approached with caution, that our purpose in such a situation is to open minds, to raise questions, and that advocacy before such an audience can only serve to antagonize and to build indestructible fortresses against the gradual absorption of ideas? You have to open the mind before you can close it again in your favor! Attitudes precede the act; develop the attitude, and the act must eventually follow. Wilson did not fail miserably; Wilson ran out of time.

In summary, I believe that Wilson chose the wisest course open to him, and that the wisdom of his act is at least partially demonstrated by the growth of his idea in the past decades. He appropriately laid the foundation in preference to constructing on uncertain sands. Unless Moses failed in leading the chosen people because time was to interfere, it is difficult to think less of Wilson.

MICHAEL GALATI  
Lemont, Illinois

#### DISCOVERY, PROBABILITY, AND MIMETIC ART

*To the Editor:*

Albert Cohn's very stimulating article (*QJS*, October 1957) rightly stresses one of drama's chief difficulties: "How to reveal through imitation the spiritual—or inward—life of men." A few comments about Aristotle's remarks on discovery—rather puzzling remarks, because Aristotle explains neither the rea-

sons for his choice of the particular species nor for their hierarchical grouping—may further demonstrate his cognizance of both the importance and the difficulty of achieving this eternal object of mimetic art, and may suggest a second direction the art of drama will take if it is to develop in the future.

Discovery, as defined in Chapter 11 of the *Poetics* (McKeon's ed.), is "a change from ignorance to knowledge"; it assists in arousing the proper tragic effects, pity and fear; and "it will also serve to bring about the happy or unhappy ending." Aristotle distinguishes six species of discovery, rated from the "least artistic" to the "best" (Ch. 16). There is a surprisingly close relationship between the ability of poets to solve successfully the difficulty Mr. Cohn discusses and their propensity to dramatize a discovery of the best species. Here is another guide to dramatists, for the best species is one which, like the ability to create "a simultaneous detailed imitation of the spiritual as well as the physical movements of man," only a few great poets seem to have been able to incorporate successfully into the fibre of their dramatic works.

Aristotle's species of discovery and his order of listing them may well be examined in terms of causal factors; such a method of investigation sheds further light on a creative problem analogous to the one Mr. Cohn dissects, and it is able to account for all causes—material, efficient, and formal—but the final cause. That cause, however, is concerned with what follows from the discovery; the fable or plot is "the most important" element and "the end and purpose of the tragedy" (Ch. 6), thus itself the final cause. Therefore it is irrelevant to the point of my discussion.

The least artistic class of discovery may be said to consist of the first three species. Discovery in that class arises primarily from matter—signs, speeches revealing "what the poet rather than the story demands," and memory (which implies reflection and to that extent is a part of character and thought) awakened by external signs or matter. Discovery of this sort is aroused by elements external to the plot; this class, then, represents the material cause of discovery.

The fourth and fifth species (concerned with reasoning) are not primarily dependent on external elements, but they arise from the agency of the characters of the tragedy. Since they do not arise from the plot proper, they, like the first three, are not the best species. On the other hand, they are not artificial (as are the first three), because they do not consist of elements extrinsic and not probable to the plot. For that reason they are a step above the most inartistic form of discovery. This class represents the efficient cause because it is primarily a part of the instruments or agents (the characters) of the plot.

Aristotle defines the sixth species thus: "The best of all Discoveries, however, is that arising from the incidents themselves, when the great surprise comes about through a probable incident." It stands in a class by itself, and is best because it is integral to the organizing principle (the plot proper) of the tragedy. Because it arises primarily from the organization of the material itself and because it is itself a probable or necessary incident, the sixth species represents the formal causal factor.

One may relate the level of probability in the various forms of discovery

to Aristotle's gradation of the artistic quality of the species of discovery. In the first three species probability does not at all enter into plot, since external signs do not arise from the tragic plot but are, rather, artificial devices to carry this plot further, or to impart certain necessary information. In the fourth and fifth species probability occupies a minor role, since discovery does not primarily occur through incidents of the plot but rather through reasoning; the probability, therefore, is partial, one of character rather than of plot. It is only in the last and best species that discovery is wholly probable or necessary because it arises from incidents which are a part of the tragic plot proper.

This analysis suggests an aid in appraising that perplexing quality, the probability of a play—what the less sophisticated call its "reality to life"—and therefore in gauging the play's artistic stature. Aristotle suggests that this stature is proportionate to the probability of the incidents; probability, in turn, establishes the universality of the statement of the play (Ch. 9). He considers universal statements philosophically and aesthetically more true than accidental historical truths, and thus defines universal statements as action and speech which find expression in tragedy because they stem from the innate nature of men in human situations. A play's universality, then, is determined by the probability of the incidents of the plot. Such probability (not necessarily evaluated in terms of the various schools of "realism") is the aesthetic embodiment of mimetic art. The difficulty of its invention no doubt accounts for the rarity of its manifestation.

MYRON MATLAW  
Hunter College

## EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS SERIES

*To the Editor:*

The American Antiquarian Society is currently making available under the editorship of Clifford K. Shipton, Librarian of the Society, microprints of all non-serial items published in the United States through 1800. The first stage of the project involves microprinting the non-serial items listed in Charles Evans' *American Bibliography*. Participating libraries began receiving prints of the first works listed in Evans early in 1956. By the end of 1957, the series was virtually complete through about 1775. The Society intends to publish microprints of the relatively few items not included in Evans after the Evans entries are finished in 1959 or 1960, and then to provide a one-volume, short-title revision of *American Bibliography*. The Society is also contemplating a project which would make available in similar format the American newspapers printed through 1800.

The Early American Imprints Series will make the extant sermons, political tracts, and other works printed in Colonial America much more easily accessible to students of American public address than was formerly the case. It should stimulate increased research activity in this area.

HARRY P. KERR  
Cornell University

## APPIAN'S CIVIL WARS YET AGAIN AS SOURCE FOR ANTONY'S ORATION

*To the Editor:*

In the Introduction to his excellent new edition of Appian's *Civil Wars* (a selection from the Tudor translation, under the title *Shakespeare's Appian*, Liverpool University Press, 1956), Ernest

Schanzer proposes that this history's most fundamental influence on Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* "centres on the portrayal of Antony. . . . The funeral oration by Appian's Antony is above all a great theatrical, almost an operatic performance, and this is precisely its quality in *Julius Caesar*." But Mr. Schanzer, by omitting from Book Five of his edition all but Sections 67 through 74, leaves out a notable parallel between Shakespeare's presumed source and his Antony's ironical *epimone* (commencing III, ii, 84), "Brutus is an honourable man."

In Appian's version of the *Oratio Antonii Ephesi habita ad Graecos & alias nationes*, which occurs near the beginning of Book Five (Greek-Latin edition, 1592), one discovers the phrase "*& talem virum boni ciues nostri tyrannu appellavirunt, & vos eis contulitis multas pecunias, interfectoribus nominis optima de vobis meriti, idque contra nos qui eius vice vbciscimur.*" In the Bynneman text of 1578 these words are rendered thus (p. 308): "And our good Citizens call such a man as he was, a Tyrant: and you have given them much money that were kyllers of the man, that most deserued of you, and that against us, that reuenged his quarrell." May not Shakespeare's Antony's *epimone* of "Brutus is an honourable man" and, subsequently, the obvious *mycterismus* of "I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong,/ Who, you all know, are honourable men" (lines 125, 126) and "I fear I wrong the honourable men/ Whose daggers have stabb'd Caesar; I do fear it" (lines 153, 154) have derived from Appian's sardonic *boni ciues?*

No *Julius Caesar* editor or commentator appears to have noticed the parallel; though in John Davies' English translation of 1679 the passage is set down as follows:

... Notwithstanding which, that great Man to whom you were obliged being slain as a Tyrant by our \*good Citizens, you have supplied with vast Sums the Murderers of your Benefactor against us who did all we could to revenge him.

Perhaps Shakespeare consulted an edition (English, Latin, or even Greek) of the *Civil Wars* in which some previous reader similarly had added, as marginalia, opposite the key words: "N. B.—irony." MacCallum and Lathrop suggested long ago that the dramatist may have drawn on W. B.'s translation of Appian for a number of scenes in *Julius Caesar*; and in 1925 Paradise demonstrated that Lodge's *Wounds of Civil War* "follows Appian with such fidelity . . . that there can be no doubt as to where he found his material." Yet Dorsch's New Arden *Julius Caesar* (1955) does not so much as allude to the Alexandrian historian in his introductory section on "The Source"—while Bridges-Adams' *The Irresistible Theatre* (1957) perpetuates the unfounded notion that Plutarch, not Appian, was Lodge's source for *Wounds*.

Hitherto, the handful of writers who have considered at all the possibility of Shakespeare's having used Appian mainly have contented themselves with comparing the respective versions, in the two works, of the funeral oration alone; and Schanzer, by his cautious statement, ". . . it is in their manner that the kinship lies," also tends towards this pattern. Is it not reasonable to suppose that Shakespeare, if he did consult the *Civil Wars*, would in crafting the magnificent Forum speech have sought hints of Antony's rhetorical method in this volume *outside* the funeral oration—that he probably did, in fact, both read and utilize Appian's account, in Book Five,

of Antony's compelling fund-raising appeal to the Grecians?

PAT M. RYAN, JR.  
*Yale University*

## REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE

The Nominating Committee of the Speech Association of America (Murray, Arnold, and Hochmuth elected by the Association, Clark elected by the Administrative Council, Thompson elected by the Legislative Assembly) submits the following nominations in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and Bylaws which became operative on January 1, 1956.

### SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT (One to be elected)

Hubert Heffner, Indiana University,  
Bloomington  
Ralph Nichols, University of Minnesota, St. Paul

### MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (Two to be elected)

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William McCoard, University of Southern California  
Claude Shaver, Louisiana State University  
Robert West, Brooklyn College

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Rowena Roberts, Colorado Springs High School  
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William Stites, Arizona State College, Tempe

**Central Area** (Four to be elected)  
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Donald Bird, Stephens College, Columbia, Missouri

\*By way of Irony.

William Buehler, University of Kansas, Lawrence  
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 Warren Lee, University of South Dakota, Vermillion  
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 Ramon Irwin, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York  
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WAYNE THOMPSON, *Chairman*

# NEW BOOKS IN REVIEW

ROBERT GUNDERSON, *Editor*

## A HANDBOOK OF SPEECH PATHOLOGY

John V. Irwin

In his preface to *Handbook of Speech Pathology*, Lee Travis states:

Just a quarter of a century ago, one man could have reacted intelligently, even authoritatively, to the whole field of communication disorders. In one book of average length he could have presented in relatively complete fashion the findings of the laboratory and the practices of the clinic. The present work, from the standpoint of both size and content, shows that speech pathology has grown away beyond the grasp of any one man. Each contributing author felt that he could have, should have, written more. Each chapter could have been a book. Each of several chapters could have been more than one book. Since this work was not possible from the pen of one man, twenty-seven authorities in the various areas of speech pathology contributed thirty-three chapters. Each author is truly a specialist in his subfield, yet each is keenly sensitive to other subfields and to the field as a whole.

It seems appropriate to point out that Editor Travis' opening sentence is not an idle statement. In 1931, some twenty-six years ago, a brilliant young man named Lee Edward Travis did react intelligently and even authoritatively to the then known field of communication disorders. The result was *Speech Pathology*, one book of average length. The publisher was Appleton. It seems further appropriate to point out that in the quarter of a century between these two publications, Travis

has not only been compelled to combine with twenty-six other authors to write the new book, but Appleton has been forced to combine with Century and with Crofts to publish it! All of which would seem to prove, even to speech correctionists, that the field of speech pathology is changing and growing.

The book is organized in four parts: "Basic Considerations in Speech Pathology" (307 pp.); "Speech and Voice Disorders Associated with Organic Abnormalities" (391 pp.); "Speech and Voice Disorders Unrelated to Organic Abnormalities" (255 pp.); and "Psychotherapy and Speech Therapy" (100 pp.). The twenty-four-page index is of professional quality. I shall discuss each of these parts in turn, and then attempt some general comments about the book.

Part I, "Basic Considerations in Speech Pathology," as its title would suggest, is almost a basic text in speech science, although its use for this purpose would be somewhat awkward because of the unevenness of the eight different chapters, both in level of difficulty and in completeness of coverage. In Chapter 1, "The Development of Speech," Clarence Simon traces so far as is now possible the development of speech in the race and in the child. His approach is suggestive and

John V. Irwin (Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1947) is Director of the Speech and Hearing Clinic, University of Wisconsin, and an Associate Editor of *QJS*.

thoughtful; his ideas will stimulate all teachers of speech. In Chapter 2, "Terminology and Nomenclature," Kenneth Wood provides an excellent twenty-one-page glossary of terms frequently used in speech pathology. The definitions are generally excellent; perhaps unfortunately, pronunciations are not indicated. In addition, he provides a two-page table of roots, prefixes, and suffixes. Wood's introduction seems addressed to the beginning student; the glossary itself may prove helpful even to the professional worker. Robert West in Chapter 3, "The Neurophysiology of Speech," elects to limit his discussion to "a few of the principles of structure and function that are significant in the understanding of the speech mechanism." This chapter, although extremely provocative, would only be meaningful to the advanced scholar, because of the rigorous assumptions made concerning the prior background of the reader. It does not discuss basic facts of human physiology and neural anatomy. Gray in Chapter 4, "Speech Sound Formation," also limits his discussion sharply. Thus in no sense does he attempt to develop a complete phonetic theory with respect to the formation of the sounds of speech. Gray does, however, with great precision and economy, develop the "minimum essentials of speech sound formation which will be of value to the therapist in the developing of a practically functional degree of intelligibility." Bruce Bogert (of the technical staff of Bell Telephone Laboratories) and Gordon Peterson have shared the preparation of Chapter Five. "The Acoustics of Speech," with Bogert preparing Part I, "Technical Aspects of Acoustic Wave Forms," and Peterson preparing Part II, "Acoustical Properties of Speech Waves." An exceptionally well planned and illustrated chapter,

the materials will, nevertheless, be beyond the interests of most teachers and students in general speech. In Chapter 6, "Instruments of Diagnosis, Therapy, and Research," Mack Steer and Ted Hanley have laboriously brought together brief descriptions, pictures, diagrams, and evaluations of various instruments that have been used in speech pathology. Although the chapter is specialized, it should be of general interest to all teachers of speech; moreover the nature of the presentation should make it clear. Chapters 7 and 8, "The Incidence of Speech Disorders" and "Methods of Evaluation and Diagnosis of Speech Disorders," are by Robert Milisen. Both of these should appeal to all teachers of speech, inasmuch as the former is a straightforward presentation of representative findings concerning incidence, and the latter is a presentation of the *rationale and nature* of the examination rather than a *how to* form of presentation.

Part II, "Speech and Voice Disorders Associated with Organic Abnormalities," encompasses medical treatment of deafness and such clinical entities as speech problems of the deaf and of the hard of hearing, aphasia—in adults and in children, mental retardation, cerebral palsy, cleft palate, dental abnormalities, and organic voice disorders. For the most part, each grouping is treated systematically and at a relatively high level of difficulty. This section is designed primarily for the professional worker, whether he be in speech pathology or in related disciplines of medicine, psychology, or education. This material is also of value to the worker in general speech who wishes to attain an authoritative overview of organic disorders. It is not aimed at the classroom teacher.

I can do no more than suggest the emphasis of each of the fourteen chap-

ters. In particular, however, I wish to call attention to Chapter 9, "Pathology, Diagnosis, and Therapy of Deafness," by Victor Goodhill. Here is an exceptionally clear treatment of deafness from the medical and surgical standpoint. This chapter provides almost indispensable background material for any specialist who must work with or who desires to understand the work of the otologist. This is unquestionably an outstanding reference chapter. The next two chapters, "Clinical and Educational Procedures for the Deaf" and "Clinical and Educational Procedures for the Hard of Hearing," by Richard Silverman are masterfully if succinctly done. For the reader from the field of speech, the chapter on the deaf will be particularly informative. Chapters 12, 13, and 14, "Aphasia in Adults—Classification and Examination Procedures," "Correlates of Aphasia in Adults," and "Therapeutic Problems and Approaches with Aphasic Adults," are by Jon Eisenson. Although each chapter is, of course, competently done, the chapter on correlates, which covers such topics as *localization of language function, extreme opposition to localization, cerebral dominance and laterality, intelligence, imagery, and personality* will be of particular interest to the general speech teacher. Chapters 15 and 16, "Aphasia in Children—Language Development and Language Pathology," and "Aphasia in Children—Diagnosis and Training," are, naturally, by Helmer Myklebust. The first of these two chapters, in which Myklebust begins with the nature of language and symbolic behavior, moves on into the realm of language pathology and language development, and concludes with a brief description of the kinds of problems that result, will appeal to the non-specialist. The second chapter is aimed

more precisely at the professional clinician. Chapter 17, "Speech Problems of the Mentally Retarded," by Jack Matthews is a little masterpiece. This systematic review will appeal to the professional clinician because of its precision and completeness, and to the more general reader because of its clarity and simplicity. Chapter 18, "An Approach to Speech Therapy for the Cerebral-Palsied Individual," by William Perkins and Victor Garwood, is not complete enough in coverage to satisfy the general reader, although it may whet his interest. Clinicians will be interested in the individualized approach suggested. Koepp-Baker's two chapters on "Pathomorphology of Cleft Palate and Lip" and "Speech Problems of the Person with Cleft Palate and Cleft Lip" are excellent but professionally oriented, as is Harlan Bloomer's splendid following chapter on "Speech Defects Associated with Dental Abnormalities and Malocclusions." The specificity of this last chapter is particularly outstanding. Paul Moore's "Voice Disorders Associated with Organic Abnormalities" concludes this part of the book. Despite some emphasis on therapy, this chapter should be of interest to the general teacher as well as the clinician, for Moore deals as systematically as present knowledge permits with the phonatory element, with the abnormal function of the mechanism, and with the basic disease condition.

Part III, "Speech and Voice Disorders Unrelated to Organic Abnormalities," covers functional articulation, psychotherapy in public school speech correction, functional disorders of voice, and several aspects of the problem of stuttering. Chapters 23 and 24, "Functional Disorders of Articulation—Symptomatology and Etiology" and "Clinical and Educational Procedures

in Functional Disorders of Articulation," are by Margaret Hall Powers. Together these chapters constitute a textbook coverage of the subject; it is difficult to imagine the reader who will not profit from this description. Chapter 25, "Suggestions for Psychotherapy in Public School Speech Correction," by Lee Travis and LaVerne Deel Sutherland, takes the position that speech therapy and psychotherapy are not in conflict with each other but that at the very least "they should be considered supplemental one to the other, or complementary to each other." Such techniques as projection pictures, finger painting, modeling clay, and dramatization are considered. Here are excellent materials, clearly presented. This chapter, along with those of Dr. Powers, should appeal strongly to the public school speech therapist. Chapter 26, "The Challenge of Functional Disorders of Voice," by William Perkins is a solid development of therapeutic premises and procedures. This material should interest the classroom teacher of speech as well as the clinician. The next three chapters, "Symptomatic Therapy for Stuttering" by Charles Van Riper, "Perceptual and Evaluational Factors in Stuttering" by Wendell Johnson, and "The Unspeakable Feelings of People with Special Reference to Stuttering" by Lee Travis, neither collectively nor individually present a systematic, textbook approach to the subject of stuttering. Nor were they so intended. Not for the uninformed reader, Van Riper's chapter offers a strong defense of a prevalent type of symptomatic therapy, Johnson's chapter deals with basic—perhaps *the* basic—factors in stuttering, and Travis' chapter documents sharply this statement:

When any person stutters, he is blocking something else besides what he might

think he is trying to say; something else that is pressing for verbal expression but which will be intolerable to you and to him alike should it be uttered.

"Method for Integrating Theories of Stuttering" by Stanley Ainsworth concludes this part. Ainsworth develops three questions, the combination of which provides, he believes, the most satisfactory understanding of stuttering in light of present-day theories. Although no integration is attempted, the approach of this chapter will intrigue both the clinician and the individual who is simply interested in the understanding of stuttering.

Part IV, "Psychotherapy and Speech Therapy," concludes the book with these three excellent chapters: "The Psychotherapeutic Process" by Lee Travis, "Play Therapy, Psychodrama, and Parent Counseling" by Zelda Wolpe, and "Group Structure in Speech Therapy" by Ollie Backus. Introductory and yet challenging, these three chapters should stimulate and inform a wide range of readers who have either interest or experience in this subject.

*Handbook of Speech Pathology* was beyond the capacity of any one man to write; it is also beyond the capacity of any one man to evaluate. Clearly it is not a perfect book. The extreme compression required of each writer has resulted in minor inaccuracies even in some of the strongest chapters in the book. Thus Steer and Hanley, in their excellent description of the galvanic skin response, state:

In recording galvanic response, skin electrodes are usually fastened to the finger, palm of the hand, or legs and then coupled to a resistance recorder, often known as a psychogalvanometer.

Usually recording electrodes are not placed on the legs, although the plantar surface of the foot may be used.

More disturbing, perhaps, is another example, this time from Wood's introduction to his chapter on terminology. He states, in urging that the student should learn the meaning of certain prefixes, roots, and suffixes:

As a further example, it will serve the student to know at the beginning that the prefix *para* carries the meaning of "faulty" and "disordered" and that *dys* means "bad" or "ill." From this he will have a better start on such words as *paralalia*, *parasigmatism*, *dyslexia*, and *dysphasia*.

But what kind of a start will this compressed advice give to the student when he confronts the word *parathyroid*, in which *para* means "near" or "beside," or *paramedical*, in which *para* means "related to but subordinate." Speech therapy is sometimes referred to as a *paramedical* service. Does this mean that speech therapy is a "faulty" or "disordered" service?

Again, the book is not always perfect from the standpoint of uniformity of viewpoint. Thus Milisen, in his chapter on evaluation, raises some question as to the essential validity of the dichotomy between the organic and the non-organic. Yet Parts II and III of the book are organized in terms of this dichotomy.

Again, the presumed audience of the book seems to differ from chapter to chapter. West writes for the graduate student with facts in his head or in his textbooks; Wood, for the beginning student; others, for levels in between.

Finally, there are differences in coverage. Organic voice disorders and mental retardation, for example, are covered systematically. Stuttering and cerebral palsy are dealt with more segmentally.

Yet, basically, the overwhelming sweep and accuracy and completeness of *Handbook and Speech Pathology* minimize the importance of such faultfinding. Compressed, contradictory, uneven

though it at times may be, this handbook is a superb compendium of contemporary scholarship in the field of speech pathology.

#### BOOK REVIEWED

**HANDBOOK OF SPEECH PATHOLOGY:**  
Edited by Lee Edward Travis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957; pp. viii+1088. \$12.00.

**THE INDEPENDENT STUDY PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES, A REPORT ON AN UNDERGRADUATE INSTRUCTIONAL METHOD.** By Robert Bonthius, F. James Davis, J. Garber Drushal, in Collaboration with Frances V. Guille and Warren P. Spencer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957; pp. xxi+259. \$4.50.

This study is primarily concerned with providing a broader perspective for suggesting improvements in the Wooster independent study plan, but it also aims to furnish pertinent information for institutions making special provisions for individual scholarship among undergraduates, and to stimulate reevaluation of the programs on the part of the local administrative officers, faculty members, and students in those institutions chosen for study.

"Those institutions chosen for study" are nineteen private colleges and the University of Illinois. One chapter presents the definition, history, and extent of independent study; the next describes the twenty representative programs; another offers comments by students and faculty on these programs; and the chapter dealing with the Wooster program gives complete details. There is also a valuable chapter on the cost of such programs.

The evidence in the present study is to the effect that almost all students in such programs feel that they receive important values, and overwhelming majorities of students and faculty participants believe in having independent study required. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching is to be thanked for supporting this investigation, as well as preliminary studies out of which this grew.

This is an extremely useful report, fuller of facts than theory. As this proceeds mostly from private colleges, attention should be called to another foundation-sponsored study of such programs in state universities now being directed by Professor Joseph Cohen of the University of Colorado.

EVERETT HUNT  
Swarthmore College

**THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET EDUCATION.** By George S. Counts. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957; pp. xii+330. \$6.00.

**A FOURTH OF A NATION.** By Paul Woodring. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957; pp. vii+255. \$4.50.

Appearing when fear of Soviet scientific and military supremacy on the one hand and confusion concerning U. S. educational policies on the other point up the need for objective appraisal and constructive recommendations, these two books provide provocative reading. Both the teacher and the serious-minded layman will find them of value in thinking about our educational programs and also in strengthening a resolve to press for reorientation of our efforts.

Stalin once told H. G. Wells, "Education is a weapon whose effect depends on who holds it in his hands and at whom it is pointed." That the Soviets appreciated the political and moral potential of education and consistently and successfully used it to achieve party goals is fully demonstrated. Drawing on thirty years of study and travel, Professor Counts documents a treatment of Russian education that starts with the elementary school but soon reaches beyond conventional boundaries to include political indoctrination, reeducation of the offender, political orientation of the soldier, and training of the political elite.

Once the Soviets decided to use education as a political tool, historical accuracy, consistency, logic, morals, and ethics were arranged and distorted to suit the needs of the leaders. From one point of view the book is a fascinating case study (or studies) of persistent and diabolical mass persuasion and/or coercion as practiced by those committed to a fixed though distant goal. Of special interest are the chapters describing "The Goals of Soviet Education," "The Political Education of the Younger Generation," and "The Transformation of the Intellectual Class."

The role of the intelligentsia in providing stability, direction, and development in a society was understood by the revolutionary leaders. Utilizing the existing intellectuals and specialists when possible and at the same time successfully producing a new and politically reliable group of this type, the Soviets have demolished the stereotype that such abilities flourish only in a free society. Where concessions and compromises were necessary they were made. Occasionally major errors, such as those in genetics, appeared. But the evidence indi-

cates that Russia has developed scientists equal to those of any free nation today. Had the American people and their leaders attended more intelligently to the striking *facts* Professor Counts marshals, our present position might be stronger and our bewilderment as to how we arrived at this unfortunate state might be less.

For all teachers and scholars the book forcefully suggests the question, "What are my responsibilities in the non-academic world?" "Must I leave my study and enter some of the battles in the political and economic arenas?"

Today the challenge of Soviet education frightens us. If both nations continue their present policies, by the end of the next decade the challenge may be unanswerable. To prevent this we are striving to rechart our academic course, and Dr. Woodring outlines a series of proposals that would overhaul American education from the grades through the graduate schools. While not specifically designed to surpass the totalitarian achievements, his ideas may well represent a functional long-range answer to that threat. Certainly they deserve serious consideration.

From a relatively dispassionate appraisal of both the classic and the pragmatic approaches to education, the author synthesizes a "new" philosophy which evolves from the needs of free men. He asserts, "In a society of free men, the proper aim of education is to prepare the individual to make wise decisions." This involves choices, and choice being an intellectual activity, he reasons that education must be intellectual but denies that it is thereby restricted to the superior or highly motivated.

Special attention is given to the abilities and training of teachers as the primary instruments in the educational process. High ability, a foundation of liberal education, adequate subject matter competence, and supervised apprenticeships are considered basic needs. Further modification in teacher training would result from overhauling both admission criteria and curricula in graduate schools of education. In the organization of the schools themselves Dr. Woodring proposes to reduce the period of elementary education and articulate more effectively the various levels up through the university. It is gratifying to note that he recognizes the responsibilities of the school to both the slow and the rapid learners. Teachers of speech and English will applaud his stress on language as the means through which ". . . man communicates with his fellow men and through communication . . . achieves his high-

est development as a man" (p. 105). Committed through experience (and generally satisfactory results) to small classes and maximum pupil-teacher interaction, the same group may question his suggestions for experimentation with larger classes, use of cadet teachers, and new media such as television. It may be, however, that such measures in the hands of able teachers have productive potential superior to that of additional teachers of indifferent ability.

THORREL B. FEST  
University of Colorado

A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE. By Bergen Evans and Cornelia Evans. New York: Random House, 1957; pp. viii+567. \$5.95.

The preface to the Evans *Dictionary* begins with a curiously limited statement:

When we speak or write we want to be understood and respected. We want to convey our meaning and we want to do it in a way that will command admiration.

The point of view here disclosed leaves out of account a number of other purposes, including the employment of language to conceal rather than to convey thought and the effective use of words primarily to further action for a cause rather than to command admiration for a speaker. Nor does the statement account for the kind of language that concerned William Butler Yeats' father, who, writing to his poet son, declared, "That which can be understood is not poetry."

Perhaps some of the limitations of the book derive from a defect in understanding the scope and purpose of rhetorical discourse. At any rate, one of the definitions provided would not inspire confidence. Concerning *rhetoric* we learn from the Evans dictionary this much and no more:

*rhetoric* in the United States still means primarily the art or science of the specially literary uses of language, in prose or verse, or the art of prose as opposed to verse. In England it is a disparaging term (*Rhetoric is the harlot of the arts*—Stanley Baldwin) meaning the use of exaggeration or display, in an unfavorable sense. This meaning is known and employed in America, but it is a secondary meaning.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the book is a bit too lady-like to serve as an adequate guide to contemporary American usage. Although the authors admit a prejudice in favor

of literary forms, this prejudice need not preclude an entry for such an idiom as "the devil you say." But "the devil" does not appear in the book except in hypocritical garb as advocate. *Deo Volente*, a phrase far less idiomatic to American English, gains seventeen lines. A persevering search disclosed none of the four-letter Anglo-Saxon-American monosyllables that appear not only on sheltered walls but also, rumor has it, in the everyday speech of the most distinguished persons in the nation and occasionally in what passes these days for literature. Even if one were to acknowledge the expediency of omitting the terms of scatology and venery, one may still wonder what has become of that noble expletive, sanctified not only by holy writ but also by ancient usage: *hell*. Without an adequate command of this explosive word the innocent foreigner attempting the American language is unlikely ever to blast a path to understanding. How will he interpret an American who in one breath declares the coffee to be as hot as *hell*—or the hinges thereof—and in the next insists that the ice cream is colder than *hell*? And surely in an era when the President of the Republic refers publicly to an *s.o.b.*, a lexicographer need not be completely impavid to explain the meaning of the term.

As a dictionary, the book suffers occasionally from an *obiter dictum*. For example, on page 261 the authors opine that ". . . most professors prefer to be called *Mister*." Some do, some don't, and no count has been made recently. Again on page 394 they rule that, "It is improper to refer to a girl or a young woman as *junior* . . . even if she does bear the same name as her mother." Somebody should explain this impropriety to Cobina Wright, Jr., and at the same time inquire whether dicta of this sort are not more welcome from Emily Post than from Bergen Evans. One is reminded of the opinion of the late Walter Williams who, on being asked how to pronounce *Missouri*, replied that the people who pay the taxes should call it what they please.

A consecutive reading of the entries suggests that the authors are preoccupied with the disapprobation of trite expressions. Doubtless anyone making a more nearly normal use of the book—to look up a phrase, for example—would not find the preoccupation disturbing. But any survivor of the reading of too many papers in English composition will regret to find the condemnation of such innocent clichés as "rhyme or reason," "wheels within wheels," "salad days," "stung to the quick" and "ugly

as sin," particularly when the authors do not note for disfavor such other old American favorites as those in the following sentence: "After he finally arrived, better late than never, he played his part well; but his goose was cooked, and so he threw in the towel."

The book makes interesting reading and deserves to be consulted, but it should not be too much relied upon as authority.

BOWER ALY  
University of Oregon

JOSEPH GLANVILL, ANGLICAN APOLOGIST. By Jackson I. Cope. St. Louis: Washington University Studies, 1956; pp. 179. \$3.75.

This book sees Glanvill as a defender of Anglicanism against Catholicism and Puritanism; he did for the established church in the middle years of the seventeenth century what Hooker had done for it two generations earlier. A brief account of Glanvill's life in Chapter I introduces his works and relates them to the opposition. The next two chapters develop the chief arguments against theological infallibility, God's free will, and Puritan enthusiasm. The arguments are essentially three in number: that God made an immutable, perfect world by necessity rather than by choice; that man comes closest to His eternal law through reason by which he comes to know natural law; that theological dogmatizing is vain because reason, even at its best as shown in scientific investigation, gives man but glimpses of the spiritual world. Chapter IV reveals how Henry Moore and Glanvill, though doubting the power of witchcraft, thought that the activity of witches offered some reasonable evidence of a spirit world. In Chapters V and VI, Professor Cope focuses on the principal sources from which Glanvill probably derived his philosophy and psychology of knowledge and error. Among other things, Glanvill used Descartes' method of skepticism and the method of science to combat enthusiasm and dogma, and for his apologetic purposes seemed to find neither one incompatible with a sort of Platonism—"a Middle Platonism"—derived chiefly from contemporaneous writers. The last chapter, "Anglicanism and Plain Prose," sees Glanvill as defender and practitioner of the plain style, although Cope rightly points out that plainness had been variously interpreted, sometimes being limited to brevity and conciseness. Concerned mainly with Glanvill's writing rather than with his preaching, Cope deals briefly with the development of Glanvill's style and his dicta about style. One learns that Glan-

vill in his early work made greater use of figures and ornamentation than he did when under the influence of the Royal Society's pronouncements on scientific diction, though in his latest writings his preference for plainness did not lead him to neglect rhetorical decorum.

The book is a good example of sound scholarship. It reveals thorough knowledge of Glanvill and of his cultural and intellectual milieu. It offers a good many interpretative judgments and swift insights which appear to be valid. It is compact; yet the reader with some knowledge of seventeenth century religion, psychology, and rhetoric will find it interesting and rewarding. The student of rhetoric, in particular, can isolate most of the ultimate assumptions and premises and the main lines of argument which men brought to bear on controversy whenever they based their positions on the nature of reason and knowledge. He will find additional evidence of the developing interest in the nature of the rational man and in the scientific endeavor to understand man himself, his eternal world, and his real world. He will further appreciate why both knowledge and communication (taken in its broadest sense and including literature) are inevitably saturated with "psychology," not only in our own time but in times past.

If the book has a major weakness, it is in its structure. The thesis seems to reside in the first paragraph of Chapter II. If so, I found considerable difficulty in precisely relating the rest of the book to it. Exactly what are Glanvill's three attitudes referred to in the thesis? (I hope they are accurately imbedded in the three arguments stated early in this review.) They are not characterized in firm terms which remain steadily and readily identifiable as the reader progresses, yet they seem essential to the development of the thesis. The book has structure, but it is not plain. Nevertheless, the work represents good scholarship, and I commend it.

KARL R. WALLACE  
University of Illinois

GRIECHISCHE-RÖMISCHE RHETORIK 1915-1925. By Georg Lehnert. *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Vol. 285 (1944-1955), pp. 5-198. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956. [\$10.72.]

This report lists 619 items (books, articles, dissertations, etc.) on ancient rhetoric; items bearing primarily on Cicero, Quintilian, Tacitus' *Dialogus*, and the Second Sophistic are not included. The list is as impressive for its variety

as for its length; there appears to be no aspect of ancient rhetoric, from the rhetorical figures in Homer to the Byzantine scholia to Hermogenes, about which someone did not write something between 1915 and 1925. Most of the items are specialized studies of limited scope, for example, Geissler's dissertation on *descriptio* (No. 10), or Schäfer's on *narratio* (No. 58). Some touch on rhetoric only incidentally, such as Lane Cooper's *Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (No. 278), or C. H. Oldfather's *Greek Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt* (No. 102). General works on rhetoric include C. S. Baldwin's *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (No. 106), and the third edition of E. Norden's *Antike Kunstsprosa* (No. 13). There are a very few important new editions and translations (e.g., the Oxford translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, No. 262).

Lehnert's comments range from a curt "nichts Neues" to an occasional discussion several pages in length. He manages to make his summaries meaningful, and often he expresses agreement or disagreement. It would no doubt be hazardous to accept his judgments uncritical-ly; yet they deserve the serious consideration of all who are working with the materials with which he deals.

Of the topics that receive special emphasis in Lehnert's *Bericht* the following two may serve as illustrations. First, the publications on Isocrates (discussed on pp. 68-79) give on the whole a highly favorable picture of him and cast considerable doubt on the supposed hostility between Isocrates and Plato. Münscher's article "Isokrates" in the *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Vol. 9 (1916), cols. 2146-2227, was a major element in this rehabilitation of Isocrates; others who had a good word for him included von Wilamowitz and Jaeger.

A second important area is that of the rhetorical element in the Latin poets (Virgil, Horace, Ovid, etc.). Lehnert lists no less than 48 items here, and his discussion runs to 17 pages (115-131). The structure and sources of Horace's *Ars Poetica* figure prominently, as a result of Jensen's reconstruction of Neoptolemus' poetics from Philodemus' *De Poematis*. Lehnert mentions also several studies of rhetorical elements in Ovid, and in general he welcomes them, though he is moved to remark that Ovid's poems are nevertheless poems.

This *Bericht* is the last of a series of reports by Lehnert on publications in the field of ancient rhetoric. He completed it in 1943 and died the following year. It has recently been

announced that the *Jahresberichte* are being discontinued, and in their place a new international journal, *Lustrum*, will publish bibliographical reports on classical studies. There is therefore some prospect that Lehnert's work will be continued.

PHILLIP DE LACY  
Washington University

PATRICK HENRY, PATRIOT IN THE MAKING. By Robert D. Meade. (Virginia Edition.) Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1957; pp. x+431. Illustrated. \$7.50.

This book is the first of two volumes concerning Patrick Henry by Dr. Meade. The Virginia edition presents selected items from Henry's Scottish influences through his arrival at the first Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1774.

As the title suggests, this biography puts particular emphasis on the events which the author believes were influential in developing Patrick Henry as a revolutionary patriot. Dr. Meade traces the growth of Henry from his early childhood, when as one of eleven children he was well-tutored by his father. Early business failures as a merchant, marriage at 18, and finally a successful law practice were other important factors which influenced Henry. It was not until Henry participated in the Parson's Cause and delivered the Stamp Act Resolutions that he gained wide-spread fame for his oratorical abilities and the reputation as a revolutionary leader.

At the end of this first volume the reader looks forward to Dr. Meade's treatment of Henry's most famous speeches. By the time Henry attended the first Continental Congress in 1774, he had taken such a strong stand in the events which led to the American Revolution that Dr. Meade says, "If the Americans won, Henry would be acclaimed as a founding father, one of the great men of history. If they failed, he would be a traitor, and probably hang on an English gibbet."

Dr. Meade, head of the History Department at Randolph-Macon Woman's College since 1939, writes primarily from the point of view of the historian. A scholarly approach to his material does not make his style and subject matter any the less interesting. In fact, the 77 pages of notes numbered by chapters and printed at the end of the text, plus the detailed index, make the volume particularly useful to other scholars.

Dr. Meade is critical of some of the comments made by Henry's contemporaries and

quoted as truth by later biographers. This is evident in a number of instances in which Dr. Meade quotes William Wirt's *The Life of Patrick Henry* and attributes erroneous impressions to Thomas Jefferson.

Unfortunately, transcripts of Henry's early speeches are not extant. The scholar is dependent upon newspaper accounts, personal letters, brief notations in private diaries or journals. Speech teachers and students will be particularly interested in materials Dr. Meade presents from these sources which are relative to Henry's two most important speeches prior to the first Continental Congress: The Parson's Cause, 1763, and The Stamp Act Resolutions, 1765.

BRUCE L. NARY  
University of Michigan

WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD TODAY. Edited by Arthur P. Dudden. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957; pp. x+96. \$2.75.

WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Edward H. Buchrig. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957; pp. 176. \$4.50.

WOODROW WILSON. By Silas Bent McKinley. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957; pp. 284. \$4.50.

The first two volumes are similar in nature and purpose. Both contain essays originally delivered as lectures at conferences held at Bryn Mawr and Indiana University commemorating the centennial of Wilson's birth. The first presents four essays by eminent historians Eric F. Goldman, William L. Langer, and Arthur Link, the latter a Wilson specialist. Included are appraisals of Wilson's philosophy, methods, and leadership, and examinations of his execution of office prior to, during, and following World War I. The second volume, which focuses upon Wilson's foreign policy, presents essays by equally distinguished authors dealing with the role of Colonel House in Wilson's diplomacy, Wilson and collective security, his Far Eastern and Latin American policies, and a British view of his foreign policy. Of uniformly high quality, the essays in both books are excellent reappraisals of Wilson's ideas and principles.

Silas Bent McKinley's biography is a relatively brief and popularized treatment of a complex subject. The author reveals familiarity with the important Wilson source materials, but

his work contains no documentation and presents little if anything new. The approach is sympathetic but not uncritical. Apparently designed for popular consumption, this book should be of only casual interest to the serious Wilson scholar or to the person who has read the Baker or Link volumes. However, its brevity, anecdotal style, and general readability should attract the reader who seeks an introduction to the life and times of Wilson.

CLAIR R. HENDERLIDER  
Western Reserve University

THE DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. By Rexford G. Tugwell. New York: Doubleday, 1957; pp. 712. \$8.50.

"The river of Lincoln literature flows on undiminished," wrote Roy Basler some years ago, and the same might be said today of the Roosevelt literature. It scarcely seems possible that there are many more intimates of the late Democratic President left to publish their versions of the inside story, but of course there are, and they will doubtless be heard from in time. The wonder is not that there are so many of these Roosevelt books, but that so many of them are so good. The latest of these, Rexford Tugwell's *The Democratic Roosevelt*, is one of the best. Tugwell is a remarkably sensitive and perceptive observer. He reveals uncommon insight into the relations between Eleanor and Franklin (he uses their first names throughout), between Eleanor and the elder Mrs. Roosevelt, and between Franklin and his associates. His probings into the personalities of New Dealers like Ickes, Morgenthau, and Wallace are penetrating and, if I am any judge, fair. One gets the feeling that Tugwell knew Roosevelt more deeply—understood more about his motivations and his ultimate aims—than even such men as Rosenman or Sherwood, certainly more than Moley or Farley. The sense of intimacy with his subject which Tugwell manages to share with his readers is the more remarkable because the writer himself is always kept in the background. Indeed, except for a brief account of his excitement at their first meeting in 1932 ("a tremendous, an unnerving experience") and the poignant explanation of their parting four years later ("He could support only so much disapproval of an intimate; when the tolerance was exceeded, friendship must not be put before expediency"), Tugwell seldom appears on the stage.

The mature Roosevelt delineated in these pages was a man who knew who he was and

where he was going. He had a sympathy with and a sense of responsibility for struggling, suffering humanity, an impulse toward reform, a passionate urge to right wrongs and correct injustices. Because he kept himself to himself and allowed no one to trespass upon his inner life, he seemed more complex than he actually was. Tugwell believes that by the time Roosevelt had reached the presidency, however flexible he might continue to be with regard to means, he had achieved a granitic certainty about ultimate ends. This certainty was anchored in the faith, acquired early in life, that he was in tune with the infinite, that he was doing God's work. It was this conviction that he was doing his best, and doing it with divine approval, that was to give him serenity in times of extreme crisis. As for the means employed—the compromises, the evasions, the trimming, the tacking to the left and to the right—Tugwell seeks to understand rather than to justify, to explain rather than to excuse. He reminds us that a large part of the art of politics is "the fitting out of what-must-be-done with acceptability." Widespread public opinion is needed to support a policy before it can become a program. "The business of creating that opinion . . . is a matter for experiment and is apt to be prolonged" (p. 439).

For the student of speechmaking, this book is chiefly valuable as a key to understanding the motivations of the man behind the speeches. Tugwell shows little interest in speechcraft *per se*, though as the foregoing quotation indicates, he recognizes that public persuasion is one of a president's most important tasks. It is significant that he explains Roosevelt's apparent vacillation and tentativeness, his habitual feeling out of public opinion, not as a timorous casting about to see in which direction it was politic to move, but as "*a gauge of the persuading that would be necessary.*" It is this, he adds, that marks the difference between the follower and the leader.

BARNET BASKERVILLE  
University of Washington

GROUP DISCUSSION PROCESSES. By John W. Keltner. New York: Longmans, Green, 1957; pp. x+373. \$4.50.

Keltner has written a highly teachable text for the beginning student in discussion. He has clearly spelled out specific techniques for carrying the student through various phases of the traditional problem-solving sequence. The text provides many illustrations, case studies, suggested activities and readings.

This book is much more than a how-to-do-it manual. The book does not confine itself to the traditional literature of speech. Instead, Keltner has presented research, theory, and practical experience from social psychology, education, sociology, semantics, and other disciplines which contribute to an understanding of the field of discussion. In borrowing from allied fields, Keltner has avoided the fanaticism sometimes found in the disciple who has just discovered a new religion, be it "group dynamics," "semantics," or "brainstorming." Keltner guides the student into areas where previous speech courses may not have taken him. He emphasizes the necessity for the student of discussion to become aware of research, theory, and practice in the behavioral sciences.

Typical of Keltner's handling of materials in allied fields is his treatment of role-playing. The techniques are not only described, but their limitations and weaknesses are pointed out. Students are warned of the necessity of getting training in the use of role-playing procedures. They are cautioned against the blind use of a "gimmick" without understanding its rationale and limitations. Such sound treatment of materials from related disciplines will make this book useful not only to the beginning student but to advanced students seeking a guide to study and research in discussion.

JACK MATTHEWS  
University of Pittsburgh

THE AGE OF TELEVISION. By Leo Bogart. New York: Ungar, 1956; pp. xii+348. \$6.50.

In *The Age of Television* Dr. Leo Bogart has with rare objectivity summarized research studies on the effect of television on the lives of people in this country. The effects are discussed in terms of television programming, patterns of television viewing, and impact on radio, reading, movies, spectator sports, advertisers, politics, and children. As a bonus, Dr. Bogart includes an appendix on "The Status of TV Research" which should prove helpful in understanding the endless arguments about the validity of program ratings.

*The Age of Television* can be effectively used by many of us in speech and dramatic art. Those whose primary concern is television will find a comprehensive summary and analysis of research. All of us are naturally concerned with people as members of audiences. While Dr. Bogart has not pretended to write a treatise on audience psychology, careful reading of his chapters will provide useful data for the public speaker and the playwright. Some conclu-

sions can be reached relative to the interests and tastes of people on the basis of age, sex, education, etc.

Dr. Bogart's distinction between the elite and the popular arts will be of interest to those in drama, especially the playwright. Not all will agree with the author's classification, even though he recognizes the existence of a continuum from elite to popular arts. If one assumes the validity of Dr. Bogart's classification, however, it may be useful for the playwright and the producer to know in which classification he is operative.

Many of the treatises on the mass media written by authors employed in the industry appear to be apologies for all the practices of the media. Dr. Bogart, whose doctorate is in sociology, neither praises nor blames. He summarizes studies, then classifies their results with some conclusions as to their meanings and implications. It is because of the author's objectivity that *The Age of Television* has so many excellent qualities.

H. CLAY HARSHBARGER  
State University of Iowa

**BRITISH RADIO DRAMA 1922-56. A Survey**  
by Val Gielgud with a Foreword by Sir William Haley, K.C.M.G. London: Harrap, 1957;  
pp. 207, 15/-.

This book differs from American radio texts as markedly as BBC radio programs do from ours. Mr. Gielgud writes from a background of thirty years as Head of BBC Drama. As Sir William Haley states in his foreword, ". . . it is overwhelmingly due to Val Gielgud that Broadcast Drama has become what it is today. . . . No man is better able to tell the story of *British Radio Drama 1922-56*" (p. 6).

In his preface Mr. Gielgud points out that he presents ". . . survey and not history. A detailed account of plays presented on the British air over a period of roughly thirty years—complete with titles, authors, and casts—would have been boring, if not intolerable, to read. The aim has been to present the general picture—not omitting imperfections, failures, and shortcomings" (p. 10).

For five chapters the author chats about important developments, productions, and personnel in the BBC drama department. He devotes special attention to the facilities of Broadcasting House and the story of wartime radio drama, and begrudges two chapters to the surge of television drama from Alexandria Palace to Lime Grove. Many of the plays and performers will be unfamiliar to most American

readers, as will be the selected BBC actors, "dramatic programmes," and producers listed in the appendices.

Three additional chapters highlight regional radio drama, the "feature programme," and dramatic broadcasting in other nations. The latter chapter concludes that: ". . . countries get the broadcasting systems—as they get the Governments—that they deserve, as suiting best the national temperament" (p. 137).

Mr. Gielgud permits himself a pair of intriguing side journeys. "The Lighter Side" samples amusing incidents of three decades of broadcasting, and "Occasions of Offence" describes a few public attacks on the BBC drama section.

A chapter on dramatic writing for radio provides unusual insight for the professional, or the broadcast instructor. Several of Gielgud's opinions conflict directly with dominant American approaches. For example, he relegates radio sound effects to the lowly position of the coconut shell in the theatre, and hails music as radio drama's most powerful aid. A chapter on production philosophy is equally provocative.

In the concluding section, the major thesis emerges—"Where Do We Go From Here?" Mr. Gielgud emphasizes radio's unique ability to stimulate the intellectual, and denies that television has sounded the death knell for radio drama (except, perhaps, in the United States). "The next four or five years will show whether a Drama of the Air more genuinely *Radio* both in conception and execution, can or cannot stand in line with the theatre, the films, and the Television Play. I hope and—for what my personal opinion may be worth—I believe that it will. It is certainly going to be fun to see" (p. 188).

This book sheds needed light upon many BBC theories, particularly in drama. But it also implies much about the reasons behind the theory. It is here that Gielgud makes his most significant contribution.

DAVID LYNDON WOODS  
Office of Naval Research

**TRAGEDY.** By William G. McCollom. New York: Macmillan, 1957; pp. ix+254. \$5.00.

A critic who wants to say something new about a subject as old as tragedy must either reorganize formal criticism on non-Aristotelian grounds (as Kitto has been doing) or go for his methods and insights into areas not previously, or at least not completely, explored (such as anthropology or psychoanalysis). Professor McCollom does both. Though he says

that Aristotle's description of tragedy is fundamentally sound, he rarely uses it in working out his own theory. Instead of thinking of a play as made up of six elements (*mythos, ethos, etc.*), he agrees with Granville-Barker that drama is essentially "character-in-action." In his opening chapters he argues that the tragic hero must be a "free conscious agent in quest of the good life and undergoing a moral evolution" and that the plot must embody, and the diction must record, the continuous purposive action of the hero (p. 50). In the last four chapters he discusses representative Greek, Elizabethan, French, and modern tragedies and their social milieu to make clear that the tragedy of the "individual moral consciousness" arose only when man was allowed to function freely and fully (p. 152).

Not merely in these final chapters, but throughout, he shows a remarkable interest in history, sociology, and philosophy and, for one in the dramatic arts, a remarkable lack of interest in dramatic criticism. The great critics of the drama, such as Longinus, Minturno, Castelvetro, the Scaligers, Jonson, Rymer, Dryden, Lessing, Johnson, the Schlegels, Coleridge, and Brunetière, are either not mentioned at all or not fruitfully used. We hear of Harry Stack Sullivan, but not of Schiller; of Jung but not of I. A. Richards; of J. B. Pratt but not of Wolfgang Clemen. Even more curious is his lack of any reference to the recent spate of books on tragedy, some of which explore, as his does, its connections with philosophy—books like Henry Myers' *Tragedy* or T. R. Henn's *Harvest of Tragedy*.

The book, then, is strong on the analysis of character, and weak on most other formal problems. Believing that drama is "tied to representation," he is more sympathetic toward modern plays than toward those that are artificial. Hence, his remarks on Ibsen, O'Neill, and Eliot are more persuasive than those on Shakespeare or the Greeks. Corneille and Euripides come off badly. Chapman is preferred to Marlowe. The plays of Yeats and Chekhov are not even mentioned. Shakespeare's language is praised because it is "essentially representational in tendency"—whatever that means. The *Oresteia* is never analyzed to show how it would reveal a free agent seeking the good life; and one might question a theory of tragedy that did not embrace the *Oresteia* as its favorite child.

Even when McCollom criticizes other formal elements than character, he rings in character or society. In the chapter on diction, for in-

stance, he tells us that, when we ask what a dramatist is "saying," we really mean: "how does this action apply to the society which produced it or, better, to the actions of men in all times and places" (p. 113). This same emphasis on characterization makes even the chapter on structure, which one might expect to be treated formally, curiously empty of any formal criticism except the outmoded analysis in terms of rising and falling action, crisis, and turning point. Not one of the various theories of *catharsis* is mentioned even to be refuted. Indeed, there is little reference to the tragic effect except as it depends on the individual hero.

What the author does best—the analysis of separate speeches—he does least often. Too frequently in this provocative but incomplete book one feels that the magnificent range of tragedy has been narrowed down to one kind and that its mystery has been intellectualized right out of existence.

EDWARD PARTRIDGE  
Bucknell University

ON THE DESIGN OF SHAKESPEARIAN TRAGEDY. By Harold S. Wilson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957; pp. 256. \$5.00.

Professor Wilson begins with the premise that the Elizabethan age recognized an "order of faith," which governed Christian believers, and an "order of nature," through which God controlled all persons and things lacking knowledge of Him. The critic then argues that *Romeo and Juliet*, *Hamlet*, *Othello*, and *Macbeth* belong to the order of faith and place man under the rule of Divine Providence and Justice; that *Julius Caesar*, *Coriolanus*, *Troilus and Cressida*, and *Timon of Athens* represent human life within the order of nature; and that *Antony and Cleopatra* and *King Lear* harmonize the orders of faith and nature.

The book is an impressive attempt to reconcile the Christian and the tragic elements in Shakespeare. Wilson's design is striking; but it is perhaps more plausible than convincing. For example, he asserts that the order of nature is antithetical to the order of faith, yet he adds that the Elizabethans placed nature under divine law. If this is so, then Shakespeare's Roman plays illustrating the order of nature are fundamentally as Christian as *Romeo and Juliet*, and we are not very far, after all, from an insistently Anglican Shakespeare. Moreover, the analysis of *Antony and Cleopatra* and *King Lear*, while pushing these plays out-

side a Christian framework, attempts to draw them back with the argument that the surpassing loves of Antony, Cleopatra, Lear, and Cordelia are conceivable only in a world which has known Christ. Yet Wilson has just praised Coriolanus as a hero who sacrifices his triumph and his life for love of his mother. The argument is perilously close to saying that Antony received a deeper draft of God's love than did Coriolanus since Antony's play harmonizes the orders of faith and nature.

Nevertheless, Wilson's book is an intelligent and learned formulation of Shakespeare's tragic attitudes, and we may properly let the critic make his own concluding statement. "The quality of Shakespeare's Christian faith, as it is reflected in his plays, is the quality of Edmund Spenser's faith as it is reflected in *The Faerie Queene*, or of Richard Hooker's faith as it is reflected in *The Laws of the Ecclesiastical Polity*—with the important difference that Shakespeare does not set forth the *whole* of that faith, as Spenser and Hooker in different ways each tried to do."

WILLIAM G. MCCOLLOM  
Western Reserve University

ENGLISH SENTIMENTAL DRAMA. By Arthur Sherbo. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1957; pp. viii+181. \$4.50.

*English Sentimental Drama* is, in general, a valuable addition to the all-too-small collection of books on eighteenth-century English drama. Mr. Sherbo finds the traditional definitions of sentimental drama inadequate, for they fit some Elizabethan and Restoration plays which are obviously not sentimental. He therefore proposes three additional major characteristics which distinguish sentimental drama from other types: 1) the repetition and prolongation of sentimental elements, 2) the eschewal of humor and the bawdy, and 3) the sentimental emphasis and direction of the story.

The author treats an impressive array of plays, comparing and contrasting those elements which best reveal the differences between English sentimental drama and drama of other genres. His analyses are especially effective where he compares different adaptations of the same play, as, for example, when he compares the treatment of humor and bawdry in Hill's *The Insolvent* (acted in 1758) with Rowe's *The Penitent* (1703) and Massinger and Field's *The Fatal Dowry* (1619).

Mr. Sherbo stands on shakier ground when he attempts to establish the repetition and

prolongation of sentimental elements as major characteristics of the sentimental drama. When, for example, he compares the rake's conversion in *All's Well That Ends Well* with a similar situation in *Love's Last Shift*, he finds the former unsentimental because Shakespeare quickly disposes of it, and the latter sentimental because Cibber draws it out. Surely, this is gross oversimplification of the matter. Cibber's converted rake, Loveless, would be sentimental if he said no more than one or two sentences: "Oh, thou has roused me from my deep lethargy of vice! For hitherto my soul has been enslaved to loose desires, . . . but now I wake with joy to find my rapture real!" Sentimentality is a matter of conception, not of word quantity.

The author is not, however, prone to oversimplification. He generally examines plays from several angles. In one chapter he shows that a play deals only briefly with sentimental situations. In the next, he shows that it has too much humor and bawdry to allow a sentimental response. If repeated analysis of the same play (and of the same or closely related characteristics in different plays) occasionally makes the book seem repetitious and pedantic, it also makes the author's position clear, and in the main, acceptable.

IRVING DEER  
Santa Barbara College  
University of California

THE IRRESISTIBLE THEATRE. By W. Bridges-Adams. Cleveland and New York: World, 1957; pp. xiv+446. \$6.00.

In 1911, when W. Bridges-Adams suggested Shakespeare be produced at the Old Vic (then devoted to the cinema), Miss Baylis and the Board of Governors would hear none of it. His directorship (1919-34) of the Stratford Memorial Theatre was hampered by militant traditionalism (a stuffed stag from the Stratford Museum had to be used in *As You Like It*, since that was how the Stratfordians liked it), a tight-money policy, and ninety parochial governors. Withal, he achieved a boys'-company *Shrew* in 1923, featuring a Katherine named Laurence Olivier; and when fire destroyed the theatre in 1926 (which drew a message of congratulation from Shaw), Bridges-Adams knocked out the back wall of a cinema house and opened there with a completely new *Coriolanus*—on schedule. The details of his eventual break with the Memorial Theatre and of its attempt to compromise him with a seat on the Board (which he promptly refused) form

minute but notable parts of a lively chronicle that begs for book-length treatment. Regrettably, *The Irresistible Theatre* is not such a book; it reveals nothing of its distinguished author's own career in the British theatre; and, what is most sad of all, it is quite resistible.

This "history of the English stage from the Conquest to the Commonwealth (Illustrated)" takes not only its title from Matthew Arnold, but also its point of view. It appears as innocent of recent theatre history and bibliography studies, bearing on this vast period, as of twentieth-century literary criticism generally. In his Foreword, Bridges-Adams pleads:

The loosely knit form I have adopted seems to me the best suited to the patchwork of fact, theory and comment that it is bound to be. In matters of fact I shall, of course, try to be truthful, and in matters of theory —of conjecture or controversy—to give due weight to every view.

This congenial rationale, however, disappoints the reader again and again. Having chosen obsolete guides, which frequently lead him astray, the author fails to define even the outlines of his preferred patchwork.

Six and one-half pages of well-meaning confusion are dedicated to medieval staging, wherein Bridges-Adams arranges mansions indoors "down the length of the nave," without regard to the audience; refers to (and reproduces) "the extant sketch-diagram for the Lucerne Easter play," evidently unaware that two are extant; alludes to "a woodcut [but reproduces the *painting*] of the Martyrdom of Saint Apolline," suggesting vaguely that "this form of drama reached Cornwall"; and blithely describes the Valenciennes stage in terms of the familiar "nine ornate mansions." The author's reconstruction of the Globe Theatre reveals familiarity with only Hodges ("working from the conclusions of Mr. Cranford Adams") and Hotson ("although we may dispute [his] arena . . . we must grant him his houses") among modern investigators; thus, he assumes "an inner stage [*hic et ubique*] with twenty-seven feet of bare boards in front of it," but also doors which "must open and shut, even slam," presupposes columns of the stage, though there is no mention of columns in the Fortune contract, and ventures that those dimly observable figures in the upper stage of the Swan drawing are "the supposed Lords, in their box."

Hardly more secure in the new bibliographical jungle, he accepts Daye's assertion that *Gorbo-duc* (A) was spurious, considers *Hamlet* "an

adaptation," and seemingly dates *The Spanish Tragedy*'s mad-scenes (which first appear in Q<sub>2</sub>) pre-*Hamlet*. And he rejects the "tattered and greasy prompt copies" of Shakespeare's plays in favor of "coaxing old actors to recall what they had said and done" for the Folio text, while supinely concluding with his countrymen on the identity of Hand D in *Sir Thomas More*. Bridges-Adams appears baffled that Kyd (who attended Merchant Taylors' School) made "frequent use of Latin," and he lumps Greene, Lodge, Peele, and Nashe together in a four-page summary—yet devotes a chapter to Chapman. Lodge was not "M. A. of Trinity, Oxford," as claimed, his *Wounds of Civil War* was not taken from North's *Plutarch* but from Appian, nor was *Tamburlaine* necessarily this play's "near predecessor." And his proposal that "Aristotle might have wished to add something" to Chapman's *Bussy* preface is equivocal at best.

None of this would really matter, of course, if *The Irresistible Theatre* conveyed a noted stage-director's private attitudes on the English drama, but Bridges-Adams here builds his approaches chiefly (and explicitly) upon foundations laid by Lamb, Ward, Swinburne, and Archer. He appears in accord with Frank Harris' Shakespeare "biography," and Rupert Brooke ("Elizabethans liked obscenity") is his most contemporary critic. The result is an ingratiating eclecticism which will sustain certain readers, though not all.

The author finds *Faustus'* farce scenes only "a declining concatenation of fooleries"; passes hurriedly over Jonson's comical satyres and disparagingly dubs *The Alchemist* "a plain farce, for all its torrent of words"; places Webster "by choice, on the fringe of dreamland," yet discloses little of his craft; and, at length, epitomizes Shakespeare as "the national poet of a shopkeeping race." It seems lamentable that W. Bridges-Adams should have trafficked thus fulsomely, but not well, in second-hand material—and have shed no light on his own adventure.

PAT M. RYAN, JR.  
Yale University

THE VARIORUM EDITION OF THE POEMS  
OF W. B. YEATS. Edited by Peter Allt and  
Russell K. Alspach. New York: Macmillan,  
1957; pp. xxxvi+884. \$18.50.

W. B. Yeats's passion for revising his poetry was as central to the process of writing it as the initial inspiration or intermediate "stitching and unstitching" of lines that preceded pub-

lication. Lady Gregory called it a "competition for eternity." In his own words, remaking a poem was a means of self-knowledge; "It is myself that I remake," he claimed in defense of the practice. The record of this tireless endeavor both to perfect the work and conquer the self is now splendidly revealed in the Allt and Alspach *Variorum Edition*.

Working from the definitive text of the two-volume edition of 1949, the present editors list under each poem all its printed variants, even of spelling and punctuation, from the poem's first appearance to 1949. Additionally, the volume includes sixty-two poems with textual variants not printed in the definitive edition, two invaluable appendices of Yeats's own notes and prefaces and dedications, and a third appendix on the order and placement of the poems in separate volumes of the collation.

The *Variorum Edition* is conspicuously a work of devotion and meticulous care, without question one of the most impressive examples of purely textual research on a twentieth-century writer that has appeared in our time. Happily, the format, printing, and practical usefulness of the book match its distinction in other respects.

ANDREW G. HOOVER  
*Oberlin College*

## BRIEFLY NOTED

**THEATRICAL COMPANION TO COWARD: A PICTORIAL RECORD OF THE FIRST PERFORMANCES OF THE THEATRICAL WORKS OF NOEL COWARD.** By Raymond Mander and Joe Mitchenson. New York: Macmillan, 1957; pp. xii+407. \$10.50.

As a chronological record of the theatrical works of Noel Coward, the *Theatrical Companion* serves its purpose. The volume is divided into four main parts: first, the plays, revues, and operettas; second, film, broadcast, and television scripts; third, miscellaneous songs and sketches; fourth, plays, sketches, and songs unproduced and unpublished. There are two indices (plays and characters), a six-page appreciation of Coward by Terence Rattigan, over 170 photographs of the produced works, and some seven appendices which include production dates (English and American), film versions, film and stage appearances, first publications, and a discography.

The format is arranged somewhat as follows. A play is listed according to date of composition, with necessary production data (including characters and cast). Then, an act-by-act synop-

sis is given, followed by a selected review of the first production. After each review is a section devoted to play composition and production, based—for the most part—on Coward's two published autobiographies. All in all, the authors have done commendable research, but they did not fully exploit such sources as contemporary biographies, letters, and interviews. Then, too, there is a redundancy, in that many reviews tend to be recapitulations of material in the preceding synopses. Much of this could have been averted had the authors condensed the synopses and written interpretatively of each play in relation to creation, structure, and production. This is not to say that the *Theatrical Companion* lacks significance as a chronicle.

EUGENE K. BRISTOW  
*Indiana University*

## GENERAL SPEECH, AN INTRODUCTION.

By A. Craig Baird and Franklin H. Knowler. (Second edition.) New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957; pp. vii+395. \$4.75.

The second edition of a popular text by two distinguished authors is always received with interest. Baird and Knowler have performed an effective revision of their original work, omitting some chapters, compressing others, re-ordering the chapter sequence, and replacing older examples with more recent material.

The text retains its focus on speech in general education rather than on public speaking. The objectives of the original work are retained: emphasis on speech as a social process, primary consideration on methods of improving speech, and stress on the dependence of effective speech on the development of ideas.

In the new edition the chapters on fundamental speech processes (Chapters 3-14) have been brought up to date. The chapter on "Finding Materials" has been made more helpful by the incorporation of material formerly presented in an appendix. A number of readings have been added to the chapter on "Oral Reading." The chapter on "Radio Speaking" has become "Radio and Television Speaking" and some specific suggestions for television have been added. Two new chapters, "Speeches for Special Occasions" and "Parliamentary Procedure," have been added.

In all, the second edition represents an improvement over the first; more concise in style, it covers a wider range of material in a manner well suited to the needs of the contemporary student.

AUSTIN J. FREELEY  
*John Carroll University*

**EDUCATIONAL COMPETITION: THE STORY OF THE UNIVERSITY INTER-SCHOLASTIC LEAGUE OF TEXAS.** By Roy Bedichek. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956; pp. xx+501. \$6.50.

Without question Roy Bedichek is qualified to write this book. For over thirty years he was director of the University Interscholastic League of Texas.

Portions of the volume are a history of the League and its contests. Other portions are an evaluation and justification of competition as motivation in education, especially in extra-curricular activities.

Educational competition is defended by the author as "a spur to industry and a whetstone of talent." He supports his justification of competition by historical examples, ancient and modern. He employs authority, classical and contemporary. He uses argument.

As an advocate of John Dewey's philosophy he reasons: "If we accept the Dewey practice-in-living school, certainly controlled competitions should be important features in it."

Counsel is given those who administer contests. Among other things, they are cautioned that no student should be forced to compete. They are advised that inter-school competition is for the gifted.

The story of the University Interscholastic League, referred to in the sub-title, is told primarily in a number of individual chapters. Most of these are grouped together in what might be called a "historical section." Some, however, are separated from this section, to the perplexity of the reader.

HERMAN H. BROCKHAUS  
*University of Wisconsin*

**THE NEW AMERICAN SPEECH.** By Wilhelmina G. Hedde and William Norwood Brigance. (Fourth edition.) Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1957; pp. xi+587. \$3.80.

*The New American Speech* is a well-designed textbook for students in high school. This fourth edition should, in my judgment, be examined by all high school administrators, teachers, and librarians and by all speech educators. Both the form and content of this edition will be likely to appeal to them and to their students.

It is based on a sound, thought-provoking, and, in my judgment, significant philosophy which is clearly stated in the Preface and Chapter I. Supported by Bagehot and Toynbee, and by analysis and reason, this philosophy

should prove challenging to those who can face "the relentless facts" and the implications of "the telephone, the talking picture, radio, and television." High school students may be more willing to face these facts and implications than "educators who want to escape living in the twentieth century."

This book presents new foundations and directions in secondary education; bold but reasonable answers to questions raised in its older editions; workable suggestions for teaching bodily action, voice, articulation, and pronunciation; practical procedures for teaching listening; new, interesting, and challenging materials for oral interpretation; a long list of plays for high school production; a specimen public affairs society constitution; a calendar of days and events for speeches, plays, television shows, and puppetry; and a detailed citation of sources of a variety of teaching materials and aids to learning. An examination of its eleven-page index will arouse the interest of a teacher of speech and dramatics.

*The New American Speech* is significantly new and up-to-date in its format, philosophy, scope, subject matter, suggested experiences, and evaluation procedures for teaching speech and dramatics in the secondary school.

HUGH F. SEABURY  
*State University of Iowa*

**THE ART OF SPEAKING.** By E. F. Elson and Alberta Peck. (Revised edition.) Boston: Ginn, 1957; pp. vi+545. \$3.60.

First published in 1952, this high school text has had better than average acceptance.

Few basic changes have been made in this revised edition. The text is organized in three parts: "principles that are basic"; "ways and means of putting one's words together effectively"; and "how the principles and techniques . . . may be applied." The authors fulfill their intent.

The textual material is skillfully complemented by carefully developed and workable activity assignments. Radio and television, previously in a single chapter, are here treated individually. A new and valuable chapter on audio-visual materials is added. Sets of tests are included for inexperienced teachers—presumably.

Two textual weaknesses appear. The chapter, "I'm Scared," permits to go unsupported the major assertion that fear is valuable. The chapter, "Communication Within the Group," produces serious confusion over the nature and intent of debate in group problem-solving.

Of course, a text intending to do everything for all cannot avoid such weaknesses.

The book's style, graphics, format, and print are pleasing and suitable. Teachers in search of a compendium of information and activities in oral language education will find *The Art of Speaking* admirably suited to their needs.

WILLIAM E. BUYS  
*Southern Illinois University*

**SPEAKING EFFECTIVELY.** By Lee Norvelle, Raymond G. Smith, and Orvin Larson. New York: Dryden Press, 1957; pp. ix+326. \$2.90.

This book is a rewriting of an earlier volume identically titled, but because of a host of changes and a different approach it must be considered not a revision but actually a new work.

This text is a delight to read, both typographically and stylistically. In describing the speaker who has memorized his talk, for example, the authors write, "He sounds like a vocal essay; he should be read, not heard." The use of sketches, drawings, and photographs enhances the usefulness of the work and effectively illustrates many of the points made.

Ten sections and two appendixes make up the book. Especially to be recommended are the chapters on "The Approach," "Audience Analysis," "Forms of Support," and "Discussion." One relatively weak treatment is that entitled "Pattern of Analysis." The assignments at the end of each section, the sample student speeches, and the discussion of "Speeches for Special Occasions" will all be found very helpful indeed.

THEODORE G. EHRSAM  
*New York University*

**THE DYNAMICS OF INTERVIEWING: THEORY, TECHNIQUE, AND CASES.** By Robert L. Kahn and Charles F. Cannell. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957; pp. x+368. \$7.75.

Drs. Kahn and Cannell have designed their book for the student and the experienced practitioner in the many areas where the information-getting interview is a major or important subsidiary technique of inquiry. Starting with the refreshing concept that the interview is a communicative process which succeeds or fails according to the direction of the interaction between the interviewer and the respondent, they discuss the dynamics of that interaction and then examine case studies which illustrate the interaction. The reader is seldom aware of

a thesis which must be pursued. No attempt is made to minimize the weaknesses inherent in the technique. But a carefully thought-out methodology is presented which the serious reader can comprehend without much difficulty. And the psychological and sociological bases of the volume are soundly supported.

Although the book should have text-appeal to teachers of interviewing theory and technique, it appears to be directed primarily to the trade. Constantly the reader is assisted in his evaluation of cases. Frequently he is directed to employ various testing devices. Offending jargon is conspicuous by its absence. Illustrations are abundant and drawn from almost all conceivable fields of interest. At times, however, one might wonder if a particular illustration is employed other than as evidence of the authors' concern for comprehensiveness. Witness example 5 (pp. 229-30) which illustrates a counselor's permissive technique as a student decides to select an easy course in preference to a difficult but more applicable course. But this is minor criticism. The teacher of business speaking, the clinician, the moderator, and the administrator will find the book thought-provoking.

DAVID POTTER  
*Michigan State University*

**THE REHABILITATION OF SPEECH.** By Robert West, Merle Ansberry, and Anna Carr. (Third edition.) New York: Harpers, 1957; pp. 688. \$7.50.

Although *The Rehabilitation of Speech* is now in its third edition (1937, 1947, 1957), and although it must be regarded as a revision and not as a new book, the importance of this timeless classic in the field of speech pathology remains such that the new edition must be given formal recognition. As in previous editions, Book One, "The Pathology of Speech and the Rationale of Its Rehabilitation," is written by Robert West. Although many established speech therapists will recognize headings, illustrations, and chapter titles from previous editions, so that the book may have an almost nostalgic effect, the fact remains that Dr. West has made many changes that reflect the two decades of the book's life. Yet, overpowering this very real upgrading of the contents of the book are the authoritative approach, the fundamentality of concept, the basic soundness that have made great the previous editions of *The Rehabilitation of Speech*.

Book Two, "Rehabilitation Principles," has been written by Merle Ansberry and Anna Carr.

Dr. Ansberry's name is new to this book, if not to the field; Anna Carr, of course, has participated in all three editions. The new team has "expanded some sections of Book Two, combined others where such action seemed advisable, and added materials in order to keep abreast of developments in the field." Stressing an integrated approach to therapy, Book Two is a strong addition to our materials on rehabilitation.

The field of speech pathology may pleasurable anticipate a fourth edition in 1967.

JOHN V. IRWIN  
University of Wisconsin

**LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY.** By F. L. Lucas. (First American edition revised.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957; pp. 340. Paper, \$1.75.

Teachers of interpretation can find enlivening lecture materials in this provocative book by F. L. Lucas of King's College, Cambridge, who applies the psychological concepts of Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Stekel to literary analysis.

Those trained in other schools of psychology will of course find much to challenge here, but at no time will they find the concepts dull or the writing unexciting. Iconoclasts, Lucas thinks, are sometimes "really searching among authors for hated father substitutes." The witches in *Macbeth* are "profound symbols of those obscure forces in the mind that so often make men court the ruin that must expiate their sense of guilt." Hamlet is torn "between love and hate . . . of his mother."

Platonists will be dismayed to find their hero described not as "a reasonable man" but as "a neurotic genius." "Platonistic dogmatism," says Lucas, "provides . . . that blessed sense of certainty craved by so many hearts, homesick for the days of childhood when parents seem omniscient and infallible."

Aesthetes who attempt to divorce art from politics and morality will likewise find cause for complaint. Is literature, Lucas asks, merely "the opium of the intellectuals"? Proust is "a fascinating case" because he exemplifies "the dangers of all literature that turns from life, all literature that loses health of mind." Writers should write "to be of some use." "The modern world has seen too many writers encouraging men to flee from reality into decadence." "The dykes of civilization prove weaker than anyone dreamed fifty years ago. The little rats of decadence swarm there. And, outside, there may well wait another deluge."

Rhetoricians should consider carefully Lucas's observations on clarity:

What can be thought clearly, can be said clearly. . . . The first step toward obtaining clarity is to realize that it is more difficult in practice than anyone at first sight could conceive. Ultimately this too is a question of psychology. Quite apart from mere incompetence and wobble-mindedness, our unconscious motives distort our expression of what we think we mean and our impression of what we think others mean.

R.G.G.

#### BOOKS RECEIVED

**COLERIDGE: POEMS AND PROSE.** Selected with Introduction by Kathleen Raine. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1957; pp. 314. Paper \$ .85.

**FROM DRYDEN TO JOHNSON.** Edited by Boris Ford. Vol. 4 of the Pelican Guide to English Literature. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1957; pp. 512. Paper \$ .95.

**HEARING: ITS INTERRELATION WITH SPEECH.** By D. Robert Frisina. Gallaudet College Bulletin No. 1, Vol. 6. Washington, D. C.: Gallaudet Press, 1957; pp. 23. Paper \$ .25.

# SHOP TALK

RICHARD MURPHY, *Editor*

## ON CALAMOPHOBIA

Having been born somewhat before the age of antibiotics, wonder drugs, public health, and preventive medicine, ST has experienced most of the known diseases. Diphtheria, typhoid, various kinds of flu from Spanish to Asian—these are a few of the maladies that have come and gone. Although these are serious enough, they do come to an end, or the patient does. In fact a little respite from the rigors of work can be very pleasant. A few years ago ST spent several delightfully restful days in the infirmary—private room, private shower, expenses paid by insurance—under diagnosis of an acute upper respiratory infection thought to be *cervical adenitis*, but which the nurses scoffingly treated as German measles. All these ills came, as we say, and went—nothing lingering such as TB or elephantiasis. But the other day ST discovered he is suffering from an acute, and evidently incurable disease, and has been a victim of it for almost half a century.

The diagnosis came about this way. A colleague dropped in to discuss some difficulties he was having in putting an essay together. We all fell to encouraging him, but he said it was no use; he had calamophobia. And what was that? *Calamo* from the Latin meaning a reed, a writing reed, and by extension, a quill, spencerian, ball point, or typewriter. *Phobia* for phobia, of course. Our informant discoursed very wisely about it. He has a friend, he said, who once managed to write a book on economics. The time came for him to

revise it, and he just couldn't do it. He took to hobbies, joined a square dancing group at the club, waxed all the floors in his house, and became a leader in various community uplift societies—all to escape sitting down at the typewriter. Calamophobia is what he had, no doubt of it. If we wanted to know more about it, our diagnostician said, we should look up an essay by Jacques Barzun, "Calamophobia, or Hints Toward a Writer's Discipline," in *The Writer's Book Presented by The Author's Guild*, Harper, 1950, ed. Helen Hull.

ST promptly got the essay, read it, and sure enough, it's calamophobia. In his case, the symptoms are a feeling of gloom, severe irritation—he once kicked at the cat—and garrulity. Checking over Barzun's rules on what not to do, ST finds he violates them all. (1) Do not read what you have written to whoever will listen, if you would have an author's discipline rather than disease, says Barzun. ST has hardly put his page into the typewriter when he is off to find an audience. (2) Do not talk yourself out of good ideas by trying to expound them to haphazard gatherings. ST expounds his ideas to any willing audience, the more haphazard the better. (3) Never choose your critics from your immediate family circle (they may be too charitable). ST bounds out of his room, pounces on the nearest member of the circle, and reads. When the children were small, he used to read first drafts to them at bedtime—more effective than nursery tales, much. (4) One need not be callous or stubborn

about reproof by a critic. ST recently insisted that a university press restore his MS, just as he wrote it, and appended a little essay on the sanctity of an author's work. As for the general advice on procedure, that the best way to write is just to sit down and do it, not worrying about the larger outline or how it will all end, ST is probably pathological. He never could write until he had the larger outline, and larger outlines don't come easily.

One of the queer aspects of the disease is that many persons suffering from it do a prodigious amount of writing. There was Thomas Carlyle, suffering from dyspepsia and insomnia, and muttering "100 pages more and this cursed book is flung out from me." Malcolm Cowley (*The Atlantic*, December) describes Thomas Wolfe as going through "weeks or months of self-torture, walking the streets of Brooklyn at night, fleeing to Europe, staying drunk for days on end." One of the main problems in writing is getting audacity enough to start to work. Cowley (this time *The Saturday Review*, November 30) gives various devices used by various people. Hemingway sharpened twenty pencils, Willa Cather read a passage from the Bible, and an agnostic (unspecified) got down on his knees to beg for courage and inspiration. The usual writing day seems to be 3-4 hours, some of them very odd. It's system that does it. ST once asked a writer who turned out a book or so a year how he managed it. He replied, "We have no children, and neither my wife nor I play bridge." Thomas Mann, according to a profile in *The New Yorker* (Dec. 13, 1941) tried to write about 40 lines a day. It took him 12 years to write *The Magic Mountain*, 400,000 words. (The mathematics are a bit off here, but no matter, it was

an achievement; there are readers who have spent more than 12 years on the volumes, at a speed of less than 400 lines a day.) In short, if you would avoid calamophobia, just sit down and write. Do it systematically, every day, for a few hours. Use whatever device you can to get started—sharpen pencils, pray, drub the keys—but start. This is comparable to advising a person suffering from stage fright to stand up there and be poised, but stand up.

Since ST has long since disqualified himself from giving any advice on the subject of how to write usefully and freely, he will have to draw on an old friend. Several months ago, in surveying the periodicals, ST wrote to Robert T. Oliver, of Penn State, editor of *Today's Speech*, to learn about the journal. The editor not only conscientiously filled in the questionnaire, but he typed on the back a memo on writing, just for good measure. He did not intend it for publication, and he will be much surprised, if he ever chances across this, to find his casual remarks emblazoned. Professor Oliver has done articles, textbooks, and for years has served as the public information official of the Korean government. His most recent book, *Speech for Democratic Living*, is now used in Korean colleges in an English edition, and in Korean high schools in a Korean translation. ST has had Professor Oliver thoroughly investigated, and in presenting him, certifies that he is without any traces of calamophobia. Here is what he wrote on the back of the questionnaire:

Too many of our people are needlessly afraid of writing; if they would sit down to share with others on paper what they freely (and often very skillfully) tell their students in conference, we'd get better writing. I think, too, we need just what you are doing: a description by editors of what they want and require. We have journals with varied aims; our people

should study them and write to meet their several types of requirements.

My "pet peeve" about scholarly writers is that they violate the precepts they give their own students: i.e., they are "subject-centered" in their writing, rather than "audience-centered." Every writer, before he starts putting marks on paper, should ask himself: "Who is going to read this, and why? What need of my readers can I satisfy?" Then he should make his article purposeful, clear, vivid, and above all, to the point. This isn't much to ask! We ask our students (even freshmen) to do it in their speeches. Why can't we do it in our writing?

My hunch is that most of our people simply don't regard themselves as being "writers." I wish they would forget it! The question is, rather, do they have something to say that would be helpful to others? If so, it is their function as teachers (using publication as "a larger classroom") to say it. Clarity, simplicity, and the sheer having of something worth sharing with others is preferable to any fancied stylistic excellence.

In discussions with teachers who don't publish, I often hear them saying that they devote their efforts to being a good teacher, rather than to writing. What do they think writers are doing? If a teacher has a real zest for teaching, why not reach out beyond the few students gathered in front of him in his classroom to teach the far greater number who read the journals?

Cross-fertilization is the heart of educational progress. We simply must learn from one another. The best teaching ought not to be sequestered behind closed doors, available only to a small number of students. It ought to be emblazoned for the widest possible dissemination, so that it can become an influence to help improve the teaching of all of us.

This is why we have professional journals. Let's do all we can to encourage our non-writing colleagues to realize that if they are doing a good job of teaching they owe a debt to the profession to set forth their philosophy, their methods, and their special knowledge for the benefit of the rest of us.

#### SHOP TALK SPEECH CONVENTION CALENDAR

##### NATIONAL

Speech Association of America: Hilton, Chicago, December 29-31; (1959: Statler, Wash-

ton, December 28-30; 1960: The Jefferson, St. Louis, December 28-30).

American Educational Theatre Association: with SAA in Chicago: (1959: with SAA in Washington; 1960: with Children's Theatre Conference in Denver, August; 1961: with CTC in New York, August).

American Forensic Association: with SAA in Chicago.

American Speech and Hearing Association: New York, November 13-15; (1959: Cleveland, November 12-14).

The Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials and Interstate Co-operation, National University Extension Association: with SAA in Chicago.

National Society for the Study of Communication: with SAA in Chicago.

##### REGIONAL

Eastern States: Sheraton-McAlpin, New York, April 17-19.

Southern States: Rice Hotel, Houston, March 31-April 4.

Central States: (1959: Statler, Detroit, April 10-11.)

##### RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

American Association for Cleft Palate Rehabilitation: St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco, April 24-26.

American Association of University Professors: Cosmopolitan Hotel, Denver, April 25-26.

Delta Sigma Rho National Congress: Michigan State University, East Lansing, April 10-12.

Modern Language Association: N. Y., December 27-29.

National Dramatic Arts Conference—National Thespian Society: Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind., June 16-22.

National Education Association: Cleveland, June 29-July 4.

National Council of Teachers of English: Pittsburgh: Penn-Sheraton, November 27-29.

Tau Kappa Alpha's Golden Jubilee Conference: University of Kentucky, Lexington, April 10-12.

**THE ETERNAL QUESTION.** Whether one is getting out a mimeographed newsletter, editing a metropolitan daily, or just gathering gossip for a professional journal, the eternal query is, *is this news?* The response to our call for news has been good. Some of the materials we receive are, however, not within our scope. For example, we get a list of persons from a particular school who attended a state convention.

Now, there are 45 state conventions, and were we to print the names of all who attend, there would be no space for those exciting articles at the front of the journal. Someone sends in a notice that he has published a book, and we have to express the hope that it may be reviewed in *New Books*. Or we get a list of publications someone has amassed, and we have to suggest that it should appear in some bibliography. We get long reviews of papers at conventions, and we have to suggest that the papers *in toto* should be printed somewhere. The number of debate tournaments reported on would fill an issue. Since these are listed in detail in *The Register* of the American Forensic Society, we have to confine our reporting to examples, here and there, which seem to have something of novelty or universality. The theatre schedules we have wondered about. They take a lot of room and are somewhat repetitious. But polls reveal they are of general interest, and so they are retained.

All this is not to discourage the sending in of news, but to explain, very apologetically, that not everything can be printed. We try to run news of general interest to the profession and particular bits which reveal what members are doing. The scope of the journal is national, not state, not regional. Many items of local or regional interest are not run unless they have some significance in the national scene. If you are in doubt as to whether your items are of interest, send them in, and let old ST, with all his fallibility, decide.

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#### INVITATION

Please send your items to Richard Murphy, 204A Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana. Deadlines are August 15, October 15, December 15, February 15.

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#### REPORT ON THE JOURNALS II

In the last issue we reported on the national and regional SAA journals, and those of organizations which at one time or another meet with SAA in convention. This issue we are reporting on speech and theatre journals of other national academic societies. Details below refer to style manual used, if specified; maximum length of articles in typescript; circulation; quantity of MSS submitted, whether plentiful, adequate, or scarce.

*Cameo*. Issued quarterly by Zeta Phi Eta, na-

tional professional speech arts fraternity for women. "Most of the material used is requested from leads supplied by members. Very few articles are sent unsolicited. Material is written primarily by members or by people in speech in departments where chapters are maintained." Editor, Mrs. Anne Jonas, 5203 Chandler, Bethesda, Maryland. 3 pp.; 2,300; scarce.

*The Cue*. Issued quarterly by Theta Alpha Phi, national honorary dramatic fraternity. Editor Lillian Masters, Indiana State Teachers College, reports: "The *Cue* is designed for students, teachers, and directors of college theatre, and features articles, pictures, and news of college theatres, articles by members of educational theatre and craftsmen of the professional theatre." 8 pp.; 1500; plentiful.

*Dramatics Magazine*. Issued October through May by The National Thespian Society. Featured are articles about theatre, especially the secondary school theatre, that will appeal to high school teachers and students. 10 pp.; 30,000; editor Leon C. Miller, College Hill Station, Cincinnati 24, reports: "Since we pay our authors for all articles accepted for publication, the supply of articles exceeds the number we can accept."

*The Forensic*. Issued quarterly by Pi Kappa Delta, national forensic honorary. Editor Emmett T. Long, California State Polytechnic College, Pomona, says he wants articles of general interest in forensics. 4 pp.; 2500; plentiful.

*The Gavel*. Issued quarterly by Delta Sigma Rho, national honorary forensics society. Editor John W. Keltner of Kansas State College says he is looking for articles in forensics, public address, popular and stimulating research. MLA; 4 pp.; scarce.

*NADSA Encore*. Issued annually by the National Association of Dramatic and Speech Arts. Founded in 1936, the journal is an organ for expression of Negro speech and drama teachers. This year there was no publication; a combined 1957-58 issue will be made. Editor Thomas E. Poag of Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial State University, Nashville, writes: "Both Negro and white institutions in the South are now being integrated. We now have more trained Negro speech and drama teachers. With the expansion of AETA, ANTA, SAA, and a number of regional organizations which are now integrated, we must restudy our philosophy and function." MLA; 5 pp.; adequate.

*Players Magazine*. Issued monthly, October to May, by National Collegiate Players. Editor,

Clark Weaver, University of Florida, Gainesville. News, notes, short illustrated articles on the theatre. 5 pp.; adequate.

*The Rostrum*. Issued monthly, September to May, by the National Forensic League. Editor Barbara M. Radcliffe, 360 Central Avenue, Dover, N. H., reports that in addition to news for chapters and members, articles in speech of general interest to coaches and students are published. 4 pp.; scarce.

*The Speaker*. Issued quarterly by Tau Kappa Alpha, national forensics honorary. Editor Keith S. Montgomery, of Purdue University, says he seeks articles in forensics, public address, analyses of speeches, etc., which will appeal to directors, undergraduates and alumni. Chicago; 4 pp.; scarce.

*The Tulane Drama Review*. Published in November, February and May, by the Department of Theatre and Speech, Tulane University. Robert W. Corrigan, editor, now at Tulane, formerly edited the journal as *The Carleton Drama Review*, when he was at Carleton College. The magazine is "devoted to the publication of essays in dramatic criticism, studies in the history of theatre and drama, important plays not otherwise readily obtainable, and reviews of scholarly books on the dramatic and theatre arts." MLA; variable; adequate.

**EPILOGUE.** This completes the review of the more or less official speech journals, national in scope, or affiliated with national organizations. Several journals have not been included because of inability to get in touch with the editors. Others may have been omitted inadvertently. But it does seem clear that we have journals aplenty, and most of them manage, amidst many difficulties, to keep going, perhaps because of organizational strength. For example, *Speech Activities*, edited through nine volumes by Egbert Ray Nichols of Redlands, ceased publication in 1954 when the editor retired; there was no organization to carry on.

The survey has not included any journals not national in scope or affiliation. For example, the *Bulletin of the Debating Association of Pennsylvania Colleges* is issued annually and carries articles. Some state speech journals have articles and reviews, although most of them seem to be restricted to news and announcements. Nor have we attempted to touch upon the inter-disciplinary journals, nor the specialized journals to which people in speech might contribute. *PMLA*, September, 1957 (LXII, No. 4, Pt. 2) carries very helpful descriptions of journals in the humanities (*QJS*

gets almost a column). It seems clear that people in speech have almost infinite opportunity to publish. A bibliography of speech and drama, recently published in *The Southern Speech Journal* (Summer, 1957) and confined to matters of regional significance, listed 72 different journals in which articles of interest were printed. This survey is here ended with a query: who will feed the presses?

**NEW JOURNALS.** *Theatre Arts*, first issue, was published this fall in New Delhi, India. Sponsor is Theatre Arts Society, an organization which produces plays in many languages. The issue contains articles by four Americans, one unsigned. Kenneth Macgowan writes on "Educational Theatre for Tomorrow"; Joseph T. Shipley on "Theatre for the United Nations"; Edward Crowley, of Northwestern, on "The Actors Are Come Hither, My Lord!" Crowley's article is a comparison of acting in the Western world with that in India.

The first issue of *The Centennial Review of Arts and Science* is dated Winter, 1957. It is issued by the College of Science and Arts, Michigan State University. *Centennial* in the name is for the 100th anniversary of the sponsoring university. Editor is Branford P. Millar. He welcomes "contributions from all fields of the liberal arts." In high purpose the editor states some of the qualities he would like to see contributors display:

Since this is a general quarterly, a "common reader" and not a specialized journal, contributors perhaps should be reminded—and readers may be assured—that material for it will be presented in a fairly straightforward manner. It will eschew pedantic footnotes, excessively complicated or esoteric charts and diagrams, and the exclusive jargon, symbolic language, learned assumptions, and other impedimenta of specialized studies. It is hardly expected that our authors can write effectively without using the essential vocabulary of their subject matter, even though they may at times have to face the difficult task of explaining it. But the cult of incommunicability may be overdone. The general nature of this magazine does impose limitations upon what may profitably be discussed here. Nevertheless it is our premise that specialists in the separate disciplines can convey at least the major results and implications of their work—and probably a good deal more than this—in language understandable to their

colleagues in the liberal arts. There are, within the criteria set forth, many topics in all the fields which are susceptible to exposition in *The Centennial Review* and may be expected in its pages. Such discussion should be mutually profitable: it is no more necessary or desirable for specialists always to mumble like medicine men than it is for them to limit their horizons like ostriches.

*Victorian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, is dated September. It is a handsome volume, with etchings and photographs. It is "devoted to the examination of English culture . . . 1830-1914 . . . plans to carry book reviews, a notes-and-queries section, bibliographies, and check-lists; it will also serve as a forum for the discussion of controversial questions." The interdisciplinary annual *Victorian Bibliography*, which formerly appeared in *Modern Philology*, will be included. Editors are Philip Appleman, William A. Madden, and Michael Wolff, of Indiana University, the sponsor of the journal. "Contributions should conform to the MLA Style Sheet, be submitted in duplicate, and be accompanied by return postage."

A recent advertisement in *The Reporter*, "A New and Exciting Magazine for the One Reader in A Hundred—Get the Current Issue Free" so excited us that we requested the free copy. Along it came, and we immediately regretted we hadn't known about it before. *diogenes* is the name. It is a quarterly publication of The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, issued "simultaneously" in French, in Paris—in Spanish, in Buenos Aires—in German, in Cologne—in Italian, in Rome—in Arabian, in Cairo—in English, in Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Richard McKeon, editor of the English edition. "Information and Propaganda," by Jacques Ellul of the Faculté de Droit de Bordeaux, in the current issue, is equal in profundity, and in international view, to anything ST has read in our speech journals, on this most absorbing subject. We cannot resist a quotation:

It is apparent that the relationship between propaganda and information is complex and difficult to assess. Their boundaries are vague and undefined. Almost inevitably information turns into propaganda; it makes propaganda possible, feeds it, and renders it necessary. It creates a need for propaganda in man, which in turn opens the door to psychic aggressions and to sentimental, political seductions.

Once again, let us refrain from erecting the kind of Manichean world that propaganda suggests—one side white, the other black, a good side, a bad side—saintly information, on the one hand, diabolical propaganda, on the other. The truth about the devil is that he created ambiguity.

**BOLDER STROKES.** Editor Bryant's "Invitation to the Pen," in the October number, has brought this department several short articles. Anthony Hillbruner of Los Angeles State College was prompted to write when he saw announced a Shop Talk essay on "Writing in the Profession." When he composed he had not seen the article itself, later printed in the December issue; so his remarks are in no way a rebuttal, but his own imaginative response to the announced theme.

#### THE RHETORICAL CRITIC'S ROLE IN SOCIETY

We do a wonderful job of *talking* in classrooms, or in justifying ourselves to our colleagues in other disciplines. In both we show how to become lucid thinkers, facile analyzers, articulate communicators, and when necessary, passionate exhorters. And all these skills ostensibly come as a result of the knowledge and practice of the speech discipline. But do we practice these arts ourselves? Only in the coffee seminars. Few public platforms, few national periodicals see us utilize these practical abilities in such a way as to help develop our evolving democratic society through the means of questions, skillful probing, or suggesting changes of significance.

Oh, we do plenty of writing too. But this is done in our own little scholarly journals; this is accomplished in a special closed society, set up in such a fashion as to give us some outlet, to suggest to ourselves that we are accomplishing something of value. In other words, to make us feel important. Actually, however, although we may not like to admit it, this is just a safeguard for ourselves—this setting up of a small fraternity in which we might be dominant. Caesar said that he would rather be top man in a small town in Gaul, than second in Rome. Most of us, in the same way, would rather be content to feed our egos in this small closed society, than to attempt to crack the national scene, where the possibilities of failure are manifestly greater.

It is true, of course, that the resurgence and growth of speech as a cohesive discipline in America has encompassed less than a half century. It is equally true that tremendous

strides have been made during that short period by articulate rhetorical scholars. But isn't it about time that more of us left the haven of our classroom platforms and the comfortable womb of our coffee symposia, where we talk so learnedly about the efficacy of the rhetorical discipline? Isn't it time, too, that we abandoned our journals, temporarily at least, where we criticize rhetoric (in terms which are largely belletristic rather than idea-centered terms, by the way, which largely have been abandoned by our fellow workers in the groves of academe—the English professors), and instead put to practice what we have been learning and advocating for so these many years?

These are only general views, however. What specifically is weak about the thinkers and scholars and writers in our area? Simply put, we are too provincial; we tend to fear and avoid the national scene; and we do not utilize the full blown resources of modern rhetorical training.

In the first place, when I declare that we are much too narrow and provincial in our outlook, I mean that we tend to stick too closely to the very limited field of analyzing speeches—and these are mostly of a bygone archaic age—or to analyzing speech theory, usually of about the same vintage. This is not to say that some of these analyses are not necessary or important. However, in our focus on the far past we neglect the present. We spend little or no time with what has been called content analysis (we still call it invention), or persuasion, or the utilization and implementation of ideas from such allied disciplines as general semantics, linguistics or psychology.

Look through our dissertations. How many deal with speech content? In fact, look through our professional journals, either regional or national, and see if you can find many analyses of *ideas* in public address. Invention, of course, is one of the most difficult of the classical canons to analyze, evaluate, and criticize. It is not impossible, however. Other scholars manage it. Why can't we?

When I speak of persuasion, I mean in the broad sense, as used not only in speeches but in other fields of communication as well. This is the kind of persuasion which is seen in the series of articles by Robert Engler in the *New Republic* (August 28; September 5, 12, 19, 26, 1955) called "The Sweet Smell of Oil," a study in public persuasion, or in the article in *The Reporter* (September 11, 1955) on the persuasive methods used by railroads and truckers in influencing public opinion, or on a dif-

ferent level, the creative one, in the castigation of the advertising industry in John G. Schneider's *The Golden Kazoo* (Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1956). It is true that these writings show a great deal of creativity, original research and documentation, and probably an exhausting amount of leg work, but do we not possess the same talent and energy?

Then there are the possibilities, too often neglected, of integrating such methodologies as those emanating from general semantics and transactional psychology as the foundation for analysis, evaluation and criticism of our society. Much too often we leave these ideas to workers in other vineyards. Look through the past issues of *Etc.*, for instance, and see how few scholars from speech are represented—English, linguistics, education, psychology, yes—but speech, seldom.

The second weakness of the rhetorician and the student of public address is that they do not function in the realm of ideas on the national level. How many of the well known scholars in our field have a national reputation outside that field? Probably none. If, however, by some chance (or to put it more fairly, by some ability) one such scholar does get a modicum of national recognition and attention, he immediately tends to mitigate or minimize the speech discipline and attempts to use other areas such as history or politics or economics to give *tone* to his evaluations.

The third weakness is that too often we are apt to forget that speech, transcending as it does many arbitrarily set lines, utilizes concepts and configurations not only from the social sciences (political theory, government, history, etc.) and from the humanities (language, literature, etc.), but even draws upon material of a more scientific character (psychology, group dynamics, etc.). These applications give unique synthesis and preparation for both the academic teaching of speech, and for making our weight felt in national affairs. If we made more adequate use of this potential, we could confidently look toward the day when rhetorical scholars and writers would make as significant contributions as writers and critics in other fields, such as Robert Penn Warren, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Hutchins, Arthur Bestor, David Riesman, Reinhold Niebuhr, Gilbert Highet, Richard Hofstadter, and Jacques Barzun, all scholars who have made their weight felt, not only in criticism, but in positive recommendations as well.

We might well ask ourselves, at this stage then, what are some of the things we can do

to overcome these weaknesses? Well, interesting as it is to many a speech student to smell the dust of antiquated tomes in the library, fascinating as it is to discover an ostensibly new tendency in Peter Ramus, gratifying as it is to get the fruits of our labor published, and helpful even as it is in a small way (perhaps to get a salary increase) to have accomplished all this, it seems about time that some of our more mature scholars or elder statesmen made their appearance in national periodicals of distinction. Moreover, in these appearances there are at least three possibilities that immediately come to mind: the evaluation of important contemporary figures; the assessment of powerful movements; and the appraisals of motivating ideas.

Cannot we write a penetrating analysis of the social and political theory of an Eisenhower, or a Nixon, or a Stevenson? This is especially apropos since most of the views of such figures have been revealed in speeches; it is simpler to work from these fugitive works than from weighty, complex, philosophical tomes. There is no reason, however, to limit such analyses and critiques to speechmaking alone. Writings, messages, and actions, particularly actions, should all be used to complement the speeches and to reveal a more comprehensive picture.

As to movements. Is there a clear analytical voice in our field which attempts to see and understand the motivating forces behind the development of management, or labor, or the Americans for Democratic Action, or *Facts Forum*?

Finally, what speech scholar concerns himself with those mainsprings of action, those fundamentals which are by no means the antithesis of action, but which set armies on the march and bring about the vast spectacle of social change, *ideas*. Who is it, for instance, who attempts to understand the underlying bases of neo-conservatism, the modifications in today's liberalism, or the growth of that anomaly of the 1950's, the philosophy of the middle of the road? Hardly a one.

These are the fields more than worthy of our most capable thinkers and writers. In fact, effective delineation, and criticism of men, movements, and ideas would be of inestimable value and importance to the growth and development of our society.

Ah, but perhaps we are too young, too immature, or too pedantic to try our wings in a national sky. Perhaps we need more time for insights, for contemplation, for growth, or for

maturity. Perhaps so. But then let's not be surprised or offended when after a new acquaintance has been told that we teach speech, he can only say, "I wish I could learn to speak in public without being nervous."

ANTHONY HILLBRUNER  
Los Angeles State College

CONVENTIONS. We asked Mary Huber of Los Angeles State College, retiring news reporter for *JSHD*, to write up the ASHA convention. Here is her report:

The American Speech and Hearing Association held its 33rd Annual Convention at the Netherland Hilton in Cincinnati, November 20-22. Jon Eisenson, Queens College, was installed as president, and Leo G. Doerfler, Pittsburgh, as vice president. Robert West, Brooklyn, editor of association publications, discussed the new journal, the *Journal of Speech and Hearing Research*, and the new scope of the *Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders*, which will carry articles dealing with therapy. Originally (and as announced in December Shop Talk) the intent was to discontinue *JSHD* and to call the journal dealing with therapy the *Journal of Speech and Hearing Therapy*, but it was decided for reasons of sentiment and cataloguing consistency to retain the title. Dorothy Sherman, University of Iowa, will edit the research journal, and Mary Huber the one dealing with therapy. Members will receive both journals; associates will receive *JSHD* unless they specify the other.

Retiring president Raymond Carhart, Northwestern, announced that the national office will be established in Washington, D. C., this year. Kenneth Johnson, San Francisco Hearing and Speech Center, has been appointed full-time Secretary-Treasurer.

Honors of the Association were awarded to Clarence L. Meader, University of Michigan emeritus, Raymond Carhart, and George Kopp, Wayne State University. Professor Meader, who retired in 1939, attended the convention. He is a spry ninety.

A highlight of the convention was the box luncheon at which Robert West presented a witty and humorous historical resumé of the growth and development of the association.

NCTE. SAA's parent organization, National Council of Teachers of English, met in Minneapolis at the Thanksgiving holiday; they never vary their date. Attendance, about 2,000, was down. The executive committee approved a system of national awards in English to high school students. One student from each Congressional

district—a total of 435—will be honored by citation and a scroll. Although the society will not be able to give financial reward, it hopes the students honored may have better chances at college scholarships.

The council also approved of an SAA—NCTE liaison committee. Members are Henry Mueller and Donald Veith for SAA and Dwight Burton, State University of Florida, and Robert A. Bennett, Minneapolis Public Schools, for NCTE. The committee will seek ways for closer cooperation between the two societies.

Karl F. Robinson represented SAA at the Conference on the American High Schools, in Chicago, in November. He reports a general spirit of ferment, with proposals to tighten the curriculum, relieve the shortage of teachers, make more efficient use of the better teachers, etc.

The official SAA representative to the Twenty-second Educational Conference sponsored by the American Council on Education and the Educational Records Bureau, in New York in November, was Magdalene Kramer. The query was "Changing Values and Attitudes on the Campus—a Look to the Future." Here are parts of her report as filed with Kenneth G. Hance, SAA Executive Vice-President. Edward A. Suchman, Professor of Sociology at Cornell, reported a survey of college students. These conclusions were drawn: 1. Educational values. Students have not developed any new or dominant values for the twentieth century. Most of the students reporting were satisfied with their college life but two very definite lacks were emphasized: (a) the impersonal relation between the students and the teacher and (b) the fact that no attention was given to moral values. 2. Vocational needs. Very few mentioned money as a goal in a vocation. Most mentioned personal happiness. They believe that they select their occupations freely and willingly. 3. Social needs. Status and prestige were mentioned frequently as social needs. Both are obtained largely through extracurricular activities. The better adjusted the student, the more successful he is in extracurricular activities. The better student had a tendency to participate in more extracurricular activities. 4. Political values. Students tend to follow their parents in political beliefs and to stand behind existing political parties. They definitely are not radical but they do have allegiance to the civil liberties. 5. Religious. Students want a working philosophy and a moral standard. However, their view of God and religion is personal rather than dogmatic.

**FREE RIDERS.** In labor union terminology, a "free rider" is a person who willingly participates in all the benefits the union can get for workers, but who, for one reason or another, won't join. But "free riders" abound among all kinds of organizations. ST has a dear friend who needles him incessantly about his membership in the American Association of University Professors. "You are a member of the AAUP," he will say. "What are you doing about salaries?" I mildly xplain that the chapter has issued a twenty-page analysis of the situation, and is working with might and main to get more money for everybody. Why not join up, and come to the next meeting? Whereupon he loses his ardor, explaining that he is an independent sort of fellow and doesn't want to belong to any organization, or, perhaps, that he can't afford to subscribe to anything more until we get his salary raised, and walks away in righteousness.

How many free riders does SAA have? The last audit shows 6,968 members. Of these, 2,159 are libraries. That would leave over 4,000 people who subscribe to all, or two, or one of our journals. We have no figures on the number of people in Speech. Waldo Braden, who made the last audit, pressed on the matter recently, estimated we ought to have at least 15,000 eligible members. That would put the figure at two free riders for every member.

We put the question of free riders to Bertam H. Davis, Staff Associate of the AAUP in Washington. He estimates that between one quarter and one third of the total number eligible belong to AAUP. The total membership is 36,415.

At the annual convention of the American Federation of Teachers, this fall, held in Chicago, Robert M. Lewin of the *Chicago Daily News* interviewed officers and members. In the 41 years of organization, he found, AFT has signed on 51,000 members; this is 4 1/4% of the eligible 1,200,000 in the field. Some of the reasons given for the small membership were: "School boards feel that unions for teachers are not professional;" "Teachers don't realize the benefits of organization—most teachers are prima donnas naturally;" "The reason teachers haven't joined the union is the same reason that exists among 'white collar' workers." No doubt many teachers feel they are sufficiently signed up when they belong to NEA and the state organization, and are not riding free.

In our inquiry to Mr. Davis, we asked whether or not it was true that AAUP has made a classification of members according to profes-

sional fields, including Speech. He replied that such a classification had been made:

The membership figures of which you speak were compiled last summer, and though they would not be completely accurate for 1957, I do not think there would be any appreciable differences. There were 644 members who listed their discipline as speech; 1 as speech arts; 7 as speech correction; 89 as speech and drama; 1 as speech and education; 7 as speech and English; 1 as speech and English composition; 1 as speech and hearing therapy; 1 as speech-journalism; 5 as speech pathology; 5 as speech and radio; 1 as speech-science; 1 as speech therapy. There were 66 members who listed their department as public speaking, and 1 who listed his as public speaking and drama. There were 53 who listed their department as drama; 1 as drama, composition; 1 as drama and literature; 4 as drama and theater; 11 as dramatic arts; 1 as dramatic theory and literature; 2 as dramatic literature; 4 as dramatics; 10 as theatre; and 13 as theater arts.

Since we have no figures as to the potential in each field, it is difficult to make valid comparisons. We have, for example, 4239 members who may be classified as teachers of English, but there are no figures available which would tell us whether our membership includes a larger percentage of eligible English teachers than of teachers of speech and drama.

We were amazed at the number of classifications speech teachers find necessary to describe what they do.

The September *AAUP Bulletin* gives a table of members grouped in 46 major areas of study. English, with its 4239 members, leads the field. Education, 2477, is second. The grouping of the various speech areas into Speech and Drama gives 942, sixteenth place. Political Science, 922, and Home Economics, 892, are 17th and 18th. Lowest in membership is Archaeology, 15 members.

ST can add a personal note to all this. In checking spellings of names and so on, about persons who are reported in news dispatches, we find on many occasions no listing in the *Directory*. Admitted that in time-lag, graduate assistants may not have had opportunity to get in the register, but what about all these people who have devoted themselves to Speech 10-20-30 years, and who, according to the *Directory*, haven't taken the trouble to sign up?

NEA. The National Education Association, with whom SAA is affiliated, had a membership of 704,000 at the end of the year.

**PROFESSIONAL GROWTH.** The October issue of *JSHD* carries a graph titled, "Pattern of Professional Growth." In 1951, total membership of the American Speech and Hearing Association was 1859; in 1957 it was 4495, an increase of 140%. Predictions for membership in 1965 are: maximal, 10500; adjusted, 8000; minimal, 5600.

#### APPOINTMENTS

Northern Illinois University: Dale Jeffries, John H. Hess, assistant professors; Caryl A. Turner, James E. Vincent, Paul K. Goldberg, instructors.

Northwestern University: Emanuel J. Kerikas, instructor in speech education, Ann M. Mulholland, assistant professor of audiology; Don Cameron, assistant in speech education.

Oklahoma State University: Martha M. Sharp, drama.

Pennsylvania State University: John K. Brilhart, instructor.

South Dakota State College: Ned Bobkoff, Charles Welch, graduate assistants.

State University Teachers College, Fredonia, N.Y.: Alan L. McLeod, assistant professor and director of debate.

University of Alabama: John Guy Handley, formerly of Arkansas State College and last year at the University of Georgia, director of the University Theatre for the fall semester as a temporary replacement for Marian Gallaway; John Carta Falsa, instructor in charge of adult therapy, the speech and hearing clinic; Mitchell Carnell, Lydia M. Foreman, Albert J. Harris, Nancy Jo Luther, Hermine Melton, Jean W. Parnell, Lewis Raimist, Shirley Sikora, Bettie L. Warren and Rose Whidden, graduate assistants.

Syracuse University: Elaine Foster, instructor in interpretation; Joan Murray, teaching assistant in interpretation and public speaking.

University of California, Berkeley: Christian Bay, visiting assistant professor for the fall semester; Morton Paglin, Herman Tennesen, acting assistant professors; Louis Bohlen, Herbert Feinstein, George Marchi, Harvey Pitkin, Jesse O. Sawyer, William Shipley, Marvin Stender, lecturers.

University of California, Santa Barbara College: Stanley Glenn, formerly of Humboldt State College, assistant professor; Robert Crumb, technical director.

University of Connecticut: Charles McNamee, formerly of Northern Illinois University, director of forensics; Nate Edmund Katter, formerly of Iowa State Teachers College, theatre.

University of Denver: Joseph F. Smith, visiting professor from the University of Hawaii.

University of Florida: Donald A. Harrington, associate professor of speech pathology, formerly at Alabama Polytechnic Institute, replacing Lester L. Hale who became dean of men; John W. Kirk, instructor in theatre, replacing Clifford Ashby, now studying at Stanford; Gerald P. Mohrman, formerly at the University of South Dakota, instructor.

University of Georgia: Arthur J. Fear, University of California at Los Angeles, business and professional speaking, and forensics; Dan F. Baker, University of Miami, theatre and television.

University of Houston: Don Streeter, formerly at Memphis State, professor and chairman of the department.

University of Illinois: Herbert Hudson, George Remington, Marvin Ulmer, Floyd Vinnedge, Ronald Werner, teaching assistants; Charles Davies, William King, research assistants.

University of Illinois, Chicago Undergraduate Division: Jack Armould, instructor; Joseph Wenzel, assistant.

University of Iowa: Paul Heinberg, formerly of Oklahoma State, assistant professor.

University of Kansas: Gale R. Adkins, formerly of the University of Texas, assistant professor in radio and TV; Gordon E. Beck, theatre; Bee Harvey, general speech; Monte Moore, radio and TV; Tom Rea, extension; Phillip Tomkins, debate.

University of Maryland: Malthon M. Anapol, Thomas J. Aylward, Dale E. Wolgamuth, Donald Dew, William P. Ellis, instructors; Thomas W. Killough, Jr., John E. Mendiola, Scott C. Schurz, Nancy E. Turner, assistant instructors. The following have joined the staff to teach overseas in 1957-1958: Atlantic program, Frank W. C. Johnson, City College of New York; Europe, Horace G. Rahskopf, University of Washington, and Richard Harris, University of Indiana; Far East, James P. Dee.

University of Miami: Jack Clay, assistant professor of drama and associate director of the University of Miami Theatres; Roberta Baker, instructor in drama and associate director of the University of Miami Theatres.

University of Minnesota: Robert Scott,

formerly of the University of Houston, assistant professor of speech and director of forensics.

University of Nebraska: Charles Lown, assistant professor in theatre; Don Russell, assistant professor in radio and TV; Elizabeth Moodie, instructor pre-school speech clinic; John Thurber, instructor speech education.

University of Oregon: Clemen Peck, formerly of Temple and Montana State, assistant professor and technical director of theatre.

University of Southern California, Los Angeles: Jack W. Warfield, former dean of the Pasadena Playhouse, assistant professor of telecommunications.

University of Texas: Frederick J. Hunter, assistant professor of drama; Frank Harland, Robert Sporre, instructors in drama; Bruce Roach, assistant professor; Mrs. Edith Roberts, teaching assistant; Mac R. Moseley, part-time clinician.

University of Washington: Alfred Sugarman, Joseph A. Wigley, R. W. Vogelsang, instructors.

University of Wisconsin: Arthur Dorlag, formerly at Southeast Missouri State College, visiting lecturer 1957-1958; Arnold Aronson, assistant professor in speech correction.

Wayne State University: John B. Ellery, assistant professor; Mrs. Edith Morris Dowling, Albert L. Furbay, Joan Hackett, Margaret L. Knapp, Maude Shapiro and George Ziegelmüller, instructors; J. Daniel Logan and Robert E. Sandlin, advanced graduate fellows; Mitchell Burkowsky, Henry Jisha, Warren S. Jones, Benjamin Mehrling and Bernard Russi, graduate fellows; David Berkman, Marianne Cusak, Presley Holmes, graduate fellows in television production; Roger Jackson, and Mrs. Julia Russi, graduate assistants; Irle White, shop technician in theatre.

Western Michigan University: Beatrice Hartman, formerly of Michigan State; Radford B. Kuykendall, formerly of Michigan State; M. Glen Nilson, Jr., assistant professor in speech and theatre; Marvin DeBoer, formerly of Iowa State College.

**PROMOTIONS.** Ohio State University: William H. Ewing, Richard M. Mall, Donald W. Riley, associate professors.

Stanford University: James J. Murphy, assistant professor; Sterling Huntley, acting assistant professor.

University of Southern California: Forrest L. Seal, associate professor.

**MEMBERSHIPS EMERITI.** The Administrative Council, at the Boston meeting, approved the first list of *members emeriti*. The honored: Hazel Abbott, A. Craig Baird, W. M. Parrish, Frank M. Rarig, J. Walter Reeves, and Roberta D. Sheets. Although the new constitution provides for such membership, it does not specify conditions. The present provisions are 25 years of continuous, or 30 years of discontinuous membership. Council is empowered, in exceptional cases, to waive these requirements. All of those named met the conditions. ST has inquired about the many names which seem to be missing, and is advised that in many cases membership had lapsed from time to time.

Council was so overpowered by a worthy idea that it overdid it; A. T. Weaver was awarded full emeritus honors. At the time Professor Weaver was on the high seas, returning from a summer in Europe, and unable to defend himself from the honor. Curious as to how A. T. would take all this, ST wrote him, and received this reply:

Ever since I relinquished the chairmanship of our department three years ago, I have been trying vainly to convince my professional friends that I am still actively teaching, and hope to be for four more years.

In view of all the circumstances, I have requested and been granted the privilege of continuing to pay my dues as a sustaining member so long as I am teaching.

In the current semester I have about 470 students in my classes and I should be grateful to you if you will notify the world—or that portion of it who subscribe to the *Quarterly Journal*—that reports of my retirement, like the premature announcement of Mark Twain's death, are greatly exaggerated.

The premature honor is understandable. Through the years Professor Weaver has been regarded as one of the founding fathers, as indeed he is. He attended that fateful meeting of the public speaking section, NCTE, which, on a Friday afternoon, November 27, 1914, decided to found a speech association. For some reason he cannot recall, he did not put his signature to the document. At the time he was on the staff of Evanston Academy, and the McCormick Theological Seminary; so he was qualified to be a member of the "academic teachers of public speaking."

#### WITH THE EMERITI

Hazel B. Abbott, Converse College, '56. Upon retirement she went to Yankton College to

write and produce their 75th anniversary pageant, an event in June of last year. She is engaged in a number of projects, including her memoirs, and says she enjoys being able to work "without having to be pushed for time." She is now 68. Asked how she regarded her election to membership emeritus in SAA she replied: "surprised, thrilled, and grateful." Address: Yankton College, Yankton, South Dakota.

Howard T. Hill, Kansas State College, '54. When Professor Hill retired, he resigned as head of the department, but continued teaching full time. In fact he doesn't regard himself as having retired. He writes: "Unfortunately, when the word 'retirement' gets attached to a fellow, the public apparently thinks that he is washed up, dried out, and laid away. That's not the case with me, and I don't propose to have it happen." Address: Kansas State College, Manhattan.

Roberta D. Sheets, Roosevelt High School, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, '57. Before going to Cedar Rapids, she taught at Lombard College, Galesburg, Illinois. Her interest through the years has been "dramatic art." She planned to retire to a university town where there is a good theatre; so she bought an apartment in Iowa City and is now ensconced there. She works occasionally at the local radio station. Asked what recommendation she had for retirees, she replied: "Make it possible for secondary school teachers to teach at least half-time on retirement as university people do." Asked what she thought of being elected an SAA member emeritus, she replied: "I am much pleased with my emeritus status. I joined as a student." Miss Sheets retired at age 65, and has grown no older. Address: 228 South Summit Street, Iowa City.

Francis Wolle, Colorado, '57. Professor Wolle's teaching career, with a slight interruption to serve as a captain in the infantry in World War I, has been spent at Colorado—44 years of active duty. Mr. Wolle served as the first chairman of the Department of English and Speech at Colorado, when work in literature, language, speech, and speech arts was integrated in one department. He is now teaching extension courses in Denver, cataloguing several collections in the library, writing articles, and trying to improve his typing—an ambition ST can testify to as most worthy. He also assists his wife, Muriell Sibell, whose oils, water colors and books on the ghost towns of Colorado are now collectors' items. Address: 736 16th Street, Boulder, Colorado.

The Superintendent of Public Documents has issued a little folder, "Planning Retirement?" Various government documents are suggested. For thirty cents you can get a *Pocket Guide to Alaska*, or *To Italy*. For fifteen cents you can get a pamphlet on *Hearing Aids*. Something for every interest. Write U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

**BACK ON THE ACTIVE LIST.** The Ford Foundation has made a grant of \$205,000 for establishing and administering a national register of retired college and university faculty members available for academic positions. The fund will be administered jointly by the Association of American Colleges and American Association of University Professors.

Louis D. Corson has resigned as Dean of Men at the University of Alabama to accept the position as Director of the Retired Professors Registry. Offices are at 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington 6, D. C.

A bulletin from AAC and AAUP says that a survey of retired professors, made by New York University, revealed that more than half of the group studied are now employed, most at full time. T. A. Distler, of AAC, declares: "Retired college teachers constitute a significant manpower resource badly needed to meet mounting student enrollments. Utilization of this group of highly-trained individuals will be a contribution to the general welfare of the United States in a period of world crisis."

It seems clear now, that if a professor can hold on until he reaches sixty-eight, he faces a rosy future.

Earl W. Wiley, Ohio State emeritus, '57, is visiting professor at the College of Wooster.

**RETIREMENTS.** Mrs. Charles R. Layton of Muskingum College retired in June. Her husband, Dean Layton, will retire next June. Together they have taught 87 years at the college in New Concord, Ohio—Mrs. Layton 43, Mr. Layton 44. In October, the Ohio Conference for Speech Education, meeting in Columbus, had a special program in honor of the distinguished team. Lionel Crocker of Denison read the citations, and presented Mr. Layton with a gavel. Mrs. Layton has taught interpretation and drama. Her husband has specialized in debate, public speaking, and deaning.

Professor Robert E. Williams, DePauw University, member of the Department of Speech for 36 years, retired in June. He will continue to teach interpretation, his favorite subject, half time.

**ON LEAVE.** Waldo W. Braden, LSU, laid down his burdens as executive secretary of the association, and went to Europe the first semester.

William C. Craig, Chairman of the Department of Speech of The College of Wooster, was on leave during the first semester to serve as visiting lecturer in religious drama at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. J. Garber Drushal served as acting chairman of the department.

Victor P. Garwood, USC, is on a year's sabbatical doing research on auditory thresholds of laboratory animals. He is a post-doctoral research fellow in the Institute of Neurological Disease and Blindness, assigned to the Deafness Research Laboratory, Children's Hospital Society of Los Angeles.

John W. Meaney, Director of the Radio-TV Film Center, University of Houston, is on leave on a Fulbright Scholarship. He is filming educational material in Western Europe.

Raymond S. Ross, Ohio State, was on leave the autumn quarter to participate as civilian instructor in the Air Force ROTC program on campus.

There has been quite an exodus at Stanford University. Wendell Cole was on sabbatical leave during the summer and autumn quarters. He and Mrs. Cole, on leave from the library staff of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, traveled in Europe. F. Cowles Strickland is on a Fulbright grant to lecture at the University of Helsinki. With Mrs. Strickland and their two children, he left for Finland in September, and plans to spend the year there. Helene Blattner is on leave to visit speech departments east of California. Donald Soule and David O'Brien are in England studying under Fulbrights. Richard Hay has returned from a year in England, on a Fulbright.

Alan Nichols, USC, is on sick leave this year. James McBath is serving in Professor Nichols' place as director of forensics.

Paul R. Beall, who went on leave from Penn State in 1950 for nine months and hasn't been back since, is serving as scientific advisor to General Henry Everett, commander in chief of Air Forces in Europe. Professor Beall has served as consultant to various government departments and manufacturers of aircraft and electronics products in the interim, and has been around the world several times on his duties. Despite his wanderings, he has managed to keep up his membership in SAA through the years.

## THEATRE SCHEDULES

Adelphi College: *Mr. Pickwick*, a student reading, *The Tinker's Wedding*, a faculty reading, *Summer and Smoke*, one-act plays, student directed, *Plough and the Stars*, *Thieves' Carnival*.

Adrian College: Plans for eight productions are under way. This includes three original productions, one of which will be an all-college musical. A children's drama will go on tour.

Agnes Scott College: *The World We Live In* was the fall production.

Brooklyn College: *House of Bernarda Alba*, *Billy Budd*, *Second Threshold*, *The Enchanted*, *Epicoene*: *The Silent Woman*, *Night Must Fall*, an original all-college musical, *My Three Angels*.

Chicago Teachers College: *The Torchbearers* was the fall production.

Cornell University: *The Tavern*, *Amahl and the Night Visitors* in conjunction with the Department of Music, *Othello*, *Shadow and Substance*, *The Haunted House*. In addition, a search was made for a hitherto-unperformed script that will serve the needs and intentions of the Festival of Contemporary Arts, held in April of each year.

Evansville College: *Ring Round the Moon*, *Eager Heart*, *Arms and the Man*.

Fresno State College: The major productions were selected from the following: *The Circle*, *The Cradle Song*, *A Tiger at the Gates*, *On Borrowed Time*, *A View from the Bridge*, *On the Side of the Angels*, *The Taming of the Shrew*, *The Rivals*.

Furman University: *King Lear*, *Clarence*, *The Patriots*. In September, a pageant, *Pioneers in Progress*, which is a chorus for women, was presented for the American Association of University Women's Golden Jubilee. The pageant was given a premiere TV performance in October.

Geneva College: *The Lady's Not for Burning* was the first play of the year.

Idaho State College: *The Duchess of Malfi* in the new flexible theatre; *Finian's Rainbow*, *The Silver Tassie*, *Bus Stop*, *Dear Brutus*. A sixth production has yet to be selected.

Illinois State Normal University: The homecoming play was *The Ponder Heart*.

Indiana State Teachers College: The Sycamore Players will present *As You Like It*, *The Lady's Not for Burning*, *See How They Run*; The Children's Theatre will present *Dick Whittington*, *Ali Baba*, *The Mystery of the Ming Tree*.

Kent State University: *Teahouse of the August Moon*, *Taming of the Shrew*, *Liliom*, *The Bluebird* (a children's theatre production), *Hedda Gabler*, *Picnic*. The theatre, in cooperation with the Division of Mental Hygiene of Ohio, presented a series of "Family Plays" throughout the season.

Lafayette College: *The Second Man*, *Golden Boy*, a new musical adaptation of *Lady Windermere's Fan*, *Dial M for Murder*.

Manchester College: *Right You Are, The Crucible*, *Henry IV*, Part 1.

Michigan State University: *Time Limit*, *Hobson's Choice*, *Lysistrata*, *Death of a Salesman*. Children's Theatre Touring Co.: *Robin Hood*, *Sleeping Beauty*.

Milwaukee-Downer College: *Years Ago*, *Tower Beyond Tragedy*.

Northwestern University: *Waiting for Godot*, *Peer Gynt*, *A New Way to Pay Old Debts*, *The Madwoman of Chaillot*, *The Servant of Two Masters*, *The House of Bernarda Alba*.

Oberlin College: *Tiger at the Gates*, *A View from the Bridge*, *The Cherry Orchard*, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Pirates of Penzance*, and a student-written musical comedy.

Oklahoma State University: *The Great Campaign*, *The Rivalry* by Norman Corwin, presented in a pre-Broadway performance; *Arms and the Man*.

Pomona College: *The Great God Brown*, *Major Barbara*, and a musical. Lab Theatre will present, in the round, *The Glass Menagerie* and *Naked*.

Purdue University: *Teahouse of the August Moon*, *Medea*, *Green Grow the Lilacs*, *Caesar and Cleopatra*. Eight experimental plays will also be presented. The Playshop will occupy its new quarters in May, 1958.

Queens College: *The Time of Your Life*, *Misalliance*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *The Stronger*.

Saint Mary-of-the-Woods College: *Tidings Brought to Mary*, *Prom-Time* on TV.

San Jose State College: *Man and Superman*, *Angel Street*, *The World is Round* by Armond Salocrow (translated and directed by James Clavery), *My Heart is in the Highlands*, *The Crucible*, *An Italian Straw Hat*. Children's Theatre: *Chop Chin and the Golden Dragon*, the winning script in a student contest for children's theatre plays.

South Dakota State College: *The Tender Trap*, *The Crucible*, *Rabbit Rarities of 1958*, the annual student variety show, *Oedipus Rex*, *Oklahoma*, an evening of one-acts. A program of one-act plays will be taken on tour to high schools in the upper Midwest.

Stetson University: *The Caine Mutiny Court Martial, The Playboy of the Western World*. 1957-58 marks the 50th year of dramatic activity at Stetson.

Texas Christian University: *The Desperate Hours, The Fischbeck Tapestry, The House of Bernarda Alba, Teahouse of the August Moon*.

Tulane University: *Dangerous Corner, Ghosts, The Cradle Song, Twelfth Night*.

University of Alabama: *Bus Stop* was the opening production.

University of Arkansas: *Green Grow the Lilacs, Hotel Universe, School for Scandal, The Chalk Garden, The Consul, Noah*.

University of California, Santa Barbara College: *The Country Girl, An Italian Straw Hat*.

University of Florida: *Street Scene, Venus Observed, Caucasian Chalk Circle, Misalliance*.

University of Georgia: The Centennial Season will include *A Streetcar Named Desire, Candida, Othello, The Circle, The Winners*—the winning plays in the annual short play competition.

University of Illinois: *The Lark, Juno and the Paycock, The Tragedy of Richard the Third, The Birds, The Skin of Our Teeth*. The University Theatre at the University of Illinois in association with the 1959 Festival of Contemporary Arts, announces its Fifth New Play Competition. The winning play will be produced by the University Theatre in March, 1959, as its major contribution to the biennial Festival of Contemporary Arts, which brings to the campus prominent artists and representative art works in painting, music, dance, film, and literature. The author of the winning script will be brought to the campus that he may assist in the production.

University of Iowa: *Waiting for Godot, The Menaechimi, Epitaph for a Bluebird*, an original, *Blood Wedding, The Sea Gull, The Alchemist*.

University of Kansas: *Henry IV, Part 1, Tailor of Gloucester, Seven Year Itch, Judith, The Saint of Bleeker Street, Robin Hood, Man and Superman, and Don Juan in Hell*.

University of Maryland: *Hamlet, Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, The Caine Mutiny Court Martial, Gigi, The Rainmaker, The Tender Trap, Tea and Sympathy, Teahouse of the August Moon, The House of Bernarda Alba*.

University of Miami: *The Skin of Our Teeth, The Trysting Tree, School for Wives*, bill of original one-acts, *The Hairy Ape*, an original full-length play, *The Birds, Murder in the Cathedral, The Sea Gull*.

University of Michigan: *Arsenic and Old*

*Lace, Desire Under the Elms, The Masked Ball, Playboy of the Western World, Love's Labor's Lost*.

University of Nebraska: *What Every Woman Knows, Teahouse of the August Moon, The Old Maid and the Thief, Ondine, The Lark*.

University of Oregon: The opening presentation, *Teahouse of the August Moon*.

University of Texas: *Man and Superman, The Crucible, Paint Your Wagon, Our Town, Winnie-the-Pooh*. The annual Shakespearean production will be directed by B. Iden Payne.

University of Wisconsin: *All's Well that Ends Well, Kismet*, an original play, *Heartbreak House, Sir John in Love*, an opera, *Teahouse of the August Moon*.

Valparaiso University: *Light Up the Sky, Anastasia*, an evening of student directed one-acts, *Dido and Aeneas* presented with the department of music, *The Wingless Victory, South Pacific*.

Washington University: *La Boheme*, original one-acts, *He Who Gets Slapped, Othello, Susanna, The Insect Comedy*.

Western Michigan University: *Carousel* was the opening production.

THAT TAX. No doubt the tax experts see some rhyme and reason in the rules for deductions on income tax. One may deduct for a loss by tidal wave, or by a stream which has changed its course. But why can't one deduct for the loss of a finger ring while duck hunting, or for the death of a saddle horse when it ate a silk hat? Or, to be more realistic, for damage by termites? The intricacies be what they may, why teachers can't deduct for many legitimate items has become something of an issue. There is the matter of expenses for further education. The official rule—stated in Treasury Publication No. 17—is that when a teacher attends evening or summer school "in order to renew or retain her teaching certificate and to continue in her teaching position, the costs of such attendance . . . are deductible." But "if . . . you attend school to qualify for a position, to obtain permanent status, or in order to receive a promotion the expense of such attendance is not deductible." In other words, if you are ordered to attend by your employer you may deduct. But if you are interested in learning something, or in being a better teacher, the Treasury regards you as going beyond the limits of deductibility. A friend had this experience. He tried to deduct expenses of convention travel, and it was disallowed. He talked to the local tax office, and got this response.

"Tell me," said the man behind the wicket, "did your employer order you to attend the convention?" "No," said the supplicant, but . . . ." "Now don't tell me," said the official. "I know what you will say. If you don't write papers, if you don't go to conventions, you won't have much of a salary. But tell me this. If your employer orders you to go to a meeting he pays your expenses, doesn't he?" The friend managed a feeble "yes, but . . .," but that was the end. He was pretty indignant about it, and appealed, but when he got a notice to appear in Chicago with an attorney he decided to drop the matter and pay the tax.

"Tax Relief for Teachers High on New NEA Legislative Program Agenda," reads an NEA bulletin (n.s., no. 2). If this part of the program is successful, "teachers will have the privilege, along with doctors and lawyers, of deducting professional expenses." In the last Congress, 17 bills were introduced more or less identical with HR 4662, to provide relief for teachers. Although nothing much came of them, the pleading on occasion was of high order. As an instance, may we cite Senator Holland of Florida (*Congressional Record*, March 27, '57, pp. 4003-04):

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to say to the Senator that I very strongly favor the action he is suggesting. I think it is just. I believe the expenses incurred by a teacher in order to enable him or her to remain in the line of promotion, or, sometimes, even to continue in employment, are certainly proper business expenses, and should be allowed as such.

The Senator may have seen the report concerning a letter which I received the other day from a couple of teachers in Miami, which I think points up better than anything else I have seen the absurdity of the present law. They were complaining that they were not allowed to charge off as necessary business expenses the cost of attending summer school, which was required of them if they were to remain in the particular public school where they were teaching. They contrasted that situation with the fact that their next door neighbor, who, they said, was a striptease artist, had a right under the law to charge off as necessary business expenses the cost of her false eyelashes, her G-string, and any other appurtenances or equipment, if any, that she had to have in order to carry on her calling. It seems to me that there could be no better illustration of the ridiculous

conditions and limitations in the present law than that letter brought out.

**RADIO AND TELEVISION.** The University of Wisconsin has been active in various TV projects. This fall, John Irwin gave an introductory course in speech correction on live television, and in the spring semester he will make twelve films for the teaching of speech correction, eight for classroom use and four for general television. He is also doing twenty films on the teaching of lip reading for television, on an Office of Rehabilitation Grant. Ronald Mitchell's *Design for November* and *The Latchkey* have been produced on the Lux Video Theatre. *Two Tests on Tuesday*, a new television play by Jerry McNeely, was presented on CBS's "Climax" November 14. McNeely's *The Starting Match*, which appeared on "Studio One" in June, has recently been published by Dramatists Play Service.

A new University of Illinois organization, The Illini Readers, is undertaking various projects in oral interpretation including weekly half-hour radio and television programs over WILL. Martin Cobin is directing the work which, during the last academic year, attracted over eighty students.

Bethany College Department of Speech and Drama is producing a thirteen week educational television series in cooperation with the local station, WTRF-TV.

The first regular series of TV programs sponsored by Kent State University was initiated in October over WAKR-TV, Akron. The programs feature a series of weekly non-credit lectures on problems of marriage and the family.

The two Chicago campuses of the University of Illinois have been active in radio and television. Eugene Vest, Chairman of the Humanities Division, Chicago Undergraduate Division, gave five television talks over WTTW under the general title "Writers Are Stranger Than Fiction." Several faculty members participated in the WMAQ radio series "Viewpoint" and in the WBBM-TV series "Orbit." Programs "Orbit" were produced by the College of Medicine and dealt with cancer, tuberculosis, rheumatic heart, and preventive medicine. The Chicago Professional Colleges of the University are now producing the pilot film on a projected series of TV film programs on the brain. Production is in co-operation with WTTW, the Chicago educational television station. A grant from the Educational Television and Radio Center is making the pilot film possible. Pro-

ducer for the program is Al Partridge, and the lecturer is Dr. Eric Oldberg, Head of the Department of Neurology and Neurological Surgery.

Ten colleges and universities in the Chicago area have formed a committee tentatively called the Educational Broadcasting Council of Chicago. The purpose is to co-ordinate more effectively the educational radio and television activities of the members. Al Partridge is serving as chairman of the Steering Committee.

Nebraska State College, at Kearney, now has its own radio station, KOVF, 605 KC. Prior to installing its own station, programs were carried for 20 years through two local commercial stations.

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**STATION PERSONALITY.** Do radio stations have personalities? When Mark Munn was continuity director at KWSC, State College of Washington, Pullman, he made a study designed to answer the question. He has very kindly permitted us to make the first detailed report of the results. Since making the study, Mr. Munn has moved to Chicago, where he is research director for WGN-AM-TV.

**INDIVIDUAL RADIO STATIONS DRAW  
DISTINCT AND UNIQUE AUDIENCES**

Does a radio station attract an audience uniquely its own, different from the audiences of other stations broadcasting to the same population?

The specialized programming of many radio stations today indicates many stations believe the answer to be "yes." But up to this point there apparently has been no extensive, detailed study investigating the problem.

This study, conducted in the spring of 1955, analyzed in detail the audiences of five radio stations. The study used a sample of 807 representative of the population of an eastern Washington county included in the service areas of all five stations.

It was found that each station attracted an audience that was uniquely its own.

Two network affiliates, X and Y, attracted audiences that included substantial amounts of all population segments in the sample. Both stations appealed strongly to women. But whereas X appealed more equally to all age, education, and residence groups, Y tended to emphasize appeal to older listeners with a limited education living in rural areas.

Two music-and-news stations also attracted distinct audiences. Both appealed equally to men and women, but one emphasized younger,

rural listeners with a limited education. The other drew middle-age groups with a high school or college background living in its home city.

The fifth station, operated non-commercially by an educational institution, appealed equally to both sexes, and emphasized older people with a college background living in its home city.

The differences among the audiences suggest that each station created a personality or image in the minds of its potential and actual listeners. Listeners in turn selected the station on the basis of this image. The image would be formed by the station's actual programming, in addition to such elements as promotion, advertising, and published and word-of-mouth comment.

MARK MUNN  
WGN, Chicago

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**TEACHING BY TAPE.** On our last call for news, Warren S. Walker of Blackburn College, Carlinville, Illinois, wrote that he had nothing much to report, but he would be glad to write a story about their new "Language Laboratory." ST asked him to do it, and here it is. Mr. Walker, in addition to being the Department of Speech, also is Chairman, Division of Humanities. There seems to be much enterprise these days in setting up booths with tape and earphones.

**LANGUAGE LABORATORY AT BLACKBURN COLLEGE**  
In the expanding list of institutions which have installed language laboratories, the small private colleges are accounting for a smaller and smaller percentage of the total. The reason for this is all too evident: the prohibitive cost of most audio installations. Major universities talk in terms of thirty to fifty thousand dollars —sums which the average small college is not willing to invest in a venture that is still in the experimental stage. The recently opened laboratory at Blackburn College, built at a total cost (furniture included) of just under \$2,000, may well provide the formula sought by institutions with limited budgets.

The general purpose of the laboratory at Blackburn is similar to that of laboratories elsewhere: to provide students in certain courses with adequate facilities for listening and recording. An obvious function of any audio room is to give students the opportunity to listen several hours a week, during their spare time, to recorded speech material, lectures, and musical performances, under supervision. But

what is more important, especially in view of the growing shortage of teachers, is the role of the language laboratory in increasing the instructional time that a college can offer to its students without adding to its teaching staff.

Tapes and records for foreign languages can be played for students in soundproof booths where they can repeat pronunciation drills, for example, or answer questions aloud without disturbing others. Lengthy conversations between instructor and student can be carried on without requiring the presence of the former; even oral examinations can be given with the instructor *in absentia*. In advance of a given assignment, an instructor can cut a tape which asks questions or directs students to make desired responses. After each question or comment, a pause of sufficient length is left for the student's response. When the student reports for his laboratory assignment, this taped material is piped to him through earphones; during the pauses, the student gives the appropriate responses into a microphone installed in the booth; and all the while this exchange is going on, the completed conversation, both question and answer, is being picked up and recorded on a second machine. This second tape can be played back to the student any number of times—perhaps to allow him to compare his French pronunciation with that of his instructor; it can also be used by the instructor, or assistant, to evaluate the progress of the student or to point out to him his strengths and weaknesses in the subject. Usually several students, each in his own booth, participate in this type of two-way conversation, first one and then another responding in a pre-arranged order. When the exercise is completed, the master tape is stored for a future class; the second tape, of only temporary value, is eventually erased.

In the Blackburn College laboratory—and herein lies the chief reason for its low cost—all electronic signals are handled through a central control panel equipped with three high-fidelity tape recorders and a high-fidelity record player. At his booth, the student has only phones, microphone, and whatever written study aids may accompany the assignment; it is unnecessary, for most purposes, to provide *each* student with a recording machine, as the standard laboratories so often do. If it is simple listening that is involved, four different programs can be run simultaneously, the student selecting from among, let us say, Speech, French, German, and poetry readings simply by plug-

ging his headset into the appropriate channel. If there is present a group that needs question-and-answer facilities, which requires two machines, this will, of course, reduce the number of programs possible to three. (A laboratory might have any number of channels, however, depending upon the needs of its college community; at Blackburn four seemed to be practical.)

The language laboratory at Blackburn will accommodate seventeen students at one time, eleven in soundproof booths, and six at listening posts along a table. It is open, at present, three hours per evening, six days a week, offering over that period of time a potential of 366 student-hours of listening. As the demand increases, more hours will be added. The mechanics both of the cutting of tapes and of the playing of all programs are handled by student personnel, reliable upper-classmen who have received several hours of training. Instructors are already reporting marked advances in the mastery of speech techniques and language skills.

Colleagues interested in obtaining more technical details about the lay-out and operation of this laboratory are invited to visit Blackburn College or to correspond with the writer of this report.

WARREN S. WALKER  
Blackburn College

**RESEARCH.** The American Academy of Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology, through its Subcommittee On Hearing In Children, has begun a program to conserve the hearing of children. Headquarters for the research are at the Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh. An initial study is being made to identify early medical signs and symptoms which may indicate danger of hearing impairment, to measure psychological, social and other effects of impairment, and to develop economical methods for testing the hearing of children. The project is supported by the University of Pittsburgh, the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, and the Allegheny County Department of Health.

The State System of Higher Education in Oregon has begun a two-year experiment in inter-institutional teaching by television. Courses in chemistry, education, and history are televised simultaneously to students in classrooms on four campuses in the state: Oregon College of Education at Monmouth, Oregon State College at Corvallis, University of Oregon at Eugene, and Willamette University at

Salem. The experimentation is made possible by a \$200,000 grant from the Fund for Advancement of Education.

Purdue University's Speech and Hearing Clinic has been awarded a special research contract by the U. S. Office of Education to evaluate and develop therapy techniques modeled after Dr. O. H. Mowrer's autistic theory of language development. This research is being conducted by M. D. Steer and T. D. Hanley at the Fort Wayne State School for the Mentally Retarded.

The Speech and Hearing Science Division of the University of Maryland has been given a grant of \$15,000 by the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare for the study of a new type of recording device in speech rehabilitation. This study will be conducted by Rheda Becker, under the supervision of Richard Hendricks.

John V. Irwin and Herman Brockhaus of the University of Wisconsin, have just completed a research "Teletalk" project with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Wisconsin Telephone Company.

**COME AND GET IT.** Stanford University announces a grant from the National Office of Vocational Rehabilitation which will provide traineeships for graduate students in pathology and audiology. Application should be made to Professor Virgil Anderson.

The University of Maryland announces the 1959 Victor Frenkil TV Script Award for original, dramatic scripts, one hour in length. Award: \$500.00. Send entries by March 15 to George F. Batka, Radio-Television Division.

The University of Miami, Coral Gables, announces 12 tuition scholarships in Radio-TV-Film. The Briggs Family Foundation has made the grant. Address Sydney W. Head.

**TR CENTENNIAL.** The Theodore Roosevelt centennial year opened October 27, 1957 and will end on the same date, 1958, a hundred years after TR's birth date. The Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission, under grant of \$150,000 by Congress, is planning the ceremonials. Other funds will be gathered by The Theodore Roosevelt Association. Richard M. Nixon is chairman of the commission, and Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney is Vice-Chairman. Hermann Hagedorn, author of many books on Roosevelt, is director and secretary of the commission. Schools, lodges, churches, and patriotic societies are being invited to plan programs in

commemoration. For details, write to the director, Theodore Roosevelt House, 28 East 20th Street, New York 3.

**MARSHALL-WYTHE.** The Marshall-Wythe debate tournament at William and Mary was held February 7-8, at Williamsburg. This year, in celebration of the 350th anniversary of the founding of Jamestown, a number of historical matters were on the calendar. Jamestown, by the way, is only six miles from campus. A featured event was the re-creation of the debate in the Virginia House of Burgesses, May 30, 1765, on the Stamp Act, in which Patrick Henry made his Caesar-Brutus inference. The debate was presented in 18th century costume, by candlelight, in the hall where the proceedings actually transpired. Titled "A Moment of Decision," the stamp act debate was produced by Colonial Williamsburg and the Debate Council. Donald L. McConkey, director of forensics, directs the re-creation and plays in it. The tournament has its contemporary aspects, however. Critiques of debates were dispensed with in order to tally results quickly. This was done on I.B.M. machines. "Each school will be provided with a results sheet showing individual speaker's scores, team scores, win and loss record, and school totals for each institution participating in the meet," reads the program. No novices are invited; "we will emphasize the competitive nature of the tournament."

Much impressed by the handsome announcement sheets, but puzzled by the name "Marshall-Wythe," ST wrote to Professor McConkey to inquire. In reply came a cordial invitation to attend, and a reasonable explanation:

"The tournament is named for Chief Justice John Marshall and Chancellor George Wythe. Marshall was an alumnus. He, and his cousin Thomas Jefferson, were Wythe's most distinguished students in law. Wythe was a Virginia signer of the Declaration of Independence and the first professor of law in the colonies. By stretching a point we can say that Wythe was one of the first debate coaches in the country. College records say that he taught "law and forensic debating to the young gentlemen of the college," in his home. He was preceded by William Small, who taught Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy."

**THE READING PLATFORM.** William Hawes' 1957 Avery Hopwood Award play, *Reach for a Dream*, had a premiere readers theatre performance on the University of Michigan campus in Oc-

tober. Hawes is a graduate student in theatre and radio at the University. The production was directed by William P. Halstead.

The eighth season of the Readers Theatre at Adelphi College opened with an adaptation by Josephine Nichols of *Mr. Pickwick* and a faculty reading of *The Tinker's Wedding* by John M. Synge.

The Readers Workshop of the University of Washington began its ninth year with a presentation of *Segregation* by Robert Penn Warren.

Northwestern University has three reading productions this season: Conrad Aiken's *Mr. Ascularis*, Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*, and Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. Charlotte Lee, Wallace Bacon, and John Edwards direct.

The Department of Speech, University of Maine, in co-operation with the Maine Speech Association, held an oral interpretation clinic at Orono in January. James Barushok was in charge.

Stanford has presented a series of reading hours this year. Most of them were given in the Wednesday Matinee series, a weekly program designed to acquaint the public and students with various aspects of speech programs, including theatre production.

**NEW QUARTERS.** In July, the San Fernando Valley campus of Los Angeles State College will become a separate college—San Fernando Valley State College, Northridge. A new speech and drama building is under construction.

Texas College of Arts and Industries has begun construction of several fine arts buildings; one will be for speech and drama.

The new Humanities Building at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, will have quarters for the department of speech.

At the University of Houston, the new KVAT Production Building is completed.

The University of Michigan Department of Speech has moved into the remodeled former Ann Arbor High School. The building has been renamed the Frieze Building. The department of speech uses the first and second floors.

The Speech Department of South Dakota State College has moved from quarters in Old North to space in the Administration Building. Facilities in the new location include seven offices off the main auditorium stage (where all theatre and speech programs are held), a scene shop and storage space below the stage, and reading acceleration booths in an adjoining room.

New facilities at Pomona College include a fully-equipped scene dock and construction building, which was to be ready for use by Christmas, and recently completed sound-recording studio facilities.

KUON-TV, University of Nebraska, has moved into its new headquarters in the Temple Building.

**PRESIDENTIAL YEAR.** Loren Reid, retiring president of SAA, has completed an active year appearing before various speech conferences and university groups as a part of his presidential duties. Beginning in the Hawaiian Islands, where he was Carnegie Visiting Professor of Speech at the University of Hawaii, he spoke to various faculty and student groups, including two appearances before the Pacific Speech Conference at Hilo, Hawaii. He spent the summer session as visiting professor at the University of Michigan, and gave a lecture at Michigan's annual Speech Conference. He also spoke informally to students and staff at Michigan State University. He gave three addresses at the annual meeting of the Speech Association of Missouri. He appeared twice on the program of the twenty-fifth Debaters' Conference sponsored by Purdue University. This January he gave two formal addresses and made various classroom and radio talks on the campus of Ohio University at Athens. Two of his lectures, one at the University of Hawaii and one at the University of Michigan, have been published in bulletin or proceedings form by those two institutions. All in all, he reports, being president was rather pleasant.

Benjamin D. Scott, professor emeritus of speech at Pomona College, died October 12-13, in his sleep at Demorest, Georgia. He was seventy-one. Professor Scott received a B.A. degree from USC in 1911, a degree in sacred theology and a doctor's degree in 1919 from Boston University. He served as pastor of the Federated Church of Somerset, Massachusetts, and taught at Simpson College and Nebraska Wesleyan. He joined the Pomona faculty in 1923. Upon retiring in 1953, he went to Piedmont College, in Demorest, to take charge of the work in speech and religion.

**PERSONALS.** Norman W. Mattis of the University of North Carolina, in addition to being Professor of English, is senior lecturer at the Morehead Planetarium. One of his lectures, "Space

"Flight and Satellites," is much in demand since Sputnik.

Emmett T. Long, formerly of George Pepperdine College, is now registrar at California State Polytechnic College, Pomona.

Lee E. Travis, who resigned from USC, is now vice president in charge of personnel for the Gibraltar Savings and Loan Company in Los Angeles.

William V. Haney of Northwestern is serving as consultant to the Bureau of the Census. He is working in the program to train 15,000 leaders and 150,000 volunteer workers who will take the census in 1960.

J. Jeffery Auer will leave the University of Virginia in June to become head of the department at Indiana University.

Robert T. Oliver of Penn State addressed the University of Michigan Speech Assembly this fall on "Speech in International Affairs." He had to scurry to make it after a summer representing the State Department on a mission in Australia. On request of the Australian Ministry of Education, Professor Oliver was consulted on development of speech education in elementary and secondary schools, and in technical colleges and universities. He traveled 30,000 miles and gave 200 lectures in 90 days.

**DOING IT UP BROWN.** This summer we received a four page printed folder entitled, "Program of the Final Examination for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Frances Lea McCurdy." It was issued by the Graduate School of the University of Missouri and the Department of Speech and Dramatic Art. Listed were the committee in charge, dates of examinations, a précis of the dissertation, a biography of the candidate, and courses taken, with instructors. Several months later, along came another program, this time for Jay William Sanders. Since we had never seen anything quite like this, we wrote to Bower Aly, chairman of one committee and member of the other, to inquire if this was something special. He replied: "The 'handsome programs' for the final examinations are normal procedure here. I think it should be done by every department of Speech offering the doctorate."

In regard to his move to Oregon this fall, Bower Aly wrote: "As you know, I was never one to move in haste. Hence I decided with what the Supreme Court calls 'deliberate speed' to follow Horace Greeley's advice before it was too late. I am going West to grow up with the

country. Technically I shall be on leave of absence at Missouri from September 1, 1957 to October 31, 1958. I plan to return to Missouri next summer in order to permit a number of candidates for the doctorate to complete their work under my direction. But my resignation has been submitted and accepted effective August 31, 1958, and I am going to Oregon—I hope for keeps."

**LET THOSE WHO CAN, DO.** In the last issue, our reporter covering the MLA convention, wrote: "the quality of oral presentation was no more satisfying than one encounters from the professionals in rhetoric and drama." The state of elocution at speech conventions has long been something to marvel at. Whether our members, in abject humility, refuse to practice before their colleagues the art they presumably are teaching their students, with some example, or whether the art has sunk so low it no longer is practiced by speech teachers at all, are matters frequently discussed in the lobbies. A. Pope's advice, "Let such teach others who themselves excel," is much recalled and parodied and misquoted in postprandial sessions of our speech conventions. ST has always regarded this as an American phenomenon, and was much surprised and cheered in reading *Speech and Drama* (VII, 42), published in London by The Society of Teachers of Speech and Drama, to see the English have the same complaint. An editorial by Harold Ripper says:

Comment was aroused at the Annual General Meeting by the fact that some speakers from the floor were not easily audible to those at some distance. It is true that acoustics were not of the best, but it is not unworthy of note that members of our profession were not able to overcome such conditions.

It is becoming almost a regular experience at our meetings, but particularly at the Annual General Meeting, to hear comment, either public or private, deplored the quality of speech displayed by many members. Long ago it used to be said by some that you could not teach speech and retain your own skill in the use of it. Others felt that such a notion was dangerous and strongly to be repudiated. Can it be that to teach speech involves, for some at any rate, a deterioration of their own? Or can it be that some make a strenuous effort to discipline their speech for the limited purpose of qualifying, and then relax their care: so their speech sinks

to the level out of which it was so painfully lifted for that special purpose? Or is it, as one famous teacher of speech once said, that one catches all the faults of the speech of those one teaches? One wonders how often some of us listen critically to our own casual speech on a recording.

**PERVERSIVE SPEECH.** We remark, now and then, on how some event in speech is used as a test in selecting a future farmer of America, a superior junior citizen, or a beauty queen, such as Miss America. Evidently the same thing goes on in the old country. In the same issue of *Speech and Drama* referred to above, appears this editorial:

**SPEECH AN ELEMENT OF PERSONAL BEAUTY**

A provincial paper, announcing the Milk Publicity Council's Dairy Queen Competition, says, "Points for which the judges will give marks are healthy appearance, natural attractiveness, personality, and *speech*." The italics are ours. The qualities of speech that will meet with highest approval are not specified, but would it be fantastic to suppose that the kind of speech envisaged might be such as could, by some standard or other, be regarded as beautiful? If so, is this the beginning of a demand for aural as well as visual pleasure before we acknowledge a woman as beautiful? It is refreshing to find that what are known as "vital statistics" are not required by our national vendors of milk, but speech! Wisdom has her home in unexpected places!

**GUARD YOUR FILES.** We have received from Santo Vanasia, in Milan, a very interesting catalogue of reviews and periodicals for sale. The introduction reads, in part:

Our Antiquarian Organization brings to the attention of all Learned Men this catalogue in order to submit complete series of periodicals which may be wanted in their Library.

We beg to invite all Librarians to consider us to their complete disposal for any information or quotation that they may desire to know about any periodical. We are really willing to cooperate with them for procuring the appreciated material to enrich their Library.

We can also facilitate payments to whom wishes to complete his Library in speed way.

Specimen item: *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXIX-XXXIX (1943-1953), \$110.00. Address: 71, Via Mauro Macchi.

**KEEP IT CLEAN.** List No. 76 of Alick Fletcher, 202, High Street, Guildford, Surrey, is in, and on page 2 there are two items, side by side, which are enough to discourage anybody from ever again putting pen to paper. Here are the items:

26. Blank Paper. Large folio vellum bound volume containing about 180 fine white blank sheets of J. Whatman paper measuring 18½ by 11½ ins., and made (judging from certain ms evidence) about 1770. 10 £ (\$28.00).

30. Cicero. The Principle Orations of Cicero, translated by Capt. John Rutherford. 4to. 1781. Interesting binding of tree calf with gilt ribbon ties. Inlaid red morocco circle in centres with border of leaves, and surrounding a pair of crossed fasces. Morocco backed spine with panels decorated with crossed fasces, laurel wreaths and the winged pole with two entwined serpents. 50/=\$7.00).